Pearl
Harbour
Pearl
Harbour was originally an extensive, shallow embayment
called Wai Momi (meaning "water of pearl") or Pu‘uloa by the
Hawaiians. Pu‘uloa was regarded as the home of the shark
goddess Ka‘ahupahau and her brother, Kahi‘uka. The harbour
was teeming with pearl-producing oysters until the late
1800's.
In the years following the arrival of Captain James Cook,
Pearl Harbour was not considered a suitable port due to
shallow water. The United States of America and the Hawaiian
Kingdom signed the Reciprocity Treaty of 1875 as
Supplemented by Convention on December 6, 1884 and ratified
in 1887. On January 20, 1887, the United States Senate
allowed the Navy to lease Pearl Harbour as a naval base (the
US took possession on November 9 that year). As a result,
Hawaii obtained exclusive rights to allow Hawaiian sugar to
enter the United States duty free. The Spanish-American War
of 1898 and the desire for the United States to have a
permanent presence in the Pacific both contributed to the
decision to annex Hawai‘i.
After annexation, Pearl Harbour was refitted to allow for
more navy ships. In 1908 the Pearl Harbour Naval Shipyard
was established. In 1917, Ford Island in the middle of Pearl
Harbour was purchased for joint Army and Navy use in the
development of military aviation in the Pacific.
As Japanese influence increased in the Pacific, the US
increased the US Navy's presence as well. With tensions
rising between the United States and Japan in 1940, the US
began training operations at the base. The attack on Pearl
Harbour by Japan on December 7, 1941 brought the United
States into World War II.
On the morning of December 7,
1941, planes and midget submarines of the Imperial Japanese
Navy began a surprise attack on the US under the command of
Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. This attack brought the United
States into World War II. At 6:00 a.m. on December 7th the
six Japanese carriers launched a first wave of 181 planes
composed of torpedo bombers, dive-bombers, horizontal
bombers and fighters. The Japanese hit American ships and
military installations at 7:53 a.m.. They attacked military
airfields at the same time they hit the fleet anchored in
Pearl Harbour. Overall, twenty-one ships of the U.S. Pacific
fleet were damaged and the death toll reached 2,400.
background
26 November 1941
At 0900hrs local time, a large Japanese fleet sailed out of
Tankan Bay at Etorofu in the Kurile Islands, the
northernmost chain of the Japanese archipelago. They were to
set sail for Hawaii, maintaining radio silence and taking a
northerly route to avoid detection. The strike force's
commander Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (Nagumo, Chuichi) had
orders to attack the United States Pacific Fleet, which was
at anchor in Pearl Harbour, the US Navy base on the
Hawaiianisland of Oahu over 3,000 miles away.
This daring plan of attack had been hatched back in
September, although talks were still continuing between
Japan and the US to avert war. Its architect was Admiral
Isoroku Yamamoto (Yamamoto, Isoroku), a veteran of the
Russo-Japanese War in 1904-05. He had lost two fingers at
the Battle of Tsushima, the decisive naval engagement where
two-thirds of the Russian fleet had been sunk. Yamamoto was
against going to war with the US. As naval attaché to
Washington, he had seen the industrial might of America
first hand. Asked about Japan's chances of victory, Yamamoto
replied: "If I am told to fight regardless of the
consequences, I shall run wild for the first six months or a
year, but I have absolutely no confidence about the second
and third years."
Japan's aim was to complete its conquest of China and seize
the southeast Asian colonies of Britain, France, and the
Netherlands. These nations were at war in Europe. Only
America stood in Japan's way. Yamamoto realized that the
destruction of the US Pacific Fleet would give Japan time to
establish an empire in Asia. Then it would have the
resources to resist the inevitable American
counteroffensive. Japan had nursed its imperial ambitions
for many years. In 1895, victory over China had allowed it
to annex the island of Formosa, now Taiwan. Korea had been
annexed in 1910; Manchuria invaded in 1931. And in 1937,
Japan began the wholesale invasion of China, leading to the
infamous Rape of Nanking.
