bombing
in the Bristol area
Bristol ablaze after an attack
Even before the outbreak of war
the Luftwaffe had started the process of intelligence
gathering, with clandestine photographic sorties being
undertaken over the Bristol area by a special reconnaissance
unit known as Gruppe Rowehl, after its commanding officer
and father of German aerial photography, Oberstleutnant
Theodor Rowehl. These flights carried out by Heinkel He
111's in civilian markings, on what were said to be route
proving flights, operated mainly over local airfields and
aircraft factories and the Parnall Aircraft plant at Yate is
known to have been photographed in this way as late as
August 29th 1939. Nevertheless, during the period known in
Britain as the Phoney War RAF and Luftwaffe bombers had
abstained from making deliberate attacks on each others
towns and cities but this lull, which had existed in the
West since war had been declared on September 3rd 1939,
ended on May 10th 1940 when the German Army marched into the
Low Countries. The following night British bombers commenced
operations against German industrial installations,
culminating on the night of May 15th with a raid by nearly
100 aircraft on the Ruhr area. This enraged Hitler who on
May 24th stated "the Luftwaffe is authorised to attack the
English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as
sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened
by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the
Ruhr".
As the subjugation of France neared its completion the
spheres of operation were defined for the two major Air
Fleets facing Britain. Luftflotte 2, based in the Low
Countries, was to attack targets on the eastern side of the
country, while Luftflotte 3, whose aircraft were located
west of the River Seine, was to concentrate its efforts on
the west. The bomber units of Luftflotte 3 then moved their
aircraft onto captured French airfields, which at last
brought the Bristol area within range of their fully loaded
bombers.
At first German air operations over Britain were carried out
on a small scale, and these began with light probing raids
by night, normally in Staffel strength, but sometimes
carried out by as few as two aircraft on one target. These
Störangriffe or harassing attacks were, in the months that
followed, directed against specific targets such as aircraft
factories, dock installations, oil storage tanks, and
specialised manufacturing plants.
The first such mission carried out against the West Country
took place on the night of June 19/20th 1940 when the
Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton, as well as the docks at
Avonmouth and Southampton, were targeted by about 7 He 111's
of III/KG 27 flying from Merville airfield, near the
Franco-Belgian border. Although the raiders claimed to have
successfully attacked the Filton plant the facts were
somewhat different, and Portishead was as near as the German
bombers came, 10 H.E.'s falling along the shore at about
02.15 hrs.
The following day German Radio proudly proclaimed, "Since
May 10th enemy and chiefly British aeroplanes have
un-interruptedly attacked open German towns. Last night
again eight civilians fell victim to these attacks. The
Luftwaffe has now begun reprisals against England. The
revenge of the German Air Force for England's sly night
piracy has begun. German forbearance is exhausted. The time
for settlement has come".
Although the damage caused by these nocturnal raids was only
slight, their nuisance value was considerable, with a few
aircraft often causing sleepless nights over large areas of
the country, as well as regularly disrupting production at
factories engaged in essential war work. They were, in
addition, a valuable way for the Kampfgruppen to learn the
art of night navigation but, as a result of their premature
use, the radio beams associated with the highly secret
Knickebein bombing and navigation aid were quickly detected
by the British enabling effective counter-measures to be put
in hand.
Knickebein, named after a German folk tale magic crow who
could see in the dark, was available to the entire bomber
force, its signals being picked up on the 'blind' landing
receivers fitted as standard to all German bombers. When
used for navigational purposes only one beam was employed,
but for radio assisted bombing the system employed two
transmitter stations which formed a beam intersection over
the prescribed objective, allowing the attack to take place
without reference to the ground below.
The next operation against the area was undertaken on the
night of June 24th when five Heinkel He 111's of I/KG 27
were briefed to attack the Bristol Aeroplane Co. at Filton,
which they again claimed to have successfully raided. The
facts, however, were somewhat different, and at 00.17 hrs
the first 1 kg I.B.'s fell in the St.Philip's area of
Bristol, followed shortly after by the first H.E. which
impacted at the corner of Lower Maudlin Street and Harford
Street killing two people. Harassing attacks against local
targets were now being being undertaken almost every night,
and during the course of a nuisance attack on the harbour
installations at Bristol and Cardiff on June 30/31st, a
transmission from the Kleve Knickebein transmitter was
monitored for the first time over the West. On this occasion
the beam was laid over Filton and St.Athan, near Cardiff, on
a bearing of 84 degrees True.
In addition to the bombing missions, the Luftwaffe now
embarked on a comprehensive photographic reconnaissance of
Britain, the first sortie over Bristol being undertaken by
an He 111 of the Aufklärungsgruppe Oberbefehlshaber der
Luftwaffe, the successor to Gruppe Rowehl, on June 29th. The
Aufkl.Gr.Ob.d.L. were joined in this work early the
following month by part of the reconnaissance element of
Luftflotte 3, the assorted Junkers Ju 88's, Dornier Do 17's
and Messerschmitt Bf 110's of 3(F)/31, 4(F)/14, 3 & 4(F)/121
and 1,2 & 3(F)/123 subsequently flying regular
photo-reconnaissance sorties over the area throughout the
summer and autumn of 1940, sometimes dropping small bombs on
targets of opportunity. Thereafter, however, as the British
defences strengthened, they tended to restrict themselves to
undertaking only immediate pre and post-raid coverage
missions.
Meanwhile, on July 2nd the Luftwaffe had received
instructions to gain and maintain air superiority over the
English Channel, and this was quickly achieved. The victory,
however, was tactical rather than strategic, because
Britain's seaborne communications with the world were
uninterrupted, the ships being loaded and discharged at
ports on the western coast, difficult and dangerous for the
Luftwaffe to reach in daylight. The harbour facilities such
as those at Bristol, Avonmouth, Newport, Cardiff, Swansea,
Liverpool, and Glasgow now assumed great importance to the
British economy, and night harassing attacks against them,
and the local aircraft industry, continued throughout the
summer, the Bristol Docks complex and the Bristol Aeroplane
Company at Filton each being targeted about 20 times between
June 19th and the end of August.
In order to maintain the pressure on the defences it had
also been ordered that during daylight hours precision
pinpoint attacks were to be undertaken against specific
important targets, usually associated with the local docks
or aircraft industry. These surprise attacks were to be
carried out by aircraft, either singly or in small groups,
only with the aid of suitable cloud cover. The first such
mission undertaken against a target in the Bristol area was
that attempted on the Portishead Docks by three Ju 88's of
II/KG 51 on the afternoon of July 3rd.
The following day a raid was carried out on the Bristol
Aeroplane Company by a lone He 111 of III/KG 54, and
although slight damage was caused to the roof of the Rodney
Works the bomber was shot down by Spitfires of 92 Squadron
on its return flight, crashing near Gillingham in Dorset,
the first German aircraft to be lost on operations against
the Bristol area.
From the fall of France until mid-July, Hitler had waited
for word from London that the British were ready ready to
negotiate a peace. He waited in vain and on July 16th issued
'Directive No. 16 on the Preparation of a Landing Operation
against England'. The code name for the assault was to be
Unternehmen Seelöwe or Operation Sealion, and preparations
for it were to be completed in by early August.
The blockade of Britain was now tightened, and following the
closure of much of the East Coast to British shipping,
aerial mine laying operations were extended to cover the
important shipping lanes and harbour entrances on the
western side of the country. This included the Bristol
Channel and Severn Estuary, which was first mined by the
Heinkel 111's of I/KG 4, based at Soesterberg, in Holland,
on the night of July 17th. In order to maintain the pressure
on the defences, and to interrupt vital war production,
these missions were usually flown on nights when no
harassing attacks were taking place, thereby extending the
amount of time an area remained under Red Alert, and on
occasions, as with the reconnaissance aircraft, small bombs
were carried, these often being aimed at searchlights or
anti-aircraft gun sites.
The beginning of August saw the use of an unusual tactic by
the Luftwaffe, when German bombers dropped aerial leaflets
on various parts of Britain. These were reprints of Hitler's
speech before the Reichstag on July 19th, his "Last Appeal
to Reason". The first such sorties were carried out on the
night of August 1st when Bristol and Southampton were the
targets for the four Heinkel 111's of II/KG 55 flying from
Chartres. Due, however, to a combination of bad navigation
and poor visibility over the target area the majority of the
leaflets intended for Bristol fell in South Wales and rural
Somerset. That night also saw the Parnall Aircraft plant at
Yate targeted for the first time, but again neither of the
two He 111's of II/KG 55 succeeded in locating any of their
objectives at Yate, Filton or Avonmouth.
As a prelude to the German invasion, the vital elimination
of the RAF and its associated aircraft industry was
scheduled to begin early in August, and the day for its
launching was given the code name of Adler Tag , or Eagle
Day. The plan required that the the fighter defences located
to the south of a line between London and Gloucester be
beaten down, a process that it was hoped would not require
more than four days, while the total destruction of RAF
Fighter Command should be achieved within four weeks, after
which the invasion itself could begin.
Meanwhile, as part of the same plan, a day and night bombing
offensive was to be directed against the British aircraft
industry and to assist in this the He 111's engaged in mine
laying were temporarily switched to conventional bombing.
Adler Tag was provisionally fixed for August 10th, but due
to poor weather conditions was postponed until the afternoon
of August 13th, when the full might of the Luftwaffe was at
last unleashed against Britain. In mid-August 484 aircraft
were available to the bomber formations of Luftflotte 3,
comprising the Ju 88's of KG 51, KG 54, LG 1 and KGr 806 in
addition to the He 111's of KG 27, KG 55 and KGr 100. This
force was further bolstered towards the end of the month by
the arrival of the 33 Dornier Do 17's of KGr 606.
The following day German bombers ranged far and wide over
the West of England and Wales, engaged in armed
reconnaissance against RAF airfields and aircraft factories.
During the afternoon, however, three Heinkel 111's of III/KG
27 were shot down over the Severn Estuary by Spitfires of 92
Squadron, with two coming to earth in Somerset. These, and
other losses suffered that day proved to the Germans the
inadvisability of sending unescorted bombers in daylight
soties over those parts of England which were out of range
of the single engined Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters. The
mammoth battles of mid-August, thereafter took place mainly
over South East England.
Over the Bristol area, owing to bad weather, a period
relative calm set in on the 19th, and this lasted until the
evening of August 22nd. It was then that conditions improved
enough to allow KGr 100, the only unit in the Luftwaffe to
be equipped with the sophisticated X-Verfahren electronic
navigation and bombing aid, to carry out their first
precision attack under Luftflotte 3, the target being the
Bristol Aeroplane Company at Filton.
X-Verfahren was a complex system employing a main and three
cross beams which gave the pilot aural indications 50 km, 20
km and 5 km out from the target. It's chief disadvantage,
however, was that it was only able to operate in conjunction
with specially-equipped aircraft manned by crews trained in
its use.
The operation against Filton involved 23 He 111's which were
dispatched from their newly established base at Vannes in
Brittany flying along an approach beam radiated from the
X-Beam transmitter at Cherbourg. Over Bristol it was a clear
moonlight night up to 02.00 hrs after which some cloud
developed at 3000 metres. During the attack, which took
place between 23.19 and 02.50 hrs, the 16.65 tonnes of
H.E.'s and 576 I.B's caused considerable damage to the
works, in particular at No.4 Factory and No.11 Test Bed, and
resulted in four people being injured. All the German
aircraft, however, returned safely to base.
