the
Schweinfurt raids
by Capt David Reichert, USAF
USAF B-17 bombers over Germany, with vapour trails of
escorting P-47 Thunderbolt fighters
After the war, Hitler’s
minister of armaments and economics, Albert Speer, said,
“The strategic bombing of Germany was the greatest lost
battle of the whole war for Germany.” Such was not the
consensus thinking early in the war, though. Commander of
the Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry “Hap” Arnold, had sent one
of his best generals and closest friends, Gen. Ira Eaker,
over to Great Britain to start what would come to be known
as the U.S. Eighth Bomber Command from the ground up. In a
push to prove not only to the British but to the world that
strategic daylight bombing was the instrument needed to
bring Germany to its knees, Eaker sent out over one-hundred
missions during the next year-and-a-half, aimed not at the
civilian populations of Germany but instead at targets that
were supposed to cripple the German war-machine. Facing
criticism from both home and abroad over his seemingly slow
pace of operations and unnecessarily high casualties, Eaker
launched the most daring offensive of the war, sending over
one thousand bombers into the air during a one-week span in
mid-October, 1943. This week culminated with the second
attack against the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt,
Germany, in which over sixty B-17s and six hundred men never
returned home. Despite the high losses and unspectacular
bombing results, the raid on Schweinfurt did help the war
cause by making the policy makers finally realize the urgent
need for long-range fighters to escort the bombers deep into
enemy territory. Without these fighters, particularly the
P-51 Mustang, the bomber losses would continue to grow to
the point at which the Eighth Air Force would be unable to
continue the successful targeting of vital war assets in
Nazi Germany.
Things were not looking good for the Allies in early 1942.
The Japanese were making steady advances in the Pacific and
the Germans were sinking virtually every ship that came
close to the European mainland. Great Britain, under siege
for a short time by a massive German bombing effort and
naval blockade, was short on men and supplies. It was during
this time that Commander of the Army Air Forces, Gen. Henry
“Hap” Arnold, sent his friend and fellow general Ira Eaker
to England to organize the new Eighth Bomber Command.
Another close friend, Gen. Carl “Tooey” Spaatz was soon to
follow as Commander of the U.S. Eighth Air Force.
Eaker had a large task ahead of him. He arrived in England
on February 20, 1942 with only six men to start what would
be the first major American cooperation with Great Britain.
From the beginning, Eaker received great support from his
British counterpart, Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Harris.
Anything that Eaker asked for, Harris would supply with as
much as he could afford to lose. Harris went so far as to
offer Eaker a spare bedroom in his house so that the two
could become better acquainted.
Despite the support that Harris was offering Eaker, he was
not convinced that the American’s plan of strategic daylight
bombing was going to work against the formidable German Air
Force. Since the war began, Great Britain had been bombing
German cities in an effort to blast the German citizens into
submission. They did this under the cover of darkness, which
made the British bombers harder for the Luftwaffe pilots to
engage and nearly invisible to the flak gunners on the
ground. Bombing during daylight, Harris argued, would expose
the American bombers to the full might of the Luftwaffe and
cause unnecessarily high casualties. Harris’ suggestion to
Eaker was to integrate the B-17s that were arriving from the
states with the British heavy bomber squadrons. This would
make faster use of the B-17s that were already arriving in
theater and, at the same time, increase the number of
bombers that the British could send against Germany every
night.
Eaker was well aware of the British position but insisted to
Harris that daylight operations against specific military
targets would enable a ground invasion of the continent
faster than the indiscriminate bombing of cities. Eaker was
also worried that if he gave the first few bombers to the
British to use for night operations, for which the American
pilots were not trained, that soon the Eighth Bomber Command
would be a subsidiary of British Bomber Command and he would
lose any chance he had of implementing daylight bombing.
Another obstacle facing the 8th was the allocation of
promised bombers to other countries and commands. At the
same time that the 8th was being built, American aircraft
were being shipped all over the world. Countries like
Australia, Russia, China, and Great Britain were having
their air force built on American planes and technology at
the expense of the 8th Air Force. Even the U.S. Navy was
doing its part in keeping aircraft from reaching the 8th.