By that time Japan was a member of the Axis, along with
Germany and Italy. The German invasion of the Netherlands in
1940 had left Dutch Indonesia defenceless. The fall of
France allowed Japanese troops to enter French Indochina,
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. By 1941, Britain was
beleaguered and its possessions in the Far East vulnerable.
The German attack on Russia in June 1940 neutralized Japan's
abiding enemy in the region. The time was ripe for Japan to
create what it called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere, a Japanese empire.
Although war had been raging in Europe for two years, the
American people wanted no part of it. Nor were they ready to
go to war in the Far East. However Washington backed Chiang
Kai-shek, the Chinese leader resisting the Japanese
onslaught and had imposed sanctions on Japan. Talks ensued
but got nowhere. On 20 November 1941, America received an
ultimatum from the Japanese government. It said the US must
withdraw its support from the Chinese, lift its trade
embargo, and supply Japan with the one vital commodity it
lacked -oil. The US could not comply. Any concession to the
Japanese would mean that China would fall, along with
British possessions in the Far East. Without its empire,
Britain would fall, leaving the whole of Europe, Africa, and
Asia to the Axis. America would then be surrounded on all
sides by hostile dictatorships.
On November 26, Washington sent a reply to the Japanese
ultimatum that simply outlined the principles of
self-determination once more. The Americans knew that this
would not be acceptable to the Japanese, but they did not
know that the Japanese fleet had already sailed. For Japan
there was no time to lose. The Germans seemed on the brink
of victory in Europe. In that case, they would soon arrive
in the Far East to seize their enemies' colonies as spoils
of war. If Japan was to have its empire, it had to strike
straight away, at Pearl Harbour.
How much did Roosevelt know?
Pearl Harbour has always been portrayed as a surprise attack
on an unsuspecting nation. And that, to a large extent, is
true. The American people's attention was focussed on the
war in Europe, fearful that they would be dragged in.
Already Roosevelt (Roosevelt, Franklin D.) was backing
Britain against Hitler by supplying the UK with weapons
under the Lend-Lease Act passed in March 1941. American
shipping was in danger from attack by German submarines, the
very thing that had brought America into World War I. And
America had occupied Greenland and Iceland. Few Americans
raised any concerns about the Sino-Japanese War which had
been raging since 1937.
Whether the US administration was surprised by the attack on
Pearl Harbour is another matter. A good case can be made
that the US government knew of Japan's plans, or should
have. There were certainly indications.
On January 27, 1941, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told the
third secretary in the US embassy that he had learnt from
intelligence sources that the Japanese had a war plan which
involved an attack on Pearl Harbour. On 10 July, the US
military attaché in Tokyo reported that the Japanese Navy
were secretly practicing airborne torpedo attacks on targets
moored in Ariake Bay-a bay that resembles Pearl Harbour. The
US military attaché in Mexico also reported that the
Japanese were building midget submarines which would be
towed to Hawaii for an attack on Pearl Harbour.
A top British agent, codenamed 'Tricycle,' told the FBI that
the Japanese planned to attack Pearl Harbour, but his
information was dismissed. And a Korean agent told American
broadcaster Eric Severeid that the Japanese were going to
attack Pearl Harbour. The agent repeated his story to a US
Senator who alerted the State Department, US Army and Navy
intelligence, and President Roosevelt personally.
American intelligence had broken all the Japanese codes. On
24 September 1941, a message from Japanese Naval
Intelligence headquarters in Tokyo to the Japanese consul
general in Honolulu was deciphered. It requested the exact
locations of all US Navy ships in Pearl Harbour. Such
detailed information would only be required if the Japanese
were planning an attack on the ships at their moorings. In
November, another message was intercepted ordering more
drills involving attacks on capital ships at anchor in
preparation to 'ambush and completely destroy the US enemy.'
The only American fleet within reach was at Pearl Harbour.