As part of the Luftwaffe's modified strategy, which now
involved the concentration of forces over South East
England, by August 24th the majority of Luftflotte 3's
fighters had been redeployed to operate over that area. The
problem now existed of what to do with the surplus bomber
force, which being stripped of all its effective fighter
cover, was unable to carry out daylight attacks, and night
operations were the obvious answer. Accordingly Luftflotte
3's bombers were ordered to attack the next most important
targets in Britain, the vital West Coast ports of Liverpool
and Bristol.
Operations started immediately and that night the He 111's
of I, II and III/KG 27, together with the Ju 88's of I and
III/LG 1, a total of 44 aircraft, were dispatched to attack
the harbour installations at Bristol. 41 crews subsequently
reported over the City claiming to have dropped 27.2 tonnes
of H.E.'s, 13 tonnes of Oil Bombs and 5364 I.B.'s in a raid
which lasted from 21.40 to 05.09 hrs. The attack, however,
was not a success and although the weather over the Bristol
area was fine, low cloud impeded visibility, with the result
that the majority of the bombs fell fairly harmlessly in
North Somerset.
Liverpool was now selected for the first really heavy raid
of the war, and on the night of August 28th 160 aircraft
were dispatched to attack the harbour installations, while a
further 23 Do 17's of KGr 606 made for Bristol where they
claimed to have dropped 9.5 tonnes of H.E.'s and 900 I.B.'s.
Locally the weather steadily deteriorated throughout the
night, with heavy cloud varying in intensity from 1000 to
3000 metres, and although the German crews claimed to have
successfully attacked Bristol through the haze, few bombs
fell anywhere near the City.
During the first week of September the bombers of Luftflotte
3 continued to attack Liverpool, with Bristol, including
Avonmouth and Portishead, being targeted by 31 aircraft
drawn from I,II, and III/KG 51 and I and III/KG 55 on the
night of September 1st. Over the Bristol area the weather
was fine, with good visibility up to about 23.00 hrs, after
which severe ground mist arose, particularly in low lying
ground. The attack itself took place between 20.15 and 03.30
hrs, with the Germans caliming to have dropped 22.9 tonnes
of H.E.'s and 9 tonnes of Oil Bombs, but due to ground haze
the effect was not seen. Not surprisingly the raid failed to
cause any serious damage, with bombs being scattered from
Avonmouth, across Stoke Bishop and the City Centre to
Redfield. Bristol's casualties, however, amounted to 9
killed and 14 injured.
The raiders returned on the night of the 3rd when 21 He
111's from Stab, I, and III/KG 55 attempted a raid on the
docks complex at Avonmouth, attacking between 21.45 and
01.22 hrs with 13.7 tonnes of H.E.'s and 7.75 tonnes of Oil
Bombs. Although it was a clear starlit night with no moon,
giving perfect visibility over Bristol, only minor damage
was caused at Avonmouth, the raid having in fact spread
itself along the North Somerset coast, with four people
being killed and five injured at Portishead.
The last of the series of attacks took place the following
night when 47 aircraft of I/KG 27, II/LG 1, I, II, and
III/KG 51, along with I and II/KG 55 reported over Bristol
and one over Avonmouth between 21.20 and 04.47 hrs, claiming
to have dropped 45.05 tonnes of H.E's and 9.25 tonnes of Oil
Bombs. Locally the sky was perfectly clear until the early
hours of the morning when a ground mist arose which was
particularly heavy in certain localities. On this occasion
the majority of damage occurred in the Clifton, Redland,
St.Anne's and Knowle areas of the City, while at the Bristol
Aeroplane Company's premises at Filton an Oil Bomb caused a
fire in No.2 Shop, which resulted in a request for the
Bristol Fire Brigade to attend. Total casualties amounted to
4 killed and 6 injured.
A feature of these attacks on Bristol in early September was
the complete reliance upon Oil Bombs for fire raising, with
a total of 105 of the 250 kg weapons being employed during
the three nights. The raids on the West Coast harbours were
the heaviest yet experienced in Britain, and although
Luftwaffe losses were minimal, no aircraft at all being lost
against Bristol, the result were not particularly good, the
bombing lacking the concentration required to cause any real
disruption.
Meanwhile bombs had fallen on Central London for the first
time during the night of August 24th, when several aircraft
attacking Thameshaven inadvertently dropped their load too
far west. In Britain this was seen as an extension of the
indiscriminate bombing already experienced in the provinces
for, regardless of intent, this was the effect of most
German night raids. The following night, on Churchill's
instructions, Berlin was attacked by the RAF, and although
the British attempt at retaliation was weak and ineffective,
it infuriated Hitler, resulting in London superseding RAF
Fighter Command and its supply organisation as the primary
target of the Luftwaffe.
Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring assumed direct command of the
air offensive against Britain on September 7th, and that
afternoon the Luftwaffe flew 372 bomber sorties against
targets in East London starting large fires and causing
considerable damage. This was the beginning of a series of
raids that was to last for 65 days, and initially many of
Luftflotte 3's aircraft, previously available to carry out
attacks on the Bristol area, were ordered to re-direct their
efforts to the Capital.
September also marked the start of a systematic series of
daylight pinpoint raids carried out by a small force of
twin-engined Messerschmitt Bf 110 fighter-bombers of Epr Gr
210, flying with long range Bf 110 fighter escort, on some
of the most important British aircraft factories. The attack
series opened with a raid on the Vickers plant at Weybridge
on September 4th, shortly after which Epr Gr 210 and the
long-range fighters of ZG 26, about 90 aircraft in all, were
temporarily transferred to Luftflotte 3. The first operation
under their new command was carried out against the
Supermarine factory at Woolston, near Southampton, on
September 10th, and it was not to be long before they were
operating over the Bristol area.
Also on that day Göring ordered that if the weather
situation prevented large scale operations against London,
then surprise daylight attacks by individual bomber aircraft
were also to be made on targets associated with the British
aircraft industry. These were to be undertaken by crews
specially selected for their skill and experience, and were
only to be flown in low cloud and often appauling conditions
in an attempt to prevent interception by RAF fighters.
These missions became known to the Luftwaffe crews as
Pirateneinsatze or Pirate Attacks, and the first such
operation carried out against a target in the Bristol area
was the attempt, by a lone He 111 of I/KG 55, on the Bristol
Aeroplane Company at Filton on September 16th.
It now seemed unlikely that full air superiority would now
be achieved by the Luftwaffe before the onset of worse
weather, and so on September 17th Hitler ordered the
indefinite postponement of the invasion. Two days later, as
a result of this change in strategy instructions were issued
to increase the attacks against the British aircraft
industry, both by night and day, by reducing the size of the
formations engaged in raids on London.
Accordingly the bomber force of Luftflotte 3 was once again
assigned the most important targets on the western side of
Britain, and as part of a new strategy September 25th saw
the start of a planned series of large scale daylight
attacks, in Geschwader strength with long range fighter
cover, on the aircraft industry in the West Country.
The target that morning was the Bristol Aeroplane Company at
Filton, and the weather was perfect for bombing, with banks
of thick cloud broken by patches of clear blue sky. As a
result the works was successfully attacked at about 11.45
hrs by 58 Heinkel He 111's of KG 55, escorted by 52 Bf 110's
of ZG 26.
The raiders were not intercepted by RAF fighters until they
had left the target area, but the local anti-aircraft
gunners scored their first success, an He 111 of II/KG 55
which was brought down at Failand during its run in to the
target. A total of 6 German aircraft failed to return, which
resulted in 8 crewmen being killed and 10 made prisoner,
including 5 injured. In addition a further 2 aircraft
crashed on return to France, adding 2 more injured to the
casualty list.
Serious damage had indeed been caused at the Rodney Works,
while here and at the Flight Shed and East Engine Works, the
workers shelters were hit by a stick of bombs, causing many
casualties. The attack which only lasted some 45 seconds
also destroyed eight newly built aircraft, including two
precious Beaufighter prototypes, and production was
temporarily halted. Over Filton and surrounding districts
81.5 tonnes of H.E.'s and 6 tonnes of Oil Bombs had been
dropped, which tragically resulted in the death of 132
people, of which 91 were Company employees, while a further
315 were injured.
The crew reports, and photographs taken by KG 55 during the
attack, together with a reconnaissance mission flown over
Filton later that day by a lone Bf 110 of 4(F)/14 proved to
the Germans that the raid had been a great success.
Accordingly the Luftwaffe's own magazine, Der Adler, soon
after proudly proclaimed "this factory will not produce many
more aircraft", while Major Friedrich Kless, the attack
leader and Gruppenkommandeur of II/KG 55, was awarded the
Ritterkruz on October 14th.
September 27th saw the return of German aircraft in daylight
over Bristol, when 10 Bf 110's of Epr Gr 210 escorted by 42
long-range fighters undertook an unsuccessful pin-point
attack on the Parnall Aircraft works at Yate. The weather
during the morning was fair, with patches of cloud, and for
the citizens of Bristol this offered the unique opportunity
to witness a classic 'dog-fight' over the City. During this
action two escorting Bf 110's of I/ZG 26 were shot down by
the Hurricanes of 504 Squadron, which had only arrived at
Filton the pervious day. One of the Messerschmitts
disintegrated over the Stapleton Institution at Fishponds,
and was the only enemy aircraft to crash within the Bristol
boundary during the Second World War, while the other came
down at Haydon, near Radstock.
During the raid Epr Gr 210 had lost about a third of its
aircraft and a number of senior officers, including the
Gruppenkommandeur, Hptm. Martin Lutz, and the Staffelkäpitan
of 2 Staffel, Oblt. Willhelm Rössiger, both of whom were
posthumously awarded the Ritterkreuz on October 1st. One
officer who took part in the raid and did survive the
devastating attack by RAF fighters, was Hptm. Wilhelm
Makrocki the Gruppenkokommandeur of I/ZG 26, and he received
his Ritterkreuz on October 6th.
A total of 10 German aircraft infact failed to return which
resulted in the death of 14 crewmen, with 6 others being
taken prisoner, 5 of them injured. The Luftwaffe obviously
could not sustain the terrible losses of September 27th, and
thus was brought to an abrupt end this type of
fighter-bomber attack on West Country targets.
The large scale daylight bomber attacks, however, continued
until October 7th when 25 Ju 88's escorted by 50 Bf 110 long
range fighters, mounted a daylight attack on the Westland
factory at Yeovil in which nine aircraft were shot down,
seven of them Bf 110's, which were proving no match for the
RAF's single engined Hurricanes and Spitfires. With such
losses being suffered the time was now quickly approaching
when any attempt at large scale daylight raiding would have
to be abandoned, and on the 19th the poor weather gave
Göring the excuse he needed to terminated these attacks.
During October London continued to be the principle target
for the long range bombers, being raided every night.
However with the planned invasion of Britain now shelved the
Luftwaffe High Command ordered more bombing effort to be put
into night harassing attacks on the harbour installations at
Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow, with the industrial centres
of Birmingham and Coventry as alternative targets, while
still maintaining the pressure on the Capital. As a result I
Fliegerkorps was transferred to Luftflotte 3 adding to its
inventory the He 111's of KG 1 and KG 26 as well as the Ju
88's of KG 76 and KG 77, although, a number of these units
were to remain non-operational for some time.