Besides asking for fighters and bombers to defend the fleet,
the Navy was also asking for more cargo planes to be built
instead of combat aircraft. As Hap Arnold later wrote:
When asked what solution they might have for getting greater
production and making more planes available to the British,
or for securing more air transports, the answer of the Navy
representatives was, “Stop manufacturing B-17s at the Long
Beach plant and build cargo planes.”…When Freeman asked what
the Navy was able to give up or help, if the Army Air Forces
stopped manufacturing B-17s, our Naval officers said,
“Nothing - there is nothing the Navy could give that would
help any.”…The Army Air Forces was expected to give
everything to everybody.
Despite all of the early problems, the 8th received its
first group of bombers, named the 97th Bomb Group, in July
1942. A month of intensive training followed, in which the
pilots learned how to fly under the instrument conditions
that were prevalent in England and the gunners practiced
their accuracy against R.A.F. fighter planes. Just as it
seemed everything was falling into place for the 8th, word
came from Washington on a new operation that would once
again stall the growth of the 8th.
Operation TORCH, the invasion of German-occupied North
Africa, diverted two of the three inbound bomb groups to the
Mediterranean and stripped Eaker of the one bomb group he
had been training for the past month. Before he lost the
97th, however, he was going to use them for what they were
brought oversees to do in the first place, drop bombs on
Germany. On August 9th, the 97th was alerted for its first
mission over German occupied territory.
Eaker was soon to discover an even more unforgiving
adversary than the Germans or the policy makers in
Washington, the English weather. The morning of August tenth
found the airfield closed due to fog and subsequently the
mission was cancelled. Over the next week, the dense fog
stayed in the air keeping the heavy bombers on the ground.
Finally, on August 17th, the weather cleared and the 97th
launched twelve planes for a mission against the marshalling
yards at Rouen, France. The bombers met very little fighter
resistance and no flak on the way to the target. Eaker,
flying in the lead aircraft, watched as most of the bombs
dropped fell within the target area. A little over an hour
later, all twelve bombers were safely on the ground in
England.
The mission was a success, but no one was under the
impression that all missions would be this easy or this
successful. British Spitfires escorted the bombers the
entire way to the target and back and they met no flak and
very little Luftwaffe opposition. Until the number of
bombers got larger, however, the Americans would have to be
content with small scale attacks against relatively
undefended targets. These easy missions would later come to
be known as “milk runs”.
The next few months saw many changes for the 8th Air Force.
In December of 1942, Tooey Spaatz was transferred to Africa
to be in charge of the aerial portion of Operation TORCH and
Eaker was given command of the entire 8th Air Force. Four
new bomb groups arrived in England, and the pace of
operations increased. Due to the lack of long-range fighter
escort and still somewhat small numbers of bombers, however,
the missions were aimed at targets on the coast or in the
occupied countries. Not one bomb had been dropped on the
mainland of Germany.
Because of this, the 8th faced near extinction during the
early part of 1943. Churchill had convinced Roosevelt at the
Casablanca conference that due to the lack of any major
combat operations on the part of the Americans in the
European theatre, that the 8th should finally be integrated
with the British Bomber Command.5 Upon hearing this, Arnold
had Eaker fly to Casablanca to meet with Churchill and plead
for him to change his mind. Though still not totally won
over on the concept of daylight bombing, Eaker was
successful in convincing Churchill to grant the 8th more
time.
One result of the Casablanca conference was the
authorization for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO). The
CBO directed the joint effort of Great Britain and the
United States to pave the way for the invasion of Europe
through using each air force’s specific capabilities: the
British bombing at night and the Americans during the day.
At least on paper, the 8th finally had the support it needed
from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
On his return to England a few days later, Eaker ordered the
first mission against the German mainland, targeting the
submarine construction yards at Vegesack. When they arrived
over the target the bombers found it completely covered by
clouds, so they moved to the secondary target, another port
city named Wilhelmshaven. Although partially obscured by
clouds, the bombers were still able to drop the first
American bombs on German soil. The 8th Air Force had its
first major victory.
Over the next few months, the 8th was sending more and more
bombers on sorties over Germany as reinforcements arrived
from the states. And also over the next few months, the
Luftwaffe was getting better and better at shooting them
down. Despite improvements that had been made both to the
B-17 airframe (a gun in the nose to counter the increasing
German head-on attacks) and the new “combat box” formation
that provided each aircraft with maximum firepower coverage
from all of the other aircraft in formation, bombers and
crews were falling at an almost irreplaceable rate. The
answer to this problem was developing a long-range fighter
escort.