On 25 November, a radio message from Admiral Yamamoto
(Yamamoto, Isoruko) ordering the Japanese task force to
attack the US fleet in Hawaii was intercepted. US
Intelligence was understaffed and it is not known whether
this message was decoded at the time. However, that same
day, the US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, noted in his
diary:
'FDR stated that we were likely to be attacked perhaps as
soon as next Monday. FDR asked: 'The question was how we
should manoeuvre them into the position of firing the first
shot without too much danger to ourselves. In spite of the
risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the
first shot, we realized that in order to have the full
support of the American people it was desirable to make sure
that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there
should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the
aggressors.''
On 29 November, US Secretary of State Cordell Hull (Hull,
Cordell) showed a reporter from The New York Times a message
saying that Pearl Harbour was going to be attacked on 7
December. As the attack approached, the American government
received information from numerous sources that 7 December
would be the day. On 1 December, Naval Intelligence in San
Francisco worked out from news reports and signals picked up
by shipping companies that the Japanese fleet that had
disappeared from home waters was then to the west of Hawaii.
Those who believe that Roosevelt knew about the attack all
along maintain that a number of other reports say that the
Japanese would strike at Pearl Harbour, but they have yet to
be declassified.
With hindsight, it is clear that the information that showed
the Japanese would attack at Pearl Harbour was there. But it
is a very serious matter to say that President Roosevelt
knew where and when the attack would come and did nothing
about it. It is, essentially, accusing him of treason.
However, the Japanese attack did suit his purposes well.
Since the fall of France in June 1940, Roosevelt had
believed that America would have to go to war against
Hitler. In August 1941, when Roosevelt and Churchill met on
warships in the Atlantic, Churchill noted the 'astonishing
depth of Roosevelt's intense desire for war.' But the
American people had no wish to get involved in a European
war. Even Roosevelt conceded that 'the American people would
never agree to enter the war in Europe unless they were
attacked within their own borders.'
Roosevelt was right. After the attack on Pearl Harbour, the
American people were willing, if not eager, to go to war.
Once the US had declared war on Japan, under the provisions
of the Tripartite Pact signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan
on September 1940, Hitler declared war on the US. At the
Atlantic Conference, Roosevelt had already agreed with
Churchill that the priority was to defeat Hitler, before
finishing off Japan. So the attack on Pearl Harbour allowed
Roosevelt to get America into the war against Germany
'through the back door.' It is difficult to see how else
this could have been achieved and there are those who
contend that Roosevelt's plan to get America into the war
against the wishes of its people was the 'mother of all
conspiracies.' They maintain that Roosevelt moved the
Pacific fleet from the West Coast out to Hawaii against the
advice of his commanders, not to threaten the Japanese, but
as bait.
Admiral Richardson (Richardson, James O.) complained that
Pearl Harbour had inadequate air defences and no defence
against torpedo attack, as did his successor Admiral Kimmel
(Kimmel, Husband E.). And when the aircraft carriers were
ordered out of Pearl Harbour, it further deprived Pearl of
air defences at a time when Roosevelt's negotiations with
the Japanese were at their most provocative.
The conspiracy theorists say that the attack was stage
managed to make America look weak. If America had looked
strong and well-prepared, Germany might not have declared
war. While this theory is plausible, the conspiracy
theorists go further. They maintain that Roosevelt was a
secret admirer of the Soviet Union and wanted to fight
Germany to defend Russia, but could never expect to get the
American people to ally themselves directly with the
Soviets. According to this theory, Roosevelt also conspired
with Stalin to use the war to destabilize the British
Empire. In such a grand scheme, the sacrifice of a few
thousand American lives at Pearl Harbour was small beer. The
attack on Pearl Harbour was played up by the government and
the press as the most infamous act in history, though it was
known that the Japanese never declared war before attacking.
Some 2,403 people were killed at Pearl Harbour and 1,178
wounded. However, these casualties are slight compared to
later losses in the war. The US aircraft carriers were
unscathed and only two capital ships lost completely.