Luftflotte 3 was also to continue pin-point Pirate daylight
attacks by single aircraft against important centres of the
British aircraft industry when weather permitted. The plants
at Filton and Yate were once again prime targets, and
operations commenced on October 6th when a lone He 111 of
II/KG 55 attempted an afternoon raid on Yate. The Parnall
Plant, however, was not attacked as the essential cloud
cover started to break up, forcing the crew to bomb
Bournemouth as an alternative.
These missions were also interspaced with more conventional
operations by single night bombers, with Filton being
targeted twice, and Yate once in unsuccessful attacks
carried out by II and III/KG 55 between the 10th and 15th of
October.
The daytime Pirate attacks had also resumed on the 15th,
when Oblt. Speck von Sternburg of III/KG 55 made an abortive
attempt against Filton, to be followed by three more
unsuccessful efforts later in the month by the same crew. On
the 19th the mission was again aborted, on the 24th the
bombs fell at Yatton, and on the 31st of October the Royal
Ordnance Factory at Glascoed in South Wales was bombed,
being mistaken for Filton! For this attack the crew received
a mention in the High Command of the Armed Forces Communique
issued on November 2nd, in which it was stated that they had
destroyed a factory near Bristol.
The first mine laying campaign to block the approaches to
Bristol, Avonmouth and the South Wales ports had ended with
the opening of the Adler offensive on August 13th, but in
late October, with the abandonment of the planned invasion
and a switch to a policy of blockade, it was resumed by the
He 111's of KGr 126 flying from Nantes in Brittany. This
unit, re-designated I/KG 28 in December 1940, was to
continued this work on and off until July 1941, and during
the one year period that aircraft were mining in and around
the Severn Estuary a total of 10 British vessels were sunk,
while a further 9 were damaged.
Meanwhile the Luftwaffe's attempt at battering London to
produce a British surrender was not proving at all
successful, as the the bombing was too scattered over the
great area of the metropolis to produce any large scale
destruction, or collapse of civilian morale. As a result the
attacks were now to be directed more against Britain's
manufacturing base, followed by a concentrated assault on
the ports as part of the policy of blockade, which was also
to be integrated with an all out submarine war at sea.
Accordingly instructions were issued on November 8th
ordering preparations to be made for attacks on Coventry,
Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, to be lead by the X-Verfahren
equipped He 111's of KGr 100. The first attack of the
series, that against Coventry, took place on the night of
November 14th, and was carried out by 449 long-range
bombers. On November 21st the Luftwaffe High Command issued
targeting instructions ordering Luftflotte 3 to attack the
larger harbours in their operational area, starting with a
raid on Southampton on the night of the 23rd.
During these operations the Germans considered that any lack
of training in night navigation and bomb aiming would be
more than compensated by the employment of their radio
bombing beams. The premature use over England from June
onwards had, however, compromised the secrecy of Knickebein,
the only system available to the whole bomber force, and
enabled the British to build jammers to counter it. These
were to prove very successful and the Luftwaffe was soon
deprived of a simple and efficient bombing aid. Sadly for
the inhabitants of many British cities efforts were much
less effective against X-Verfahren , and the Germans' latest
development Y-Verfahren, which was about to make its
operational debut over the area.
Y-Verfahren employed a highly complex single directional
radio beam to provide track guidance to the target, while
associated with this was a range measuring facility. Since
it required only one ground transmitting station, and left
minimum latitude for human error, Y-Verfahren was
technically the most advanced of the German systems. The one
serious disadvantage, however, was that unlike Knickebein
and X-Verfahren, only one aircraft at a time could use the
system because of the communications and other signals
involved, and consequently an interval of five to ten
minutes usually separated each attacking aircraft.
The two specialist units, KGr 100 equipped with X-Verfahren,
and III/KG 26 operating Y-Verfahen , became collectively
known as Beleuchtergruppen or Firelighters serving as
pathfinders for the main bomber force. Their aircraft were
employed to start fires during the early stages of an
attack, which helped to guide the normal bomber units to the
target area.
They were assisted by a third unit II/KG 55, which although
not officially recognised as a Beleuchtergruppe, had
considerable operational experience and had displayed
particular skill at finding targets at night. It was this
unit, employing standard navigational techniques, that
dropped parachute marker flares and very high calibre bombs
at the commencement of major attacks on the West Country
during the winter of 1940/41.
The H.E.'s carried externally on their aircraft were used
not only to created fires, but also in an attempt to damage
the water mains in the target area and so hamper the
fire-fighters activities. In Bristol these 1800, 1700 and
1400 kg weapons were often mistaken for Land Mines, few of
which were infact ever deployed against the City.
Because of the weak British defences concentration of effort
in time and place was not considered necessary, and so the
attacking aircraft operated singly over the target, at about
four minute intervals. The various Gruppen involved were
also ordered to attack at widely spaced times, to cause the
maximum disruption, not only to the area actually under
attack, but also to the country as a whole, by placing much
of it under a Red Alert. As a result the attacks could last
from dusk to dawn, although on occasion poor weather on the
Continent necessitated operations to cease before midnight.
The orders for the night of November 24th were for the first
major attack on Bruder, the German code name for Bristol,
but as there had been a good deal of fog over Northern
France earlier in the day, and a chance that it might
return, it was decided operations should be completed by
midnight. A total of 148 aircraft were ordered to the City,
135 of which claimed to have attacked between 18.30 and
23.00 hrs with 156.25 tonnes of H.E.'s, 4.75 tonnes of Oil
Bombs and 12,500 I.B.'s.
The Concentration Point was centred on the harbour and
industrial plant on both sides of the City Docks, with the
intention of "eliminating Bristol as an importing port
supplying much of the Midlands and South of England". The
aircraft involved in this operation were drawn from I/KG 1,
III/KG 26, LG 1, I and III/KG 27, KGr 100, KGr 606, I, II,
and III/KG 51, Stab, I, II, and III/KG 55.
Late in the afternoon the RAF's Radio Monitoring Service
reported that there were slight indications that X-Beams
were aligned over Bristol, but KGr 100 subsequently claimed
to have bombed only by Dead Reckoning and Knickebein. III/KG
26, however, attacked using Y-Verfahren , and the Cherbourg
transmitter was monitored on 45.7 mc/s. In addition the
Cherbourg and Dieppe Knickebein stations laid beams over the
City during the evening.
The wind in the target area was moderate to gentle WSW, and
parachute flares were successfully dropped by II/KG 55 at
the commencement of the raid. Initially, however, because of
broken high cloud bombing was undertaken mostly by radio and
Dead Reckoning methods, but as the attack progressed the sky
cleared and it became possible to bomb visually, guided by
the fires which could be seen from some 250 kilometres. In
general the line of run-up to the target was from south to
north, but later in the evening large cumulus clouds
developed over the City, as a result of numerous fires, and
some raiders were tracked flying round Bristol and
approaching from the north.
At about 19.13 hrs the small gasholder at Marksbury Road,
Bedminster had exploded and the high jet of flame this
produced was noted by both KGr 100 and II/KG 55, although
the latter assumed it to be a gasometer at target GB 52 52,
the St.Philip's Gasworks. The general impression given by
participating airmen was that results were similar to those
achieved at Birmingham and Coventry. As a distributing
centre and important railway junction Bristol, it was
announced, had been wiped out. "Of all the ports on the West
Coast, Bristol WAS the nearest and best situated for the
Midlands, London and the South Coast". For the Germans it
had been a very successful night and only 2 aircraft failed
to return, as a result of which 4 crewmen were kiled and a
further 4 made prisoner, including one who was injured.
The attack, however, resulted in the death of 200
Bristolians, and injuries to a further 689. It had
concentrated on the central area, with further damage
occurring in Clifton, Temple, Knowle, Barton Hill and
Eastville, but greatest destruction took place in the heart
of the City from Broad Quay to Old Market, while St.James'
Barton and St.Philip's suffered severely. Exceedingly large
calibre bombs were reported as having fallen at Eastville,
Speedwell, Temple and Totterdown, while for the greater part
of the night the City was blazing furiously and many well
known buildings were totally destroyed and others gravely
damaged.
Extensive fog on the Continent ruled out any more large
scale raids for the next few days, but with good weather
still prevailing at Vannes airfield, an X-Verfahren assisted
attack was mounted by KGr 100 against the docks at Avonmouth
on the night of November 25th. Nine aircraft participated,
but with thick cloud over the target area only one serious
incident resulted, this being a fire at the Shell Canning
Factory at the Royal Edward Dock.
The next night, with fog still widespread on the Continent
KGr 100 returned to Avonmouth with 7 aircraft, all operating
with X-Verfahren, again against targets in the Royal Edward
Dock. On this occasion there was thick cloud at 1200 metres
with only occasional clear intervals, and no significant
damage was caused, the majority of the bombs falling
harmlessly on open ground in the Avonmouth and Shirehampton
areas.
Bristol was the target for a second major raid on the night
of December 2nd, but once again the operation was restricted
to the first half of the night to allow the bombers to
return to base before the onset of widespread fog on the
Continent. Participating aircraft were drawn from 1 and
III/KG 1, II/KG 77, II and III/LG 1, 1 and III/KG 27, KGr
100, KGr 606, I and II/KG 54, KGr 806, 1 and II/KG 55.
The attack, which the Germans claimed was to complete the
work of destroying the industrial and port installations at
Bristol, was carried out by 121 aircraft between 18.20 and
22.30 hrs, with 120.9 tonnes of H.E.'s, a tonne of Oil Bombs
and 22,140 I.B.'s. Prior to the raid the RAF had correctly
identified X- Beams laid over the City, and just before
nightfall the Knickebein transmitter at Dieppe, previously
deployed over London, suddenly swung round and to be
re-aligned over Bristol.
In the target area at the start of the raid there was nearly
10/10ths cloud cover in two layers, the lower lying between
300 and 1000 metres, and the upper between 2500 and 3000
metres. Underneath, surface visibility was bad and down to
1000 metres, with the result that initial bombing was by
Knickebein and Dead Reckoning methods. The general line of
approach by the raiders was from the south, though a few
aircraft were tracked in from the north-west.
Parachute flares and I.B.'s were dropped at the start of the
raid by II/KG 55, but due to the exceptionally overcast
conditions many initially fell over Clifton and the northern
parts of the town. However, immediately after this opening
attack Oblt. Otto-Bernard Harms, Staffelkäpitan of 4/KG 55,
dived through both layers of cloud to an altitude of 300
metres to check on the positioning of the Gruppe's target
marking fires. Despite the poor visibility he confirmed the
accuracy which his Gruppe had achieved using Knickebein and
Dead Reckoning, aided by the flares. This was undertaken
with complete disregard to the Balloon Barrage and strong
Anti-Aircraft defences.
Later, isolated breaks occurred
in the cloud cover enabling some visual bombing to be
carried out, but the returning crews were unable to provide
an accurate assessment of the success of the operation.