At this point in the war, British Spitfires and American
P-47s and P-38s were escorting the bombers on their missions
to Germany, but the combat radius of these planes was such
that they had to turn around and go home just after crossing
the German border, leaving the bombers unescorted for up to
four hundred miles on some of the longer missions. The fact
that the German FW-190s and ME-109s were more manoeuvrable
than the Allied fighters and hence better in a dogfight
rarely came in to play. The Germans would remain well out of
range of the bomber formations until the Allied fighters had
to turn for home, then ferociously attack until the bombers
could make it back to the relative safety of fighter cover
on the return trip to England.
Eaker had been trying for months to get external drop tanks
fitted to the fighters that were already in theatre, but the
tanks that were added either didn’t extend the range of the
fighter far enough or resulted in poorer aerodynamic
handling of the aircraft. All attempts at adding the tanks
were eventually scrubbed, but a savoir in another form was
soon on the way.
Under development at this time in the United States was the
P-51 Mustang. The Mustang would have the combat range to
escort the bombers all the way to the target and back home.
It was also faster and more manoeuvrable than the German
fighters. Eaker had petitioned Arnold repeatedly in 1943 to
allocate P-51s to the Eighth to escort his bombers, but, as
with the bombers a year ago, Arnold had to fight to get
allotments over the Navy and other allies.6 Until Arnold
could deliver some P-51s to the European theatre, the B-17s
still had to fly and Germany still had to be bombed.
One of the focal points of the Allied bombing campaign was
the destruction of ball bearing production facilities. The
ball bearing was an integral part of the German war
industry. The Ministry of Economic Warfare (M.E.W.), the
British Cabinet agency that had been collecting information
about potential targets in Germany since the beginning of
the war, had named ball bearings as one of the top
priorities due to their use in every German aircraft. This
dependence was first learned when the British themselves
faced a shortage early in the war after the Germans bombed
one of their ball bearing plants causing a delay in aircraft
production. Not only did the German fighters and bombers use
a large number of bearings per aircraft, but ground
equipment such as tanks and motor vehicles did as well. By
destroying the ball bearing production plants, the Allies
could, in effect, also be destroying the production
capability of the factories that made military aircraft and
vehicles. Ultimately, this would shorten the length of the
war.
On the one-year anniversary of its first mission, the 8th
launched its most complex mission of the war. In an effort
to destroy the production facilities of the German fighters
that were terrorizing the bombers, over 350 bombers (formed
into two divisions, the 1st and 3rd Bomb Divisions) took to
the skies in a dual effort to bomb both a Messerschmitt
production plant in Regensburg and Germany’s main ball
bearing factory in Schweinfurt. Timing for the mission was
critical, as the 3rd was supposed to cross into enemy
territory ten minutes ahead of the 1st in order to divide
the Luftwaffe and lessen the total amount of fighter
opposition each division faced. As was so often the case for
the Eighth, the English weather forced a change of plans.
Having already postponed the mission for close to two weeks
due to consistent cloud cover over the targets, August 17th
found Germany clear but England shrouded in fog. After
delaying the mission for an hour, it was decided that the
3rd would have to take-off immediately in order to be able
to land at their North African recovery bases before
nightfall. While the 3rd was taking off, however, the 1st
remained grounded due to the thick fog. Over three hours
later, the 1st finally got off of the ground and headed
towards Schweinfurt.
This delay was going to cost the 8th. With three hours in
between the formations, the German fighters had enough time
to attack the 3rd Division, refuel, and then take-off again
to attack the 1st Division. All of this was done, once
again, out of the range of Allied fighter escort. Sixty
aircraft and over six hundred men were lost over Germany
that day, and although both of the targets were
significantly damaged, neither was destroyed.
The attacks on Regensburg and Schweinfurt worried some of
the Nazi leaders. The Allied bombers had taken everything
the Luftwaffe had to offer and they still proceeded to
significantly damage two major factories deep within
Germany. Speer warned that if the Americans kept hitting
ball bearing factories, of which Schweinfurt was by far the
largest (different estimates had the factories in
Schweinfurt producing between forty to fifty-five percent of
Germany’s total output of ball bearings), German armament
production would suffer within four months.8 To counter the
increasing and further reaching American attacks against
their homeland, the Germans moved virtually every fighter
from the Russian front over to protect the western flank.