While it is true that various wings of the US government did
have good reason to suspect that the attack would come at
Pearl Harbour, it is difficult to know now how far this
intelligence was transmitted. With the nation not yet at
war, there were often delays in sending incepted message for
decryption. US Intelligence was short staffed and there were
long delays in decoding and reading even high priority
traffic. Some incepts were filed and forgotten, and it is
not possible to know how much President Roosevelt and other
key players knew at the time. For example, due to concern
that the Japanese might realize their codes had been broken,
President Roosevelt himself was taken off the list of raw
intelligence sent between 20 May and 12 November, 1941.
During that period he was only given an oral summary.
It was noted at the time that Roosevelt, usually a highly
strung man, was surprisingly calm on the night of 7
December, 1941, as if a great weight had been lifted from
his shoulders. America was now at war.
How much did Churchill know?
Throughout World War II, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill and US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
(Roosevelt, Franklin D.) were portrayed as the closest of
friends. In fact, Roosevelt had only met Churchill once
briefly before the war and found him extremely rude. His
closest advisors dismissed Churchill as a 'drunk and a
windbag.' Although they appeared friendly in front of the
cameras, Roosevelt never fully trusted Churchill and
carefully distanced himself from Churchill's plans.
Roosevelt was right to be wary. From the moment Churchill
returned to government with the outbreak of war in September
1939, he planned to defeat Germany by dragging America into
the war. While Roosevelt was keen to help Britain, and
eventually came to believe that war with Germany was
inevitable, he was keen not to be dragged into Churchill's
imperial adventure.
Throughout the first year of the war, Churchill bombarded
Roosevelt with flattering messages. At the same time, he
skilfully manipulated the intelligence he shared with
Roosevelt to manoeuvre America to the brink of war. The
Americans had cracked the Japanese diplomatic codes and, in
January 1941, they gave the British the Purple and 'Red'
decoding machines which allowed the British to read Japanese
diplomatic traffic. In return, they expected to be given the
German Enigma code machine, so they could break the German
codes. The British refused to hand one over. It was not
until after the attack on Pearl Harbour that the Americans
learned the British had broken the Japanese navy code JN-25.
The British had listening posts in the Far East, with
headquarters in Singapore. From 1939, they had been on a war
footing and priority was given to intercepting enemy
messages and decoding them. Churchill insisted on seeing all
JN-25 messages personally.
While America was still at peace, code-breaking was not
given priority. Its western-most listening station was in
Seattle. Some of the crucial intercepts indicating that the
Japanese intended to attack Pearl Harbor were not decoded
until after 1945, and due to security considerations,
President Roosevelt was often not privy to raw intelligence.
There were US liaison officers at the British decoding
centre in Singapore, but they were not allowed to see raw
intelligence and did not even know that the British had
broken JN-25. British and Australian intelligence officers
sent all their decrypts back to London, assuming that
intelligence concerning an attack on Pearl Harbour would be
forwarded to the Americans. It was not.
Although Churchill knew of the Japanese intentions, he
deliberately misled Roosevelt by exaggerating the British
strength in Singapore. He gave the impression that this was
where the first attack would come - or, at the very least,
that the Japanese would split their fleet and attack British
and American forces simultaneously. However, he knew this
was not the case. A report had already been drawn up showing
that Singapore could not be defended. It would take at least
90 days for a fleet to reach Singapore from Britain, and
besides, all available vessels were needed to protect the
Atlantic convoys. In his mind, Churchill had already
abandoned Singapore. And the Japanese knew it. The defence
report had been on its way out to Singapore when it had been
captured by a German ship and forwarded to Tokyo. The
Japanese knew that it was not necessary to make a first
strike against Singapore. It would fall anyway. Churchill
knew that too, but he maintained the pretence that the first
attack would come there, to the extent of pouring in British
and Australian troops who would end up in Japanese prisoner
of war camps with hardly a shot being fired. Not even the
Australian prime minister was informed of the deception.