Again the attack force's losses had been minimal and on this
occasion amounted to just 4 men killed as the result of a
single aircraft crashing on take-off. Unknown to the Germans
the damage caused to Bristol was of a more widespread nature
than on November 24th, but the main concentration was
astride a line running about due east and west through
Redfield, St.Paul's, Cotham and Redland. As result 156
people were killed and a further 270 injured.
Bristol's third large raid within a fortnight took place on
the night of December 6th, when 67 crews reported bombing
the City with 77.5 tonnes of H.E.'s, half a tonne of Oil
Bombs and 5688 I.B's, between 19.20 and 22.45 hrs. This was
smaller scale effort than the previous two attacks on
Bristol as gale force west to north-west winds on the
Continent had restricted the activity of the bomber force,
and once again the attack was compressed in time.
The RAF Monitoring Service detected X-Beams which came on
during the afternoon, but these were switched off before the
evening's activity commenced due to KGr 100 being forced to
cancel operations. However, Knickebein transmissions
monitored during the early evening gave the British
authorities an indication that Bristol was the intended
target. The attack force on this occasion comprised I and
III/KG 77, I and II/LG 1, II/KG 27, I and II/KG 51, I, II
and III/KG 55.
As a result of the non-appearance of KGr 100 the raid
undertaken without precision radio assisted pathfinders, and
was opened by II/KG 55 dropping marker flares, a number of
which were carried away to the east in the strong westerly
wind. The direction from which the attack was made was quite
different to that used in previous operations, the raiders
following a line from Shaftesbury to Bath, and when east of
Bristol turning due west to attack the City from east to
west. In the target area the night was extremely cold, but
fine and moonlit, with 1/10th cloud cover at about 750
metres. The good visibility with only a small amount of
broken cloud therefore permitted visual bombing, and the
operation was considered to have been carried out
successfully.
Once again losses were acceptable, and although no aircraft
failed to return 3 crashed on the Continent, resulting in
the death of 6 crewmen with a further 6 being injured. Sadly
in Bristol it was a different story, and during the course
of this attack 100 people were killed and 188 injured, with
much damage being caused by fire. The areas mainly affected
that night being in the vicinity of St.Philip's Marsh,
Temple Meads, the City Centre and Cotham.
At the beginning of January 1941 the forces of Luftflotte 3
deployed against the West Country received a boost with the
decision to employ the bomber units of Luftflotte 2 in joint
operations over Bristol. Thus both II Fliegerkorps and the
anti-shipping IX Fliegerkorps joined the attacks on the
area, bringing with them the He 111's of KG 4, KG 28 and KG
53, the Ju 88's of KG 30, and the Do 17's of KG 2 and KG 3.
Inspite of this German operations during January were
seriously hampered by the bitterly cold NE winds, freezing
conditions and snow which covered much of Britain and the
Continent.
For Bristol the New Year started with a combined attack by
178 aircraft, their task being to complete the destruction
of the harbour installations, large mills, warehouses and
cold stores in the City, in order to paralyse it as a large
trading centre supplying Southern England. During this raid,
which took place on the night of January 3rd, the Germans
claimed to have targeted Bristol with 152 tonnes of H.E's, 2
tonnes of Oil Bombs and 53,568 I.B.'s, the town centre on
both sides of the River Avon being the concentration point.
The aircraft from Luftflotte 3 were drawn from I and III/KG
1, I and III/KG 77, I and III/KG 26, I/LG 1, I and II/KG 27,
KGr 100, I and II/KG 54, Stab, I, II and III/KG 55, while
elements of KG 30, KG 4, KG 3, KG 2 and KG 53 operated under
Luftflotte 2.
Before the raid started RAF radio intercepts had indicated
that an attack was to be mounted against Bristol. It was
known that navigational beams were to be in operation from
17.00 hrs, with the first raid expected to reach Bristol at
18.30 hrs on a beam transmitted by the Cherbourg Knickebein
on a bearing of 335 degrees. In addition X-Verfahren was
operating, while II/KG 55 were as usual to drop parachute
flares early in the operation.
The attack was opened by Luftflotte 3 which operated 111
aircraft over Bristol between 18.35 and 00.38 hrs, with a
second wave of 67 bombers from Luftflotte 2 attacking
between 01.40 and 05.51 hrs. Many aircraft appeared to
meander about after crossing the British Coast and some
early arrivals circled the Bristol area before bombing.
These were awaiting the arrival of the pathfinder aircraft
from KGr 100 which were late departing Vannes because of
weather conditions. III/KG 26 were even later arriving over
the target and on this occasion bombed visually and not by
means of their usual Y-Verfahren.
It was a bitterly cold night with a clear starlit sky and at
the start of the raid the City itself with a covering of
snow and the course of the River Avon, were both clearly
visible in the moonlight. The amount of cloud cover
increased as the night progressed, but breaks still
permitted a degree of visual bombing, although recourse to
Knickebein and Dead Reckoning bombing was at times necessary
until the fires had developed sufficiently to be used as
aiming points. Inspite of clouds closing over the target
crews operating after midnight were able to observe the
fires burning at Bristol from a distance of 150 to 170
kilometres. For the Germans it was another successful night
with only one aircraft crash-landing on return, and no
crewmen killed or injured.
Once again Bristol suffered badly with casualty figures of
149 dead, and 351 injured. The principle areas affected that
night were Bedminster, St.Philip's, Hotwells and Cotham,
with both Temple Meads Station and the City Docks sustaining
a certain amount of damage.
A follow-up attack by 103 aircraft was also attempted
against Avonmouth on the night of January 4th, the
concentration point being centred on the docks and
industrial installations situated in the west and north west
part of the town. The total bomb load dropped between 18.35
and 06.15 hrs was reported as 106.5 tonnes of H.E.'s, 1.5
tonnes of Oil Bombs and 27,722 I.B.'s. Participating units
of Luftflotte 3 were II and III/KG 77, I/KG 26, I and II/KG
27, KGr 100, I, II and III/KG 51, I and II/KG 54, while from
Luftflotte 2 came elements of KG 30, KG 4, KG 3, KG 2 and KG
53.
The RAF Monitoring Service were unable to give any early
warning of an impending attack on Bristol and it was not
until 18.45 hrs that the Kleve Knickebein was detected
having laid a beam over the Thames Estuary area. In addition
KGr 100 were discovered operating with X-Verfahren .
It was another very cold night, but the weather at the start
of the attack was moderately good with 8/10ths cloud at 1500
metres and a bright moon, so the first formations arriving
over the target were, in a number of cases, able to bomb
visually. However, as the attack progressed thick cloud
cover developed after which bombing was principally by Dead
Reckoning and Knickebein, or by using the previously kindled
fires as aiming points. The thick clouds made it difficult
to assess the overall results, and only after midnight were
light flickering fires reported in the Avonmouth Dock area.
Again only one aircraft crash-landed on return and no crew
casualties resulted.
Unknown to the Germans, the raid had actually failed to
develop at Avonmouth, and although a number of fires were
caused in buildings of national importance, most had been
extinguished by 22.00 hrs. The bombing had, by this time,
dispersed along the Bristol Channel coast, past Clevedon
where a soldier was killled and three people injured, to
Weston super Mare where a sharp attack took place. In the
Bristol area only two people were killed and five injured,
but sadly at Weston 34 died and a further 85 received
injuries as a result of the five H.E.'s and an estimated
3000 I.B.'s which fell on the town.
On January 13th the High Command of the German Armed Forces
issued new instructions for the prosecution of the air war
against Britain by night and day. The attacks still being
carried out against the industrial cities of Britain were to
be scaled down in favour of an all out night time assault on
the most important importing harbours, the approaches to
which were also being mined. However, key points of the air
armaments and aircraft industry were still to be subjected,
whenever possible, to Pirate attacks by single aircraft
during daylight hours.
In accordance with these plans Avonmouth was singled out for
another large scale attack on the night of January 16th. It
was to be centred on the town and northern half of the dock
area and its industrial installations. Additionally single
aircraft were briefed to attack Parnall Aircraft at Yate and
Gloster's at Brockworth. The raiders, all from Luftflotte 3,
were drawn from III/KG 26, I/LG 1, I, II and III/KG 27, KGr
100, I, II and III/KG 51, I and II/KG 54, KGr 806, Stab, I,
II and III/KG 55.
That night a total of 126 aircraft reported over Avonmouth,
and 15 over Bristol between 19.30 and 05.08 hrs, claiming to
have dropped 158.2 tonnes of H.E.'s and 54,864 I.B.'s. Both
X and Y-Verfahren were in operation although an X-Beam
signal failure and winds stronger than forecast made KGr
100's bombing uncertain. Flares were again dropped at the
beginning of the attack, and also at 01.45 hrs when a second
phase began.
The first formations over the target encountered 8/10ths
cloud cover with thick haze which only started to break up
after about 23.00 hrs. Shortly after a lone aircraft from
III/KG 55 dived down to an altitude of 1200 metres and
reported that there was a very large fire in the target
area. As a result of the poor visibility at the beginning of
the action bombing was mainly by Dead Reckoning and
Knickebein. However, by 02.00 hrs the weather had improved
sufficiently to allow visual bombing through breaks in the
cloud, although by then dense smoke covered the town. Loses
were again small with only 8 crewmen being killed in the 2
aircraft which failed to return
Early in the raid numerous I.B's were released over the dock
area and a number of fires were started, but with the
assistance of military personnel they were speedily
extinguished, and damage to vital buildings was confined to
small dimensions. A further shower of I.B's fell in the
early hours of the 17th, but on this occasion the fires
started quickly got out of control, and damage done to
docks' property and industrial buildings in the area was
considerable.
Unknown to the Luftwaffe they had in fact succeeded in
causing such serious damage at Avonmouth that January 17th
was the only day during the entire war, that, due to enemy
action, the Docks were prevented from working normally.
Casualties were, however, mercifully smaller than in
previous large scale attacks, with only 18 killed and 109
injured in the whole of the Bristol area.
Impossible weather for much of February, with many of the
grass airfields on the continent waterlogged, severely
hampered Luftwaffe offensive operations and for the first
time in many months no major attacks were carried out. The
poor weather did, however, permit a number of Pirate raids
on aircraft manufacturing plants to be undertaken by low
flying aircraft taking advantage of the overcast conditions.
These sorties became a feature of operations towards the end
of the month, and on the 22nd an He 111 of II/KG 27
attempted a raid on the Parnall Aircraft factory at Yate. It
successfully penetrated the defences as far as the Severn
Estuary, but as it neared Avonmouth, in drizzle beneath the
low scud, it was hit by AA gunfire and crashing on the mud
at Portbury became the second victim of Bristol's Heavy
Anti-Aircraft guns.
II/KG 27, however, returned and on the afternoon of February
27th when a particularly successful raid was made on the
Parnall plant, by a single He 111 commanded by Oblt. Hermann
Lohmann. Weather conditions again favoured Pirate operations
with much low cloud and occasional rain and drizzle in the
target area. The attack was carried out at 14.36 hrs, from a
height of only 30 metres, with seven 250 kg H.E.'s some
fitted with delayed action fuzes. Lohmann later reported
that he had come in from from the north, with the bombs
being distributed over the whole length of the target. Five
hits were observed on a workshop and an explosion was seen
in the northern part of the target area.