When the Americans returned to Schweinfurt almost two months
later, instead of meeting the three hundred reported attacks
from the first mission, an estimated eight hundred enemy
sorties were flown.
For the next month and a half, due to the extent of their
losses from the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission and poor
weather over Germany almost the entire month of September,
the 8th was relegated to a small number of short missions
carried out under cover of fighter escort. Eaker didn’t send
another mission to Germany until September 27th, when cloud
cover coupled with a new but inaccurate British radar system
produced poor bombing results. Arnold’s impatience was
growing as he continued to send reinforcements to the 8th
and received little, if any, positive results in return.
Despite Arnold’s impatience, however, the 8th would have to
wait until the weather cleared over Germany in order to
launch an effective mission.
With adequate reinforcements and clear weather over Germany,
Eaker launched the 8th’s largest offensive of the war to
date. In a series of missions that came to be known as
“Black Week”, the 8th launched over a thousand bombers
against vital industrial targets in Germany. The first three
missions (October 8th-10th) against the cities of Bremen,
Gdynia, and Munster resulted in the loss of eighty-eight
bombers and nearly nine hundred aviators. Four days later,
October 14, 1943, the day known as “Black Thursday”, the
bombers of the 8th Air Force flew once again towards
Schweinfurt.
The morning of October 14th started out in the same manner
with which the men of the Eighth Air Force had become
accustomed: cold, dreary, and foggy. “When I looked outside
at the weather, it was pitch black and very foggy. I thought
we can’t possibly takeoff in this weather,” recounted Wally
Hoffman, a member of the 351st Bomb Group stationed at
Polebrook and the pilot of Morning Delight.
The pre-mission briefings contained all the information the
crews needed to know before putting their lives at risk over
Germany: enroute weather, flak concentrations, enemy
aircraft opposition expected, and so forth. The tensest part
of the briefing, however, came when the briefing officer
pulled back the curtain that covered the map of Europe. In
his article “Reality…Remembering Schweinfurt”, Hoffman
recalls this particular mission briefing.
“There is a hushed silence as everyone leans forward looking
at the fateful end of the red yarn. “It’s Schweinfurt” the
Major says with a sardonic smile, and gives us time to
think. Abruptly a buzz of voices breaks out, and one voice
says ‘Sonofabitch! This is my Last Mission.’ And it was, as
he was one of those who never made it back.”
This story was repeated all throughout England. Over three
thousand men left their respective briefing room to go to
their aircraft and wait either for the fog to lift so that
they could take off or for the call that the mission had
been canceled due to weather. On the way to their airplane,
the aircrew would get dressed into the multiple layers of
clothing that were necessary for survival in the sub-zero
temperatures four miles above the Earth’s surface. If not
properly protected, the cold temperatures could wound or
kill a man just as easily as a German bullet.
With the crews on their way to their planes, the 8th’s
leaders could only sit back and hope first that the weather
improved and then secondly that their plan to destroy
Schweinfurt was successful. The plan consisted of sending
378 aircraft from nineteen bomb groups, which were formed
into three air divisions, over Schweinfurt. The First Air
Division consisted of nine B-17 bomb groups, the Second Air
Division consisted of three B-24 bomb groups, and the Third
Air Division consisted of seven B-17 bomb groups. Each
division consisted of multiple combat wings, which were in
turn comprised of at least three bomb groups.
The combat wings were organized into “combat boxes”,
designed by then-Colonel Curtis LeMay. The “combat box”
placed the lead group of the wing in the centre of the wing,
both vertically and horizontally. The second group was
situated high, behind, and to the right of the lead group
and the third group was situated low, behind, and to the
left of the lead group. Less than one thousand feet
separated the highest aircraft of the high group from the
lowest aircraft of the low group. This arrangement provided
the formations with the maximum protective firepower from
each aircraft. When a bomber was shot down or had to abort,
the remaining bombers in the group would move forward to
fill the holes in the formation.