On November 19, 1941, the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo sent out
a 'Purple' message to its embassies and consulates around
the world. It instructed them to listen to Japanese news
bulletins. If they ended with a weather report saying 'east
wind rain' the attack would be on the US. 'North wind
cloudy' would mean an attack on Russia, and 'west wind
clear' would herald an attack on the British, with an
invasion of Thailand or Malaya, or an attack on the Dutch
East Indies. Both the British listening station in Melbourne
and the American station in Seattle intercepted this and
reported it to London and Washington respectively. While the
Japanese diplomatic traffic still talked of negotiation,
JN-25 traffic intercepted by the British talked of 'opening
hostilities.' From November 21, it was clear that an attack
was being set in motion and a large Japanese fleet was being
assembled. Meanwhile, Japanese merchant ships were sailing
home.
On November 25, the British intelligence headquarters in
Singapore decoded a JN-25 message from Admiral Yamamoto
(Yamamoto, Isoroku) saying: 'The Task Force will move out of
Hitokappu Wan [Tankan Bay in the Kuriles] on the morning of
November 26 and advance to the standing-by position on the
afternoon of December 4 and speedily complete refuelling.'
As negotiations with the Americans were continuing, it was
unlikely that the Japanese would have sent a fleet towards
Singapore or Manila as they would almost certainly be
spotted by merchant shipping in the busy southern waters and
the reconnaissance planes which patrolled that area. So
Pearl Harbour was the likely objective. It is not clear
whether this information was conveyed from Churchill to
Roosevelt as those documents are still classified. However,
there was a considerable hardening of Roosevelt's
negotiating position with the Japanese the following day.
On 2 December, the Singapore station decoded a message from
Yamamoto saying: 'Climb Mount Niitaka 1208.' This was the
signal for the attack to go ahead and gave the date of the
attack - 8 December, in Tokyo, 7 December in Pearl Harbour.
As each day passed and no Japanese fleet was spotted heading
for Singapore or the Philippines, intelligence analysts in
Singapore became all the more convinced that the attack
would be on Pearl Harbour. They informed London, assuming
that the warning would be forwarded to the Americans. It
wasn't.
On 4 December, Japanese news bulletins ended with a weather
forecast predicting 'east wind rain' -the code for an attack
on America. This was broadcast three times before anyone in
American intelligence realized that the attack was imminent.
But without the JN-25 intelligence, it was still not clear
where the attack would come.
Staff shortages in the American decoding rooms meant that
Churchill knew the contents of Tokyo's final communiqué to
Washington before Roosevelt did. He had time to invite the
American ambassador John Winant and Roosevelt's special
envoy to Britain, Averell Harriman, down to Chequers for
dinner. At 9pm, he asked his butler to bring a portable
radio into the dining room so they could listen to the
evening news. It announced that Pearl Harbor was being
attacked.
'No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to
have the United States on our side was to be the greatest
joy,' Churchill said. 'Once again in our long island history
we would emerge safe and victorious. Being saturated and
satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept
the sleep of the saved and thankful.'
However, the British intelligence analysts at the Singapore
station were puzzled. If the Americans had received all the
JN-25 intelligence reports they had sent back to London, how
could they had been taken by surprise? If they had received
those reports, they would have had more than enough warning
to prepare a trap, or perhaps even to prevent the attack on
Pearl Harbour occurring at all.
Where does blame lie?
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Admiral Husband
E. Kimmel (Kimmel, Husband E.) -Commander in Chief of the
Pacific Fleet -and General Walter C. Short (Short, Walter
C.) - the Army commander on Oahu were relieved of duty and
demoted.
During the raid itself, Kimmel had replaced the shoulder
boards of a full admiral he wore as CinCPac with those of a
rear admiral, his permanent rank. Both Kimmel and Short
retired in 1942.
A commission of inquiry hurriedly set up under Associate
Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts and seven subsequent
inquiries blamed Kimmel and Short for the catastrophe at
Pearl Harbour. However, the Navy Court of Inquiry and the
Army Pearl Harbour Board partially exonerated them, though
their ranks were not restored to them. Neither man was
granted the court martial they requested to clear their
names. In 1941, they had agreed to sign a waiver to speed
the investigation and the government held them to it.
Short died in 1949, it is said, due to the stress cause by
the humiliation of Pearl Harbour. During the attack on
Pearl, a spent bullet broke the window of Kimmel's office.