At Parnall's factory considerable damage had indeed been
caused, and tragically 53 workers died, with a further 150
being injured, many of them victims of the delayed action
bombs. The aircraft itself was lucky to escape for as it had
ben successfully engaged by the Yate defences, with 8 rounds
of 40mm Bofors, and 40 rounds from Light Machine Guns being
fired.
During March, as the weather improved and with the bomber
units reinforced and partly re-equipped, it became possible
to resume the offensive against the principle British ports,
while in daylight the Pirate attacks continued against
aircraft factories and other associated industrial
installations.
On March 6th it was the turn of the the Bristol Aeroplane
Company to be targeted by a lone He 111 of I/KG 27 commanded
by Oblt. Hollinde. The bomber's arrival caused the Bristol
sirens to sound just after 18.00 hrs on that gloomy evening
and after machine gunning the outskirts of the city seven
H.E's were aimed at the Filton works. The weapons, however,
missed the factory completely but it was assumed that
serious damage had been caused, and for this achievement the
crew were given special mention in the High Command of the
Armed Forces Communiqué issued the following day.
By contrast the Yate plant of Parnall Aircraft was again
successfully attacked by Oblt. Lohmann on the afternoon of
March 7th, when he engaged the target with another seven 250
kg bombs from a height of just 25 metres! Lohmann reported
that five bombs had made hits on assembly shops, with the
other two falling on accommodation blocks and outbuildings
in the southern part of the factory complex. For their
actions during this, and for their previous attack on
February 27th, this crew were also given a special mention
in the High Command of the Armed Forces Communiqué issued on
March 9th.
Happily for Parnall's employees, on this occasion only three
workers were killed and 20 injured. However, as a result of
the additional damage caused during the raid production came
to a complete standstill and the total dispersal of the
factory was immediately ordered.
On the night of March 16th the harbour installations at
Bristol and Avonmouth were again selected for attack, and
164 crews from the bomber units of Luftflotte 3 subsequently
reported over the area, claiming to have dropped a total of
164.25 tonnes of H.E.'s and 33,840 I.B's between 20.35 and
03.25 hrs. To guide the pathfinders X-Beams were aligned
over Avonmouth and Y-Beams over Bristol, while flares were
also dropped at the commencement of the attack.
At Avonmouth the Concentration Point was a rectangle
covering the port area adjacent warehouses and industrial
works, while at Bristol it was centred on the Floating
Harbour, down stream of the Bathurst Basin. The attack force
for the raid was drawn from I and II/KG 1, III/KG 26, I and
II/KG 77, Stab, I, II and III/KG 55, I, II and III/KG 27,
KGr 100, I, II and III/KG 51, I/KG 54 and II/KG 76.
Over the target areas the German crews initially encountered
thick cloud, with mist later, and consequently bombing was
predominantly by Knickebein and Dead Reckoning. However,
towards the close of the attack intermittent improvements in
conditions enabled some crews to bomb visually, but many
used searchlight activity as an indication that they were
over the city, sometimes additionally aided by the glow of
fires seen through cloud or mist. A large detonation
followed by a tongue of flame some 1000 metres high was
observed a little after midnight, and this the crews
correctly assumed was the explosion of a gasometer, although
they thought it to be at the St.Philip's Gas Works, rather
than at its true location at Stapleton Road.
German casualties on this night were higher than in previous
attempts against the Bristol area, but none of the aircraft
had been brought down by the defences. In all 5 crashed in
France killing 12 men and injuring a further 6, while the
one aircraft which did come down in England did so as a
result of engine failure. This resulted in a further 4
crewmen being taken prisoner.
That night bombs fell in many parts of Bristol, but the main
attack was roughly east to west of a line from Stapleton
Road Station, through the City Centre to Clifton Down
Station. In addition to the City Centre, the areas most
affected were Fishponds, Eastville, Whitehall, Easton,
St.Paul's, Montpelier, Kingsdown, Cotham, Redland and
Clifton. Of all Bristol's major air attacks this was perhaps
the worst as due to the poor visibility over the target area
the raid had drifted into mainly residential parts, a number
of bombers being attracted by the few large fires which had
developed. As a result the City's casualty figures were
higher than at any time during the war, with 257 killed and
391 injured.
Unknown to the suffering Bristolians things in the area
could have been a lot worse, for it had been intended that
the bomber units of Luftflotte 2 should also participate in
the attack, but fog over their bases in the Low Countries,
had prevented them from operating.
The reinforced bomber force in the West was not, however, to
maintain its new found strength for very long, the Luftwaffe
High Command having issued orders on March 26th transferring
of some 600 combat aircraft from France, Germany and the
Mediterranean, to bases in Bulgaria and Rumania, to fly
operations in support of the imminent invasion of Greece and
Yugoslavia due to start on April 6th.
Although poor weather set in during the latter part of
March, a slight improvement in conditions over some bomber
bases in North West France late in the day had allowed a
sharp raid to be carried out against local harbour
installations on the night of the 29th by III/KG 1, II/KG
76, III/KG 26 and KGr 100.
The targets were South-East Bristol, with the concentration
point between the east end of the Floating Harbour and the
two Gasholders situated 2 kilometres east-north-eastwards,
and Avonmouth where the harbour and industrial installations
were the objectives. To guide the pathfinders both X and
Y-Beams were aligned on Avonmouth, and III/KG 26 later
reported that the Y-Verfahren signals were well received.
36 aircraft subsequently claimed to have dropped a total 33
tonnes of H.E.'s and 13,088 I.B.'s on Bristol and Avonmouth
between 21.05 and 22.08 hrs. At Bristol only five crews
bombed visually, the other 15 using Dead Reckoning and
Knickebein because of the cloud and mist over the target. At
Avonmouth fires were reported in the target area and these
helped to guide following crews who also had some difficulty
in locating the objective.
No German aircraft were lost and no incidents were reported
in Bristol, but at Avonmouth a number of fires were started
in the dock area, and three tanks belonging to the
Anglo-American Oil Company burned furiously, the last not
being extinguished until 16.30 hrs the following day.
Casualty figures that night were low, with 6 people being
killed and 17 injured.
Normal Luftwaffe operations finally re-started after
nightfall on April 3rd, when taking advantage of the
generally improved weather conditions, an attempt was made
against the harbour and industrial installations at
Avonmouth by some 76 aircraft of Luftflotte 3 drawn from
III/KG 26, II and III/KG 1, II/KG 76, KGr 100, II/KG 27, I
and II/KG 54 and KGr 806. Once again to guide the
pathfinders, both X and Y-Beams were aligned over Avonmouth,
and it was subsequently claimed that a total 79.8 tonnes of
H.E.'s and 8938 I.B.'s were dropped over Bristol and
Avonmouth, during the attack which lasted from 21.16 to
00.45 hrs.
At the beginning of the operation there was 7/10th's cloud
cover which cleared to 2/10th's with a half moon between
22.00 and 23.00 hrs. Thereafter conditions deteriorated to
10/10th's cloud with rain by midnight. As a result only 49
aircraft actually reported over Avonmouth some crews bombing
visually, but the majority using Dead Reckoning and
Knickebein. The remaining 27 aircraft attacked, as an
alternative, the Floating Harbour and industrial area of
Bristol where the bombing was entirely by Dead Reckoning and
radio methods due to the total cloud cover they encountered.
German loses were again minimal, but the one aircraft lost
was brought down by a Beaufighter of 604 Squadron based at
Middle Wallop in Hampshire, and flown by the legendary
Flight Lieutenant John "Cats Eyes" Cunningham. It crashed
into the sea off the Isle of Wight with the loss of its 4
man crew.
During this raid the fire fighting services were so
effective that although thousands of I.B's were dropped,
particularly in the section of Bristol from St.Michael's
Hill to Redland Green, no major fires developed. A little
later, when the H.E. attack developed, it was on a line
between the Horseshoe Bend and Filton, while in Avonmouth
only a few scattered incidents were reported. That night in
Bristol a total of 22 people lost their lives with a further
56 being injured.
The attack sequence continued, and the following night 85
aircraft drawn from I, II and III/KG 77, III/KG 26, II/KG
27, KGr 100, I and II/KG 54 and KGr 806 again targeted the
harbour and industrial installations at Avonmouth, two
raiding Bristol as an alternative. The operation against
Avonmouth by the remaining 83 aircraft took place between
21.15 and 01.30 hrs with 80.4 tonnes of H.E.'s and 19,675
I.B.'s.
Just as on the previous night the pathfinder force of KGr
100 and III/KG 26 successfully operated with X and Y-Verfahren
, although III/KG 26 were unlucky enough to have an aircraft
shot down at Hewish, near Weston super Mare, another victim
of a Beaufighter of 604 Squadron from Middle Wallop. This
was the only aircraft to be lost that night and it resulted
in the death of 2 of the crewmen, with the other 3 being
taken prisoner.
It was initially a fine clear night with a half moon,
although visibility did deteriorate slightly during the
latter part of the operation. Not surprisingly the crews
subsequently reported that the target area was visible for
much of the attack, and at times was very clearly seen in
the moonlight. As a result bombing was predominantly visual
and only a small proportion of crews found it necessary to
use Dead Reckoning or Knickebein.
At the start of the operation the whole of Bristol was lit
up by a large number of chandelier flares, 15 of which were
counted in the air at one time, while H.E.'s and I.B.'s
followed at regular intervals. However, the promptitude of
the fire fighting parties and others once again helped to
save the City from serious damage.
Avonmouth was principally affected, and to a lesser extent
the Westbury and Whitchurch areas, but minimal damage was
caused at Avonmouth Docks, many of the I.B.'s which fell in
the vicinity burning out harmlessly on high ground in
Shirehampton Park. The most serious incident that night
occurred at the National Smelting Company, where production
was seriously affected, particularly in the Fertilizer and
Acid Works. Considering the scope of the raid and the number
of H.E.'s dropped, casualties were small, with 3 dead and 21
injured.
The series of raids directed against the local harbour
installations continued on the night of April 7th with a
minor attempt against Bristol by 22 aircraft from KGr 100, I
and II/KG 54, KGr 806, I, II and III/KG 55, nine of which
subsequently attacked Avonmouth as an alternative. This
operation was carried out in conjunction with large scale
efforts against the Glasgow, Greenock and Liverpool areas.
In addition a further 11 aircraft from KGr 100, II and
III/KG 1, I and III/KG 27 unable to locate their main
targets also raided Bristol where nine people were injured,
the most serious damage being reported in Horfield. A total
of 29.2 tonnes of H.E's and some 6442 I.B.'s were reported
dropped on Bristol and Avonmouth in this attack which lasted
from 21.13 to 01.17 hrs. As it was overcast in the target
area, with 10/10th's cloud at 1000 metres, the operation was
carried out using only Knickebein and Dead Reckoning
methods, and no German aircraft were lost during the
operation.
The last of the major attacks on the Bristol area took place
on the night of April 11th 1941, and is locally known as the
Good Friday Raid, during which 15 aircraft from Luftflotte 2
and 138 from Luftflotte 3 reported dropping 193 tonnes of
H.E.'s and 36,888 I.B.'s between 22.10 and 03.15 hrs. The
designated targets were the harbour and industrial
installations in South West and West Central Bristol over
which Y-Beams were aligned, as well as Avonmouth and
Portishead Docks, which was covered by X-Beams.
