the
Blitz
The Blitz began as the daylight
battle of Britain was nearing its climax and at a time when
the invasion of the UK, for which the battle was a necessary
preliminary, was still on the German agenda. For the
Germans, who never committed more than a third of their
twin-engined bomber force to daylight raids during the
battle of Britain, it was first an extension of the
battle-in that they wanted to destroy British aircraft
factories and thus deny the RAF the reinforcements it
required-and then a war of attrition when they failed to
achieve the necessary air superiority to launch SEALION.
If an invasion was not immediately possible, then surely,
German planners surmised, the UK could be bombed into
submission by destroying its means of communication and
supply as well as its armaments factories and, if necessary,
by terrorizing its citizens.
However, despite Hitler's
directive of 5 September 'for disruptive attacks on the
population and air defences of major British cities,
including London, by day and night', the primary objective
of the Luftwaffe remained to destroy the RAF and the
factories that sustained it. But now that London was a
legitimate target it was decided that Air Fleet 2, stationed
in the Low Countries, would carry out daylight raids on the
Capital's infrastructure- in fact, it participated in the
night raids as well-while Air Fleet 3, based in France,
would attack at night 'until the docks and all supply- and
power-sources of the city have been annihilated'. But by
October, when it became apparent that the battle of Britain
had been lost, the attacks became increasingly a matter of
inflicting terror and exhaustion in the ebbing hope that
British morale would collapse.
rescuing civilians in London
From the British point of view
the raids were simply terror tactics and were presented as
such by war correspondents and propaganda to an increasingly
sympathetic American public. At first there was little the
British could do to oppose them. At that time few of the
defending antiaircraft (A-A) batteries were equipped with
fire-control radar: searchlights were rarely effective at
altitudes greater than 3,600 m. (12,000 ft.); few
night-fighters were fitted with Al (airborne interception)
radar; and ground controlled interception radar (GCI). which
tracked incoming aircraft overland, was still being
developed. It was, therefore, unusual for a raider to be
seen by the defenders and rare for one to be shot down.
Though counter-measures were already being taken against the
radio beams by which the bombers were directed to their
there was initially a lack of coherence in the defences.
There were preliminary raids elsewhere-Birmingham was
attacked on 25/26 August, Liverpool on the nights of 28-31
August and 4-6 September-before London was attacked on 7
September 1940, the date normally associated with the start
of the Blitz. Only 92 guns were available to defend the
city. The fire control system for these failed miserably (as
did the night-fighter squadrons) and for three nights the
city was pounded with hardly a gun being fired in
retaliation. However, General Frederick Pile, C-in-C of
Anti-Aircraft Command, quickly doubled the number of guns
and on the night of 11 September the gunners were allowed to
fire at will.
The huge barrage of A-A fire
that resulted, accompanied by a blaze of searchlights,
heartened the civilian population and drove the attackers to
a more respectful height, but otherwise had little effect.
In this opening phase of the Blitz, which lasted until mid
November, an average of 200 raiders, including Italian
aircraft based in Belgium, bombed London each night except
one, and to these attacks were added daylight raids by
fighter-bombers, and by single bombers attacking targets of
opportunity on cloudy days. The one on 7 September began in
the afternoon when 300 bombers, escorted by 600 fighters,
attacked in two waves. The docks were the main target, but
many of the bombs fell on surrounding residential areas.
That night another 180 bombers converged on the capital and
altogether 430 Londoners were killed and some 1,600
seriously injured.
Central London after a night of German bombing
An even heavier attack took
place on the capital on the night of 15 October while others
were mounted against Birmingham and Bristol. It was a bright
moonlight night and the 400 bombers began their attack at
2040, continuing through until 0440 the following morning.
The railway system was hit particularly hard, with many of
the terminals being put out of action; Becton gas works,
Battersea Power Station, and the BBC headquarters at
Portland Place were also hit; three large water mains were
fractured and there was widespread damage to residential
areas. More than 900 fires were reported, six of which were
'major' and nine 'serious'. The RAF sent up 41 fighters but
only one Heinkel was shot down. By Mid November, when the
bombers switched temporarily to attack provincial cities
such as Coventry, Southampton, Birmingham, Liverpool,
Bristol, and Plymouth, the Germans had dropped over 13,000
tons of high explosive bombs on London and nearly one
million incendiaries with the loss rate to themselves of
less than 1%. Between mid-November and the end of February
1941, fourteen attacks were mounted on ports, nine on
industrial inland targets, and eight on London, while in
January Cardiff, Portsmouth, and Avonmouth became targets
for the first time. However, although these raids cost the
Luftwaffe only 75 aircraft, the German High Command was
becoming increasing critical of what was being achieved.
Grand Admiral breeder persuaded Hitler to issue a directive
on 6 February that gave attacks on ports the highest
priority, and from 19 February to 12 May 46 raids were
mounted against Plymouth, Portsmouth, Bristol and Avonmouth,
Swansea, Merseyside, Belfast, Clydeside, Hull, Sunderland,
and Newcastle, while only seven were directed against
London, Birmingham, Coventry, and Nottingham. Initially,
German losses were again minimal, but by May-when the Blitz
began to peter out as German bomber squadrons were withdrawn
to take part in the German invasion of the USSR - British
night defences had been much improved as the highly
effective Beaufighter had become operational and more A-A
guns and searchlights were radar controlled. Fitted with the
latest version of Al radar, the Beaufighter could now be
guided on to targets by GCI sets that worked effectively.
The Blitz caused enormous damage to the country's
infrastructure and housing stock, cost the lives of more
than 43,000 civilians (a further 139,000 were injured), and
tied up precious human and material resources. All this was
achieved by the Luftwaffe for the loss of about 600 bombers,
or about 1.5% of the sorties flown; and a sizeable
proportion of those had been wrecked in landing accidents
caused by bad weather. But it did not seriously impair
British aircraft production and notably failed to bring the
UK to its knees, just as a second Blitz failed to do in
1944.
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