'It would have been more merciful if it had killed me,' he
said. Kimmel died in 1968, still protesting that the Pearl
Harbour debacle - America's worst wartime defeat - was not
his fault.
But there was plenty to blame Kimmel and Short for.
Although, for security reasons, they were not supplied with
raw intelligence data, they were give 'war warnings' that
told them to prepare for a Japanese attack. A surprise
attack by submarines, planes, possibly both, was a 'definite
possibility,' they were told on 18 February. However, like
most other people, neither Kimmel nor Short expected the
Japanese to attack at Pearl Harbour. They assumed that the
enemy's first target would be far to the west. The crucial
information that the Japanese consulate was sending Tokyo -
details of the Pacific Fleet's moorings in Pearl Harbour in
preparation for an attack - was denied to them.
Nevertheless, Kimmel failed to organize long-range
reconnaissance flights. He had flying boats that could have
patrolled out to 800 miles from Hawaii - the Japanese attack
was launched from only 250 miles. (Although, to have covered
the area effectively, Kimmel would have needed 250 flying
boats, not the 49 he had.) Meanwhile, Short, who thought
Kimmel had long-range reconnaissance in place, only deployed
his radar equipment for three hours a day. It was operated
by inadequately trained men who had no proper way of
communicating with headquarters.
Neither Kimmel nor Short had any experience with aviation
and Kimmel had been leap-frogged over 46 senior officers to
take command in the Pacific. When the war warnings came,
Kimmel saw his duty to follow the long-established US Navy
battle plan, which was to divert the Japanese from attacking
Singapore, until the Royal Navy had time to reinforce it.
However, he had more ambitious plans of his own. He aimed to
lure the enemy out into the middle of the Pacific Ocean and
engage them in an old-fashioned engagement between
battleships. This kind of battle never took place during the
Pacific war; all naval engagements took place between
carrier-borne aircraft. So Kimmel's preparation for war was
to ready his fleet for aggressive action. The defence of
Pearl Harbour, he thought, was in the hands of the Army and
he complained bitterly to Washington at Short's lack of
equipment.
Short, however, believed that the Japanese would not attack
the military installations on Oahu while the Navy was there.
An infantry officer, he admitted that he had no idea of how
to protect the base against air attack. He made preparations
to defend to the island against an amphibious assault. When
the attack came, he retreated to his bunker and prepared to
defend the beaches.
Although Kimmel and Short played golf together, they had set
up no effective Navy-Army liaison. Kimmel did not pass on
intelligence reports he received from Washington and failed
to inform Short that he had not instituted reconnaissance
flights. He did not even inform the Army when an enemy
submarine was spotted at the entrance to Pearl Harbour on
the morning of 7 December, even though intelligence analysts
had long said that this would herald an aerial assault.
In turn, Short, who believed that the Navy had deployed
reconnaissance aircraft, failed to inform Kimmel that he was
limiting the use of radar to three hours a day, due to a
shortage of spare parts. It is clear that he thought that
the Navy was in Pearl Harbour to defend the Army
installations, rather than the other way around. With the
fleet in port, he believed that the major threat to his
aircraft was sabotage, so he bunched the planes together on
the airbase. That way they were easy to guard against
saboteurs, but it made them sitting targets to air attack.
On instructions from Washington, Short had not instituted an
all-out alert for fear of alarming the civilian population.
When he informed Washington that he was calling a low-level
alert against sabotage only, they made no response, so he
assumed they concurred. The Navy was also informed of his
state of preparedness, which was Level 1, the lowest state,
in Army parlance. The Navy assumed that Level 1 was the
highest.
When the attack on Pearl Harbour finally came, neither
Kimmel nor Short had serious defence plans to put into
action. Kimmel said that, if he had received the raw
intelligence that had been denied to him, he would have
ordered the aircraft carrier Saratoga back from the West
Coast and would have sent the Pacific Fleet to sea to
intercept the enemy. His successor, Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz pointed out that this would have been a disaster:
'It was God's mercy that Admiral Kimmel didn't have warning
that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbour, he
said. 'If we had been warned, our fleet would have gone out
to sea. All our ships would have been destroyed one by one
in deep water We would have lost the entire Pacific Fleet
and eighteen to nineteen thousand men, instead of the ships
and 3,300 men we did lose.'