Participating units from Luftflotte 3 were I, II and III/KG
27, KGr 100, II and III/KG 1, III/KG 26, I and II/KG 54, KGr
806, Stab, I, II and III/KG 55, while from Luftflotte 2 came
I and II/KG 53.
In the target area the weather was generally fine with a
full moon and a high layer of fleecy cloud. As a result,
over Bristol, the bombing was carried out mainly with visual
reference, however, from time to time thick cloud required
the use of Dead Reckoning or other radio assisted methods.
At 02.10 hrs the crews of I/KG 55 noted a large explosion
followed by a flame rising 1500 metres into the sky,
announcing the destruction of a gasometer at Canon's Marsh,
the third to be lost at Bristol during the Blitz. The
aircraft attacking Avonmouth also reported bombing visually,
while at Portishead a considerable amount of smoke was
encountered. The German attrition rate on night operations
was now mounting and 5 bombers were lost, 3 which failed to
return, including yet another shot down by the now Squadron
Leader John Cunningham of 604 Squadron, and a further 2
which crashed in France. These losses resulted in the death
of 17 crewmen, while a further 2 were injured.
In Bristol it was seen as a two phase attack, the first
phase beginning shortly after 22.00 hrs when the majority of
the incidents straddled a north and south line from Bristol
Bridge to Horfield. The second phase, which commenced just
after midnight, affected entirely different districts of the
City, with St.Augustine's, Bedminster and Knowle, suffering
badly, and to a lesser extent Avonmouth and Shirehampton.
The total casualties in the Bristol area that night were 180
people killed and 382 injured.
Although it was not realised at the time, the main Blitz on
Bristol had now ended, and although in early May German
bombers attacked on a number of nights, it was only in
relatively small numbers. These were aircraft which had
selected the City as an alternative target, being unable to
locate their main objectives in the Liverpool and Glasgow
areas. The most serious of these raids took place on the
night of May 7th, when as a result of 10/10th's cloud cover
over Liverpool some 16 aircraft from II and III/KG 27, KGr
100, I, II and III/KG 55 attacked Bristol, causing much
damage in the Knowle, Bedminster, Clifton and City areas,
killing 20 people and injuring a further 84.
From mid-May onwards the Luftwaffe was preoccupied with the
forthcoming invasion of Russia, but the basic plan still
called for for a continued assault on Britain's war economy,
industrial capacity and importing docks, in order to
camouflage the movement of German aircraft to the East. As
part of this strategy the use of the minelaying units
operating against England was reviewed, and by the end of
the month instructions had been issued detailing their
temporary deployment against selected land targets, where
they were to assist the remaining bomber Gruppen by dropping
Land Mines.
In a final effort on the night of May 30th 34 aircraft
attacked Liverpool, while a further 15 (units not recorded)
made for Bristol, where the crews claimed to have dropped 4
tonnes of H.E.'s and 12 Land Mines. As a result damage
occurred in the Clifton, Westbury, Sea Mills and St.Anne's
areas of Bristol where 12 people were killed and 29 injured,
and although no Land Mines actually fell on the City that
night, two came down at Kingston Seymour, including one
which failed to explode.
According to German records very few other Land Mines were
ever aimed at Bristol, but on the night of June 11th a lone
He 111 of I/KG 28, the unit normally employed in sea mining
around the West Country's coastline, dropped two on the
Bedminster area killing 16 and injuring 77. This aircraft
unable to locate its assigned target in the Birmingham area,
had again selected Bristol as a suitable alternative.
With few German bombers left in France the raids on the West
Country all but ceased, although KGr 100, employing X-Verfahren
, continued to carry out small scale night attacks on local
airfields and aircraft factories. The Bristol Aeroplane
Company at Filton being their objective on the night of June
14th, while the Gloster Aircraft Company at Hucclecote was
targeted on the 16th.
By mid-June 1941, however, the Air Battle for England as
German historians refer to the period since the fall of
France, had finally drawn to a close. The whole of
Luftflotte 2, with the exception of IX Fliegerkorps,
together with the majority of the bomber units of Luftflotte
3, had now completed their move East in readiness for the
attack on Russia, which opened shortly before dawn on June
22nd.
During the period August 12th 1940 to June 26th 1941 Bristol
had suffered badly at the hands of the Luftwaffe. According
to German figures issued in 1944 it was the fourth most
heavily bombed city in the country, with only London,
Liverpool, and Birmingham receiving more attention, while
Coventry, synonymous in Britain with widespread destruction,
was in seventh place. It was claimed that 1237 tonnes of
H.E.'s and Oil Bombs, plus 248 tonnes of I.B.'s had been
aimed at the Bristol during the course of 10 significant
attacks on the City, in which 50 or more tonnes of high
explosives had been used.
Towards the end of July a bizarre incident took place
locally concerning a Ju 88 of I/KG 30, which was flying back
from an attack on Birkenhead Docks. This aircraft became the
victim of electronic countermeasures directed by the RAF
against German navigational beacons, resulting in the crew
becoming hopelessly lost. Low on fuel and thinking they were
over France, at 06.20 hrs on the morning of July 24th they
successfully landed at RAF Broadfield Down, an airfield
which was still under construction. So it was that a Ju 88
became the first aircraft to land on what is now the main
runway of Bristol's Lulsgate Airport, and subsequently saw
service with the RAF as EE205!
With the majority of German bombers now operating on the
Eastern Front, by August 1941 only about 120 bomber and mine
laying aircraft remained to continue to enforce the blockade
of Britain. Nevertheless, the hope remained that Russia
would be crushed before the end of the year, thereby
releasing the Kampfgruppen for another winter campaign
against Britain.
With so few aircraft available for operations over Britain
very little activity was experienced over the Bristol area
in the latter part of 1941, although mine laying around the
coasts of Southern England re-started during September, with
the transfer of the Ju 88's of III/KG 30 from the Balkans to
Melun in France. The unit extended its operations to the
Bristol Channel and Severn Estuary area in early October,
before removing to Northern Norway in December 1941.
Locally, as a result of these activities six ships were
sunk, and a further one damaged, while one man died at
Oldbury Naite on the night of November 25th, a victim of a
stray mine which fell on land.
During late November 1941 the pathfinder units KGr 100 and
III/KG 26 had been declared non-operational and temporarily
returned from the Eastern Front. Shortly after, on December
15th 1941 at Märkisch-Friedland, an experimental test range
in Germany, KGr 100 and III/KG 26 combined to form KG 100
and the following month 2/KG 100 was detached an an
experimental and training flight under the title Erprobungs
und Lehr Kommando X-Y. Although this unit was to undertake
development work on both types of bombing aid it was
particularly involved with bringing into operational service
a new variant of X-Verfahren known as Taub which left the
old modulation frequency on the transmissions so that the
British would continue to jam it, whilst superimposing a
supersonic frequency above the limit of human hearing.
Ergr.u.Lehr Kdo X-Y, commanded by Hauptmann Siegfried
Langer, took up residence at Amiens, in France, in
mid-February 1942 and began experimental operations against
Britain with an attempt against Hull by ten aircraft on the
night of March 8th.
This was followed, when cloud cover of a suitable character
allowed, by experimental daylight precision attacks using X-Verfahren
, these being carried out during the first ten days of the
April, and included missions to the Bristol Aeroplane
Company at Filton, on the evening of April 3rd and Gloster
Aircraft at Brockworth, near Gloucester, on the afternoons
of April 4th and April 9th, by which time the unit had been
re-titled Eprobungs und Lehr Kommando 100 and was operating
from Chartres.
A most difficult situation arose when, following a
successful RAF attack on Lübeck on the night of March 28th,
German public opinion demanded heavy reprisal attacks
against British cities. Although few aircraft could be
spared from the Russian Front a small formation was
assembled for which the He 111's of Ergr.u.Lehr Kdo 100 were
to act as pathfinders. The main bomber force, comprising
some 80 aircraft, was drawn from II and III/KG 2, and II/KG
40 equipped with Dornier Do 217's, as well as Kü Fl Gr 106,
an anti-shipping unit equipped with Ju 88's, while I/KG 2
with around 25 Do 217's joined the battle a little later.
The attacks were planned to start during the moonlight
period at the end of April, and copying the tactics so
successfully employed by the RAF against German towns, were
to be concentrated and of short duration in order to
minimise British defensive action.
The series of RAF raids on Rostock, which began on April
23rd, really brought things to a head and as a result the
Germans threatened eradication of all British cities listed
in Baedeker's tourist guidebook. The raids, thereafter
became known in both Germany and Britain as the Baedeker
Raids. For the first time in the war the Germans clearly
stated that "besides raids on ports and industry, terror
attacks of a retaliatory nature are to be carried out
against towns other than London", the campaign opening with
operations against Exeter on the night of the 24th.
Bath was the target on the following two nights with all
bomber units of Luftflotte 3 being called upon, including
for the first time the training crews of the fourth Gruppen,
of which IV/KG 2, IV/KG 3, IV/KG 4, IV/KG 30, IV/KG 55 and
IV/KG 77 were available flying an assortment of obsolete Do
17's, He 111's and Ju 88's. Once the aircraft arrived over
the City they would be able to fly around at will, make
extensive use of shallow dive bombing and machine gun the
streets, as the City possessed no Anti-Aircraft guns or
Balloon Barrage protection.
On the night of April 25th the Luftwaffe flew a total of 151
bomber sorties to Bath, with most aircraft making two
flights, the crews claiming to have dropped dropped 206
tonnes of H.E's and 3564 I.B.'s on the City in the biggest
effort against Britain since July 1941. The pathfinders from
Ergr.u.Lehr Kdo 100 were operating that night with Y-Verfahren,
successfully leading in the other participating units from
II and III/KG 2, II/KG 40, Kü Fl Gr 106 and Kü Fl Gr 506, in
addition to the assorted aircraft from the fourth Gruppen.
The Red Alert went out in Bath at 22.59 hrs, and shortly
after, the sky, which had been clear with a bright half
moon, was filled with the light from chandelier flares,
which were quickly followed by I.B.'s, the first fires
developing in the west of the City in the Upper and Lower
Bristol Road areas. Then came the H.E.'s, one of the first
of which destroyed No.3 Gasholder at the Gasworks, while
others caused serious damage to the Kingsmead area, at the
Abbey Church House and Circus Tavern. In addition a serious
fire developed at the Midland Railway Goods Yard. Some of
the bombers, however, mis-identified the target completely
and bombs also fell on the Brislington area of Bristol,
where 18 were killed and 41 injured. This, the first phase
of the attack, ended with the sounding of the All Clear at
00.11 hrs.
The German aircraft then returned to their French bases to
refuel and rearm before taking-off again on their second
sorties of the night. The first of the bombers crossed the
English Coast at 04.20 hrs and in Bath the Red Alert was
issued at 04.35 hrs. On this occasion the bombing, whilst
heavy was rarely concentrated, although both the Kingsmead
and Oldfield Park areas again received a fair amount of
attention. Other isolated bombing also took place at
Southdown and North Bath, while railway traffic was also
affected, the main line between Bristol and London being
closed by a damaged bridge at Oldfield Park, before the All
Clear sounded at 06.02 hrs. A total of four German aircraft
failed to return, resulting in the death of 14 crewmen, with
a further two being taken prisoner.