The First Air Division was to lead the train of bombers
towards the target, followed by the Third Air Division,
which was scheduled to be thirty minutes behind the First
and on a parallel course ten miles to the south. The Second
Air Division was to fly well to the south of the B-17s and
then rendezvous with the other two divisions just prior to
the bomb run to provide for a continuous stream of bombers
over the target. Almost immediately after take-off, and once
again due to the English weather, this plan began to fall
apart.
Once it was determined that the weather over the target was
clear and that the visibility required for take-off was
above minimums, the order was given to proceed with the
mission. As the bombers began to climb away from their
fields, they realized that the weather briefers had been
incorrect with their predictions. Instead of breaking out of
the low clouds at two thousand feet, as briefed, most
bombers didn’t break out until six thousand feet with some
remaining in the clouds until ten thousand feet. Since the
bombers needed clear conditions in order to form up into the
“combat boxes” that would afford them the maximum defensive
firepower, the excessive cloud cover over England delayed
and in some cases prohibited the bombers from joining with
their pre-briefed formations.
The most significant casualty of the weather was the loss of
the entire Second Air Division from the total combat force.
At the pre-briefed rendezvous time, only twenty-nine of the
sixty B-24s were in formation. After repeated attempts to
contact the missing bombers, the air commander of the Second
decided against flying into Germany with such an undersized
force and instead flew a diversionary mission against the
port city of Emden. Without a single bullet being fired, the
weather erased sixty bombers from the mission.
Engine problems along with other technical difficulties
would send thirty-three B-17s home early, bringing the total
number of bombers that would cross into German territory
down to 285 bombers, almost twenty-five percent less than
planned. In addition to losing over five hundred thousand
pounds of bombs, more importantly to the survival of the
crews was the loss of over twelve hundred machine guns that
would have been used for protection against the German
fighters.
Another casualty of the weather was the loss of nearly half
of the fighter escort force. Of the four P-47 fighter groups
that were dispatched with the mission, one failed to find
any bombers after breaking through the clouds and another
joined on the Second Air Division and accompanied them on
their diversion. The other two groups each joined on a
division of B-17s and accompanied them to the limit of their
endurance. The loss of fighter escort was less pronounced
than the loss of the missing bomber’s guns, however, because
even though the P-47s destroyed thirteen enemy aircraft, the
majority of German fighters waited in the distance for the
Thunderbolts to turn for home.
Once the bomber formations reached the German town of Aachen,
on the German-Belgian border, the Thunderbolts had reached
the limit of their fuel and had to turn for home. Without
any further fighter opposition, the Luftwaffe began to
ferociously attack the bombers. Single-engine Focke-Wulf
190s and Messerschmitt 109s came directly at the formations,
firing their 20-millimeter cannons and machine guns and
twin-engine Messerschmitt 110s and 210s would stay beyond
the range of the bomber’s guns and shoot crude rockets into
the formations. Also in the fight were Junkers 88s,
primarily used as night fighters by the Germans, and Junkers
87s, which were fixed-landing gear dive bombers that would
climb above the Allied formations and drop time-fused bombs
down among the B-17s.
“We were briefed to be met by about five hundred enemy
fighters of various sorts. It turned out to be about seven
hundred with fighters having come in from the Russian front.
We saw every thing imaginable thrown at us. Fighters,
usually twin-engine, lined up at beyond our gun range and
began launching rockets that appeared to be like a telephone
pole as they passed by us and exploded. Some enemy aircraft
flew above us towing bombs on long cables hoping to entangle
the cable on a Flying Fortress. We had never seen so many
enemy fighters before or afterwards,” recalled John Piazza,
a gunner in the 92nd Bomb Group stationed at Alconbury,
which was attached to the First Air Division.
The 306th Bomb Group, also flying as part of the First Air
Division, had lost three of its eighteen planes to
mechanical problems shortly after crossing the English
Channel. Two more went down to enemy fire before the P-47s
left the formation at Aachen leaving the 306th missing five
aircraft from the formation before any serious combat had
begun. The German fighters were relentless in their pursuit
of struggling units and the 306th was no exception. Six of
the remaining thirteen were shot down prior to the target
area with two more being shot down on the return trip home.
In all, only seven of the aircraft from the 306th managed to
bomb Schweinfurt and only five made it back to their base at
Thurleigh.