Kimmel, a 1991 report concluded, fancied himself 'the
American Nelson' and neglected his defences while preparing
for attack. He had already had a falling out with Short over
the defence of Wake Island. Short wanted command if the Army
was deployed there. Kimmel refused, and deployed the Marines
instead. This falling out explained why vital intelligence
was not forwarded from Kimmel to Short.
Kimmel and Short must bear some of the responsibility for
the losses at Pearl Harbour. Despite the warnings they had
been given, they were not ready for war. But they were not
the only commanders to be unprepared. General Douglas
MacArthur on the Philippines, for example, had seven hours'
warning after the attack on Pearl Harbour and his aircraft
were also caught on the ground. He eventually conceded the
Philippines with over 70,000 killed or taken prisoner, yet
he went on to become a war hero.
If there was a conspiracy at the highest level to invite a
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour to get America into the war
in Europe on the British side then, it is argued, Kimmel and
Short were merely scapegoats. Since their deaths their
families and friends have tried to clear their names on the
grounds that Washington had not provided them with all the
intelligence indicating an impending attack. On those
grounds the US Congress exonerated the two men in 2001. They
have subsequently been returned to the ranks they held
before Pearl Harbour. Now, it seems, America must find
someone else to blame.
Was the bombing of Pearl
Harbour really a success?
The Japanese claimed that the attack on Pearl Harbour was a
great victory. There was jubilation on board the Japanese
fleet and among the militarists back in Tokyo. But even as
the Japanese task force turned for home, there were those
who expressed their doubts.
Commander Fuchida (Fuchida, Mitsuo), the flight leader who
had led the attack, begged the task force commander Admiral
Nagumo to let him lead a third strike against the fuel depot
on Oahu. Nagumo refused. The enemy now knew of the Japanese
intentions and he believed his fleet was vulnerable to
attack from the US carriers that were missing from Pearl
Harbour. He decided to turn for home. He believed he had
succeeded in his mission, which was to cripple the fleet in
Pearl Harbour and put it out of action for six months.
Had Nagumo sent in a third strike and finished off the
fleet, blown up the fuel depot and destroyed the naval
dockyard, the Japanese would have had the undisputed mastery
of the whole of the Pacific. Even the dockyards along the
West Coast, where the Americans would have tried to build a
new fleet, would be vulnerable. However, the only way to
defeat the United States permanently would have been to
mount a full-scale invasion. And not even the most fanatical
Japanese militarist was planning that. As it was, Nagumo had
left the Pacific fleet the facilities to raise and mend
their ships, and the fuel to send them to sea. Indeed, all
of the ships sunk by the Japanese that day foundered in
shallow water and-with the exception of the Arizona and the
Oklahoma-they were raised, repaired, and returned to
service.
Back in Tokyo Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack,
also had his doubts. He was against going to war with
America, believing that Japan could not win against the
USA's industrial might. However, he believed that an attack
on Pearl Harbour would keep America on the defensive for six
months, while Japan expanded its 'co prosperity sphere' to
take in the oilfield and other sources of raw materials it
needed to fight the war. He succeeded in giving Japan that
six-month breathing space. But in June 1942, the US Navy
revenged itself on the Japanese fleet with a decisive
victory in the Battle of Midway (Midway, Battle of). Planes
from the Hornet, Enterprise, and Yorktown-all carriers that
the Japanese had hoped to catch in Pearl Harbour-obliterated
the Akagi, Hiryu, Kaga, and Soryu, the carriers that had
launched the attack. This destroyed Japan's first line
carrier fleet and killed most of the pilots who had attacked
Pearl Harbour. From then on, no matter how tenaciously the
Japanese fought, their defeat was inevitable.