The following night a further
83 bombers were dispatched to Bath in a repeat operation,
the participating crews reporting dropping 107 tonnes of
H.E's and 7956 I.B's on the City. The raid, which took place
on a fine night with some cloud, lasted from 01.25 hrs until
the All Clear at 02.45 hrs, and started as usual with flares
and I.B's. The old residential part of the Bath was chiefly
affected with many houses being destroyed. Within a short
time numerous small fires, plus two large areas of
conflagration were developing, one around the Kingsmead and
Green Park area and the other near Bath Spa Railway Station.
In addition the area south of the river from Holloway and
Beechen Cliff to Bear Flat received a large number of H.E.'s.
For the Germans this was yet another successful attack, as
just one aircraft failed to return, although its 4 man crew
were all killed, as were two men in other aircraft.
The damage caused in Bath over the two nights was very
serious, with over 80 per cent of the City being affected in
some way or another, while tragically the raids resulted in
the death of 400 people, with a further 872 being injured.
By this period little daylight reconnaissance was possible
over the Bristol area, nevertheless on April 29th a Bf
109F-5 of 3(F)/123 succeeded in taking post-raid photographs
of Bath, as well as photographing Avonmouth and the Nailsea
Munition Store, its long range drop tank falling at Pill
around midday.
Folowing the Exeter and Bath attacks York, Norwich, and
Cowes were targeted by an operational force of between 40 to
70 aircraft lead by Epgr.u.Lehr Kdo 100 which, in mid-May,
was re-designated Ergr.u.Lehr Kdo 17, and still undertaking
experimental daylight attacks in addition to its nocturnal
duties. Typical of these was the attempt against Avonmouth
Docks by seven He 111's, using both X and Y Verfahren, in
poor weather on the afternoon of May 23rd. Although the
operation was not a great success, one aircraft being lost
and the nearest bombs falling at Severn Tunnel Junction,
some six miles from the objective, it was the first occasion
when the British first definitely detected supersonic
modulation on the X signals allowing countermeasures to be
immediately put into action.
No other local targets were actually engaged until Weston
super Mare was attacked on the nights of June 27th and 28th
resulting in the death of 102 persons, with a further 400
injured. Not strictly speaking part of the Baedeker series,
it was chosen as a reprisal for the British Thousand Bomber
raid on Bremen on the night of June 26th, because German
intelligence understood that Churchill was to stay in the
town on his return from a visit to the United States.
53 aircraft of I, II and III/KG 2, II/KG 40 and Kü Fl Gr 106
claimed to have attack Weston on the night of June 27th,
with a total of 28.6 tonnes of H.E's and 18,832 I.B's, while
2 Ju 88's of 1(F)/123 kept a look-out for British fighters.
The raid began in brilliant weather with a full moon and the
first bombs were dropped just before the siren warning at
01.22 hrs. A toatl of 62 H.E. incidents involving casualties
were reported from many locations, but the main
concentration was in the residential and shopping centre of
the town. The attack, which was of short duration, ended at
about 02.00 hrs, the majority of the damage having been
confined to residential property. From the attack force only
one aircraft was lost, this having crashed in France
injuring the 4 crewmen.
The following night a similar number of bombers from the
same units delivered some 27 tonnes of H.E.'s and 20,096
I.B's, the Weston Anti-Aircraft guns engaging them between
01.59 and 02.24 hrs. During this raid it was the main
shopping centre which was chiefly affected with many shops
and commercial premises being destroyed as a result of the
large fires which took hold in the Regent Street, High
Street, South Parade, Waterloo Street and Boulevard area.
Railway services in and out of Weston were also suspended,
and at the station the waiting room and goods shed were
destroyed by fire, as were 12 passenger coaches. Once again
German losses were small, and from the 3 aircraft which
crashed in France only 3 men were killed and one injured.
In July the Luftwaffe's activities were directed mainly
against ports and targets of the British armaments industry,
the month starting with an unsuccessful attempt on the
harbour installations at Bristol on the night of July 1st in
which I, II and III/KG 2, and II/KG 40 were known to have
taken part.
Over the target it was a moon light night, but there was
thick haze and 4/10ths cloud at 1200 metres. 46 German
aircrews subsequently claimed to have successfully attacked
with 20 tonnes of H.E.'s, but due to the poor visibility no
bombs whatsoever fell on the docks, although widespread
bombing occurred on the South and South West coasts and in
South Wales. Infact, the nearest any bombs came to Bristol
that night were those reported falling at Brean Down at
02.10 hrs. One raider subsequently landed back in France
with one crewman killed and one injured, the result of a
night fighter attack.
During the summer of 1942 the strength of the units involved
in operations over Britain had eroded steadily as the ever
strenghtening British defences took their toll, a total of
40 aircraft having been lost. There was, however, still
pressure on the Luftwaffe to increase its effort as the RAF
attacks on Germany had become progressively heavier,
culminating in the Thousand Bomber raids on Cologne, Essen
and Bremen. One of the few possibilities open to the Germans
at this time was to employ their new and experimental Ju 86R
high altitude bombers over Britain, and so the trials unit
the Höhenkampfkommando der Versuchsstelle für Höhenflüege,
later re-designated 14/KG 6, moved to Beauvais in France to
commence operations.
The Ju 86R was not particularly fast, nor did it carry any
armament, but for its survival relied upon the fact that it
could attack from altitudes of over 12,000 metres, out of
reach of British fighters then in service. Its offensive
load, however, was limited to a single 250 kg bomb.
Operations by the Höhenkampfkommando der Versuchsstelle für
Höhenflüeg started with an attack on Camberly on the morning
of August 24th, followed by sorties to Southampton and
Stanstead, while on the 28th Bristol was targeted. The lone
aircraft, commanded by Ltn. Erich Sommer and piloted by
Fw.Horst Götz, appeared over the City at about 09.20 hrs,
its bomb impacting on a Ford Ten car in Bristol's Broad
Weir.
As a result of the subsequent explosion one of three nearby
buses was seriously damaged by blast, while petrol from the
car's fuel tank was sprayed in a more or less atomized state
over the other two which immediately burst into flames. The
death toll was horrific with 45 being killed, many burnt to
death in the blazing buses, with a further 45 injured. In
terms of loss of life this was the single most serious
incident to occur in Bristol during the Second World War.
Bristol was once again the target on September 12th but on
this occasion the lone Ju 86R, again flown by Götz and
Sommer, was intercepted en-route by a specially modified
Spitfire flown by Pilot Officer Prince Emanuel Galitzine,
from the RAF's newly formed 'SS' Flight at Northolt.
For the first time a Ju 86R was engaged in combat, and the
crew, who hastily jettisoned their bomb near Salisbury, were
lucky to return to France with only one cannon hole through
the port wing. So ended the highest air battle ever fought
over Britain, and soon after the high altitude bombing
experiment ceased.
By the beginning of 1943, due to the strength of the British
defences, it became almost impossible for the Luftwaffe to
fly daylight reconnaissance missions over much of Southern
England and a switch was therefore made to night sorties.
When engaged in this work the aircraft carried photographic
flash bombs and the base plates of two such spent devices
were recovered for the first time locally at 23.00 hrs at
Long Ashton on the night of January 23rd when a single
aircraft operated over the Exeter, South Wales and Bristol
area. Although the area was not targeted during 1943,
Cardiff was attacked and in preparation for this on the
afternoon of May 13th two Bf 109F-5's of 3(F)/123 undertook
a pre-raid mission to South Wales, their drop tanks falling
at Yatton at 13.00 hrs, on what was one of the last daylight
reconnaissance operations carried out locally. The Cardiff
raid in fact took place on the night of May 17th and during
the course of this a few stray bombs fell at Aust and Uffz.
Joachim Tröger of 3/KG 2 was rescued from the sea off
Clevedon, his Do 217 having crashed into Woodspring Bay
following a mid-air collision. This operation was, not
surprisingly, followed by post-raid photographic sorties,
and between 01.44 and 01.49 hrs on the morning of May 31st
eight photo flash bombs fell south of Bristol, one of which,
having failed to ignite, was recovered unburnt at Winford.
By the end of the year the terrible pounding that the RAF
was inflicting on Germany's cities had reached intolerable
levels and on December 12th Göring ordered a new series of
retaliatory attacks to be carried out against Britain under
the code name of Steinbock or Ibex. As a result the
Luftwaffe long range bomber force in the West was
reinforced, and by mid-January 1944 there was available
about 500 aircraft.
The Germans, however, realised that standards of training
amongst the bomber crews left much to be desired, and
therefore made considerable efforts to emulate the examples
of RAF Bomber Command by the use of the expert pathfinder
crews from the specially formed I/KG 66, in addition to the
Illuminator Ju 188's of KG 2. These units operated an
elaborate target marking system which involved using
clusters of parachute flares as route, as well as target sky
markers, in addition to dropping incendiary ground markers.
The attacks were themselves to be of short duration, heavy
and devastating.
Operations began with a raid on London on the night of
January 21st, the Capital continuing to be the target
throughout February. These missions, however, produced most
unsatisfactory results with the Ju 88's and Ju 188's of I/KG
66 failing to provide adequate target marking. In addition
unlike the Night Blitz of 1940/41 and, to a lesser degree,
the Baedeker Raids of 1942, the night defences now had the
upper hand. Large numbers of radar controlled AA guns, 'Z'
rocket batteries and searchlights, together with a well
equipped night fighter force directed by a most efficient
Ground Controlled Interception radar system, took a heavy
toll of the attackers, with 129 aircraft being lost during
January and February alone.
Nor were these the German's only problems, for on January
23rd Allied troops had landed at Anzio in Italy
necessitating the transfer of about 100 aircraft for
operations in the Mediterranean area, a further cut in the
already inadequate force in the West. As if this was not
enough the new four engined bomber, the He 177, was also
proving to be a design disaster, suffering some 50 per cent
breakdowns in operational use, many of them involving engine
fires!
March saw a further four attacks on London, as well as an
unsuccessful raid on Hull on the 19th, followed towards the
end of the month by the first directed against Bristol since
1942. By this time only 297 bombers were available for
operations over Britain, these being the Do 217's of I and
III/KG 2, Stab and 6/KG 100 and part of I/KG 66; the Ju 88's
of II and III/KG 6, Stab, II and III/KG 30, Stab, I and II
KG/54 and Stab/KG 77; the Ju 188's of II/KG 2, Stab and I/KG
6 and part of I/KG 66; the Me 410's of Stab and I/KG 54; as
well as the He 177's of I/KG 100.
On the night of March 27th the target was the harbour
installations at Bristol, while a co-ordinated attack was
also undertaken against night fighter airfields in the
Bristol area by the Me 410's of I/KG 51. To aid navigation
the pathfinders of 1/KG 66 employed Y-Verfahren which was in
use between 22.18 and 01.38 hrs from Cherbourg, Calais and
St.Valery, while the Knickebein transmitters at Bergen op
Zoom, Caen, Cherbourg West, and Morlaix were also in
operation.