As bad as the losses were for the 306th, the 305th Bomb
Group’s losses were worse, in fact the worst of the day.
Scheduled to be the low group of the lead wing, the 40th
Combat Wing, the 305th was eight minutes late to the
assembly point. Upon finally reaching this point, the group
commander tried to contact the lead group of the 40th but
was unable to do so. Not wanting to waste any more time, the
group moved to another assembly point where they came in
visual contact with the 1st Combat Wing. Like the 40th, the
1st was also missing its low group. After making radio
contact with the 1st’s commander, the 305th slid into
position as the 1st’s new low group. The assigned low group
of the 1st, the 381st Group, later joined up on the wing’s
high group, the 351st, over the English Channel.
While the low position was still the least enviable position
in the wing due to the greater susceptibility to flak and
enemy fighter attacks, members of the 305th were possibly
feeling a little relieved because they were no longer a
member of the lead wing, which in recent weeks had been a
frequent target for German frontal attacks. This relief was
short lived however, when the air commander for the battle,
Col. Bud Peaslee, ordered the 1st to take the lead because
his wing, the 40th, was missing its low group. Operating
procedures prohibited the lead wing from entering Germany
with any less than three groups due to the German’s new
tactic of using frontal attacks. The 40th moved above and to
the left of the 1st in a non-standard formation.
Having the extra aircraft above them in the formation didn’t
help the 351st’s position as the low group. Thirteen of the
original sixteen aircraft dispatched were lost prior to
reaching the target area. The remaining three did manage to
bomb the target and return to their home base at Chelveston.
Conversely, the extra firepower did help the other groups in
the 1st. Each of the other three groups only lost one
aircraft. The 40th, offset as it was in its non-standard
formation, lost nineteen of its thirty-seven aircraft.
“The intercom was a constant chatter as the crew called out
Luftwaffe fighter locations,” remembered Gene Carson, a tail
gunner with the 388th Bomb Group stationed at Knettishall.
“I knelt in silence. I had nothing to say . . . . No one had
to tell me there were bandits at six o’clock and there was
no need for me to report their presence. The Luftwaffe was
all around us. . . . We were being mauled.”
While the German fighters concentrated on the First Air
Division, the Third Air Division proceeded to the target
relatively unscathed. Aided in part by the thirty-minute
time lag behind the 1st, the 3rd also benefited from a
planned course diversion near the German border that took it
well south of the 1st’s penetration course into Germany and
away from the heaviest concentration of German airfields. As
a result, the entire 3rd Air Division of over 140 planes
lost only two more aircraft than did the 351st Bomb Group
during the course of the mission.
Despite the unrelenting fighter attacks and constant flak
barrage, the bomber pilots handed control of their aircraft
over to their bombardiers for the most crucial part of the
mission. The next five minutes would determine if the
mission would be a success, and, more importantly, whether
or not all of the lives lost in the process would be in
vain. The first to arrive over the target, the 91st Bomb
Group, had an unobstructed view of the five major ball
bearing production factories. As had been practiced and
preformed many times before, the lead bombardier released
his bombs when the target was in his crosshairs and the
remaining bombers in the formation released on lead’s mark.
With Schweinfurt billowing smoke below, the unrelenting
bombers from the 1st turned back to the west. Unfortunately
for them, their day was not yet over.
The 3rd reached Schweinfurt approximately ten minutes after
the first and found the entire target area covered with
large clouds of smoke. Having no other option, the lead
bombardier set his crosshairs on a bridge to the southeast
of the factories. On his mark, the entire division dropped
their bombs, primarily on the southern half of the factory
complex as well as the marshalling yards that led to
Schweinfurt from the city of Wurzburg. Their mission
complete, the 3rd turned to follow the 1st back to the
fighter escorts that would give the beleaguered bombers some
relief from the Luftwaffe and accompany them to their bases
in England.
During the return trip home, the bombers were again
tormented by an innumerable amount of German fighters. The
Luftwaffe pilots who had attacked the bomber formations on
their way into Germany were now refuelled and ready to renew
the onslaught. The B-17s that they met on the way out of
Germany made easier targets because there were fewer of them
and many of those that remained were already operating on
less than four engines or otherwise badly battered. The 3rd
bore the brunt of the attacks on the return leg as the 1st
benefited from a more southerly route across Germany and
France. The only defence that the bombers could offer was to
keep their formations tight and their gunners firing until
the Thunderbolts arrived, presumably near the border town of
Aachen.