The atomic bomb finally forced their surrender. But, by that
time, Japan was ringed by British and American fleets. On
the day the first atomic bomb was dropped, more people on
the mainland Japan were killed by conventional bombing and
shellfire than died in Hiroshima itself. The justification
for the use of the atomic bomb was that military planners
calculated that an invasion of the Japanese islands would
cost a million Allied casualties.
From the point of view of Japan's war aims, the attack on
Pearl Harbour was a failure because the Japanese strategists
had misread the situation in Russia. Their war strategy
assumed that Germany was on the brink of crushing the Soviet
Union. They thought that, once Germany had won the war in
Europe, they would seize the colonies of their former
enemies in the Far East. Japan had to act fast to grab them
first. However, the war in Europe was not nearly won and,
ultimately, the Soviet Union crushed Germany. If you believe
that Churchill or Roosevelt, or both of them, connived in
the attack on Pearl Harbour, then as an Allied strategy it
was a success.
For Churchill, it brought the
United States into the war. Without the US, the war against
Hitler would probably have been won, but at an even more
terrible price. If the Japanese had taken the British
colonies in Asia and invaded India and Australia unopposed
by the US, the British alone would not have had the strength
to open a second front. The Soviet Union would have taken
over the whole of Continental Europe and, ultimately,
Britain itself. For Roosevelt, the attack on Pearl Harbour
served the long-term interests of the United States. It
united America behind him and, with Hitler's subsequent
declaration of war against the United States, allowed him to
follow the strategy he had long proclaimed in private. It
brought the US into the war in Europe on the side of
Britain. Hitler, not Hirohito, Roosevelt was convinced, was
America's real enemy.
If the United States had not been brought into the war at
that point, Japan would have seen the German advances into
the Soviet Union falter. With the former colonies of France,
the Netherlands, and Britain no longer at risk of being
seized by the Germans, Japan might then have gone to the aid
of its German ally and attack its traditional enemy Russia.
Fighting on two fronts, the Soviet Union would have probably
been defeated, or Stalin would have sued for a humiliating
peace. Britain and its colonies would then have fallen,
leaving America to stand alone between an Atlantic Ocean
controlled by the Germans and a Pacific dominated by the
Japanese. Not even the might of the US could have survived
this encirclement.
It was the attack on Pearl Harbour and Hitler's subsequent,
foolish, declaration of war on the United States that
allowed the liberal democracies to triumph in the 20th
century. It is true that the Soviet Union also came out of
World War II as a superpower. It had lost 21 million
citizens, but its industry was intact. It subsequently built
up its military might with materiel looted from Germany and
the slave labour of German prisoners of war. And the memory
of the suffering of the war kept its own citizens loyal to
its oppressive system. But ultimately, its economy could not
match those of the victors in the West.
It might also been argued that the attack on Pearl Harbour
and its subsequent defeat in the war was a success for Japan
in the long term. It freed it from its feudal past and
allowed its economy to flourish. The attack could even be
described as a success for Germany - with America's entry
into the war, it was possible for the Western Allies to
mount the D-Day landings and occupy half of Germany in 1945.
West Germany soon became the industrial powerhouse of Europe
and it was rich enough to bail out the East, which had
suffered under Soviet control, when the country was reunited
in 1990.
Pearl Harbour forced Britain and America to ally themselves
with the Chinese in their war against the Japanese. This rid
China of the foreign invader, but it built up the strength
of the Communists who defeated the Nationalists under Chiang
Kai-shek and took over in 1949. The Japanese were also
forced out of Korea, but the northern part was occupied by
the Soviets who declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945, two
days after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Korea
remains divided. In the broad sweep of history, it can be
argued that the one loser here was Great Britain. The loss
of Singapore to the Japanese exposed British weakness in the
Far East. After 1945, it no longer seemed feasible for
Britain to hold on to its colonies in Asia. Following Indian
independence in 1947, the rest of the British Empire was
slowly disbanded and the last British colony in the Far
East, Hong Kong, was handed back to China in 1997.
America still sees the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour as a
defeat, but it set off a chain of events that has left the
United States as the world's one remaining super power and
its dominant economy.
|