The main attack force, probably made up of I, II and III/KG
2, I, II, and III/KG 6, II and III/KG 30, I and II/KG 54,
I/KG 66 and I/KG 100, were to converge on Guernsey before
crossing Lyme Bay at about 23.44 hrs and flying over South
West England to the first turning point, known as the
Initial Point, at the mouth of the Usk near Newport. This
was to be marked by four red flares dropped at four minute
intervals starting at 23.58 hrs. These were to be laid at an
altitude of 3000 metres by four Ju 188 Illuminators of II/KG
2.
From here the final approach to the target required a four
minute leg along the north bank of the River Severn to the
second turning point at Beachley, near Chepstow, followed by
a short north to south run-in to Bristol. Here the target
was to be marked by I/KG 66 with a cluster of white flares
and one of yellow. Additionally, in an attempt to jam the
British radar system Düppel anti-radar foil was also
dropped, first off shore, but later spreading to cover
almost the whole operational area. This was the first
operational use of this material in a raid against Bristol.
Over the target area there was a 16 kph south-east wind and
visibility was 3.2 kilometres with no cloud cover, although
there was thick mist at 1500 metres. The bombing time was to
be concentrated between 00.00 hrs and 00.12 hrs in an
attempt to saturate the defences, and units were allocated
specific bombing heights, which varied between 3350 and 4425
metres. After bomb release all aircraft were to continue to
the third turning point, 13 kilometres SSW of Bath before
turning to cross the Dorset coast near Bridport, their
fourth point, while the fifth, and final point, was over the
sea at 50° 23´N 02° 43´W.
116 of the 139 crews dispatched claimed to have attacked the
the target with 100 tonnes of bombs including H.E.'s and a
considerable number of Phosphorus Oil incendiaries between
23.38 and 00.13 hrs, and this was the first time that
Phosphorous bombs were employed locally. As the Luftwaffe
had been unable to carry out any daytime photographic
missions over the Bristol area since the summer of 1942,
1(F)/121 was instructed to fly strike assessment sorties at
night, and their activities probably accounted for the
numerous photo-flashes reported during the attack.
In actual fact no bombs whatsoever fell on Bristol, and
those aircraft that managed to get anywhere near the City
were first of all led astray by inaccurate marking of the
Initial Point, and then by target marking flares dropped
well to the west of the port. For the Luftwaffe it had been
yet another bad night with a further 13 valuable bombers
lost. Of these 10 failed to return resulting in the deaths
of 21 crewmen, while a further 18, including 5 injured, were
taken prisoner. In addition 3 more aircraft crashed in
France where 4 men were killed and 3 injured, while yet
another aircraft returned safely, but with a dead crewman
aboard.
Incidents were in fact reported over the whole of Southern
England, from Hastings to North Somerset, with the highest
concentration in the rural areas around Highbridge and
Weston super Mare. Many Phosphorous bombs fell on the
Bournville Estate at Weston, but the 3 H.E.'s and 6
Phosphorous incendiaries which fell at Strode, near Winford,
in Somerset were the closest that any bombs came to Bristol
that night.
By the end of March it had become obvious to the Luftwaffe
High Command that the target marking over Hull and Bristol
had been particularly poor, and so 1(F)/121 was also ordered
to photograph the flares laid by the pathfinders in an
attempt to improve the accuracy of subsequent attacks.
The first two weeks of April were quiet, then on the 18th,
there was a final manned bomber raid on the Capital. From
here on the Germans were more concerned with the build up of
shipping and supplies in the various ports from which an
invasion of the Continent seemed likely, and henceforth the
Luftwaffe was to concentrate almost exclusively on these
objectives. Accordingly the harbour installations at Bristol
were again the target on the night of April 23rd, while in
parallel an attack against night fighter airfields in the
Bristol area was also to be carried out by the Me 410's of
I/KG 51.
The raiders, probably drawn from I, II and III/KG 2, I, II
and III/KG 6, II and III/KG 30, I and III/KG 54, I/KG 66,
I/KG 100, together with the Ju 88's of the operational
training unit IV/KG 101, were to converge on Guernsey before
making for the Initial Point at the mouth of the River Usk,
and the second turning point near Chepstow. From here the
final approach to Bristol was to be from the north, the
target being marked by a square of red and white flares at
the start of the attack. Over the target area there was a 16
kph south-west wind and 5/10th's cloud at 900 metres, but
ground mist reduced visibility to 800 metres
To aid navigation during the raid the pathfinders of 1/KG 66
employed Y-Verfahren which was operational from 23.45 to
02.45 hrs from St.Valery. In addition the Knickebein
transmitters at Cherbourg West, Caen, and Morlaix were also
in use, and Düppel was dropped in an attempt to jam the
British Radar system. It first fell at about 01.25 hrs over
the coast near Portland, but eventually built up overland
forming extensive areas of about 20 miles radius.
A total of 117 aircraft were dispatched, of which 93
reported over the City, claiming to have dropped 59.3 tonnes
of H.E.'s and 79.4 tonnes of I.B's on target. Once again,
however, not one bomb actually fell on Bristol, the majority
being scattered throughout, Wiltshire, Dorset, Hampshire,
and East Somerset, the nearest to Bristol having landed at
Batheaston at 02.05 hrs. German losses for this attack were
again very high. A total of 10 aircraft failed to return
resulting in the deaths of 39 crewmen, with 3 more being
taken prisoner, 2 of them injured. In addition a further 4
aircraft crashed in France killing 5 and injuring another 6
men.
Like April, May started quietly and it was not until the
night of the 14th that a force of 91 bombers took off for
the third time in 1944 to attempt an attack on the harbour
installations at Bristol. The raiders, probably drawn from
I, II and III/KG 2, I and II/KG 6, II and III/KG 30, I and
III/KG 54, I/KG 66 and I/KG 100, first flew to Guernsey
where the bomber streams converged, and from there direct to
Bristol. The Sonderaüfklarungsstaffel Ob.d.L. had at, the
end of April, joined 1(F)/121 in photographing target
markers, and it was their aircraft which provided the night
photographic capability for the attack force.
To aid navigation the pathfinders of 1/KG 66 employed Y-Verfahren
which was operational from Cherbourg and St.Valery, while
the Knickebein transmitters at Caen, Cherbourg West and
Morlaix were also active. The target was to be marked by two
green cascade flares dropped by I/KG 66, and the bombing run
was to be south to north at 4000 to 6000 metres following a
30 degree glide. Over Bristol there was a 8 kph NNE wind,
and a half moon in a cloudless sky giving 16 kilometres
visibility.
This raid was particularly significant for on that night the
Luftwaffe initiated airborne jamming on a frequency band
covering part of the British ground and airborne radar
system. A few Ju 188's of I/KG 2 carried the apparatus under
the code name Kettenhund or Watchdog, which was applied to
both the equipment and the aircraft in which it was fitted.
During the operation extensive use was also made of Düppel
which was dropped from 01.20 hrs onwards, eventually
covering a lane about 20 miles wide from Portland to
Bristol. It persisted throughout the raid, the Bristol area
not being free of it until 03.01 hrs.
A total of 68 aircraft subsequently claimed to have attacked
the City, with a further 15 Me 410's of I/KG 51 operating
over local fighter airfields. Bristol was reported to have
been raided between 01.50 hrs and 02.25 hrs with 163 tonnes
of H.E.'s being dropped on target, and a further 4.65 tonnes
on airfields in the Bristol area. The attack force again
lost 14 aircraft, 11 of which failed to return resulting in
the deaths of 40 crewmen, while 6 others were taken
prisoner, including 3 injured. In addition 3 more aircraft
crashed in France where a further 2 men died.
However, in spite of the German claims only five bombs had
actually fallen within the Bristol city boundary. These came
down at around 02.00 hrs in Headley Park, and at Kings
Weston where a Searchlight Site was destroyed, and its
attendant killed, the last life to be lost locally as a
result of enemy action during World War Two.
For the inhabitants of Bristol and surrounding districts the
trial by combat was drawing to an end, the All Clear at
03.07 hrs on the morning of May 15th 1944 marking the
departure of the last German bomber to threaten the area.
During the rest of the month the attacks continued against
the ports where the forces were concentrating for the
forthcoming invasion of France, accordingly Portsmouth,
Weymouth, Torquay and Falmouth were targeted. These were
infact the final raids of the Steinbock operation, and
manned attacks on the West Country did not continue into
June, the few remaining aircraft being required to counter
the Allied landings.
By this time, however, the long awaited Fiesler Fi 103
pilotless aircraft, better known as the V1, was almost ready
for action and Flak Regiment 155(W) opened their bombardment
of London on June 13th. It had also been planned to attack
Bristol from the Côtentin Peinsula where specially
constructed launching ramps were aligned on the City. As
early as March it had been stated that the eight sites then
existing would be able to discharge 96 to 120 missiles at
Bristol during a six hour period. The scheme thankfully came
to nothing as effective bombing of the sites and their
supply routes, followed by the Allied landing in Normandy on
June 6th, ensured that the Germans were not able to mount an
attack before the V1 launching ramps, and the bunkers from
which it had also been intended to bombard Bristol with A4
(V2) rockets, were overrun.
A threat still existed from the He 111's of III/KG 3 based
in Holland, each of which carried a V1 suspended below the
fuselage. These weapons were air launched over the North
Sea, their targets being initially Southampton, Portsmouth
and London, although early on the morning of August 31st 20
were fired at Gloucester. Of these, 17 were detected by the
defences between 04.30 and 05.00 hrs, and of the 8 which did
eventually make landfall, 6 fell in Suffolk and 2 in Essex.
These proved to be the Luftwaffe's parting shots at our
region, and any lingering threat was soon removed as III/KG
3 had completed its enforced move to Germany by September
16th 1944.
During the period June 1940 to May 1944 the Luftwaffe are
known to have lost 105 aircraft, with others suffering
various degrees of damage, during operations against targets
in the Bristol area. This resulted in the death of 257
German airmen, with a further 65 being injured. On the
British side, as far as can be ascertained, in what is now
the County of Avon some 2046 people lost their lives and
5961 were injured as a result of enemy air attacks on the
area. Of these Bristol suffered 1243 kiled and 2903 injured,
Bath 417 killed and 952 injured, Weston super Mare 138
killed and 478 injured, Filton 135 killed and 335 injured,
Yate 57 killed and 175 injured, North Somerset 36 killed and
57 injured and South Gloucestershire 19 killed and 61
injured. In addition to the tragic loss of life material
damage to the area had also been serious, and following the
end of the War in 1945 Bristol City Council announced that
over 3000 houses had been completely destroyed and a further
90,000 properties damaged. In Bath a total of 19,147
premises had suffered damage, of which 1185 were houses,
some 218 being of architectural and historic interest. 329
houses and shops were totally destroyed, and a further 732
had to be demolished. At Weston super Mare 282 premises were
totally destroyed, while 7757 houses, 6 industrial
establishments, 581 offices and shops, 85 churches and
public buildings, and 18 other premises in the town had been
damaged.
Even today few people can fail to be moved by the sight of
the personal monuments to the victims of the Second World
War, especially the neat rows of German and British military
graves at Greenbank Cemetery in Bristol, at Haycombe in
Bath, and at Weston super Mare, where men of both
nationalities lie side by side. In this account, based as it
is upon German records, it is fitting that the names of
individual airmen lost on operations against the area should
be recorded, not only in the spirit of reconciliation, but
also in commemoration of their suffering and as a tribute to
their sacrifice.
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