When the bombers reached the German border, there were no
friendly fighters in sight. The weather had once again dealt
a crucial blow to the members of the 8th Air Force. The fog
that had almost caused the cancellation of the mission had
persisted, and in some cases gotten worse, causing the
escorts to remain grounded. Although not as numerous or as
ferocious as the attacks over Germany, the Luftwaffe
continued to harass the bomber force across the occupied
countries and in a couple of instances all the way to the
English Channel.
Just because the crews had made it back to the Channel
didn’t mean that they were in the clear. “At the ending of a
mission . . . (the English Channel) was not always a safe
haven. The RAF Search and Rescue boats were always standing
by to pick up grounded flyers. . . . Not until we touched
down, taxied to our hardstand and cut engines did we feel a
measure of comfort,” Piazza reminisced.
Others weren’t as lucky. A fitting ending to the deadly day
was waiting for the crews over England. The weather,
combined with the struggles of the battered bombers, was at
least in part responsible for the final five lost bombers of
the day. Low on fuel and unable to find any airfield to land
on due to the low clouds, the crews of these airplanes
decided to abandon their aircraft. All five planes were
lost, but all fifty crewmembers survived. This brought the
total number of bombers lost over the past ten hours to
sixty making the trip to Schweinfurt the costliest single
mission in the history of the 8th Air Force.
“First it was a feeling of wonder that we were alive and had
made it back to good old mother earth in one piece, plus an
inner appreciation of being alive which I have to this day,”
said Hoffman.
“After being debriefed and a shot of “Old Crow”, we hit the
sack as we were totally exhausted both mentally and
physically as the mission had taken everything out of us. I
think for everyone who flew at that time this was true. When
you say “We Gave Our All”, that is a true expression.”
The crews had done their part; it was now up to the
intelligence officers and the analysts to assess the damage
done to the 8th Air Force. After receiving the results,
Eaker sent Arnold a cable that detailed the 8th’s losses and
once again requested additional bombers, long-range
fighters, and drop-tanks for the shorter-range fighters. He
concluded by saying “There is no discouragement here. We are
convinced that when the totals are struck yesterday’s losses
will be far outweighed by the value of the enemy material
destroyed.”
In fact, Eaker was discouraged. He had not received the
complete results from the attack yet, but he knew that with
the depleted force that had actually dropped bombs on
Schweinfurt, there was little hope that the ball bearing
factories were bombed out of commission.
As with the first attack on Schweinfurt, he had hoped that
Harris would follow the 8th’s attack with a night attack on
Schweinfurt. Harris, however, was adamant about not
attacking what he deemed panacea, or cure-all, targets. In
his autobiography, Bomber Offensive, Harris defended his
position, saying that every time the Americans went to one
of these targets, their resources were so depleted as to not
return for a couple of months, giving the Germans ample time
to rebuild or replace everything that was destroyed. He also
defended not attacking Schweinfurt specifically, saying,
“They (the target experts) paid no attention to the fact
that Schweinfurt was too small and distant a town for us to
be able to find and hit in 1943.” Yet he failed to mention
that Bomber Command had indeed flown missions further into
Germany than Schweinfurt, including multiple missions to
Berlin, as early as 1941. He also failed to mention that
finding the fire-lit Schweinfurt would have been easy on
that clear night over Germany and that Luftwaffe opposition
would probably have been light and unorganized as a result
of the multiple missions that the fighters flew against the
Americans earlier in the day. Instead, another opportunity
was missed to inflict even greater damage on Schweinfurt.
Desperate for a victory in the face of the huge losses
incurred, the preliminary results of the battle were overly
optimistic and exaggerated by senior Army leaders. At a
press conference on October 18th, Arnold boldly exclaimed,
“Now we have got Schweinfurt!” The Army Air Forces
classified magazine Impact stated that the factories were so
heavily damaged that “our bombers may never have to go
back.”
While not to the extent that the Army Air Force was
reporting, the Schweinfurt factories were significantly
damaged during the raid, so much so that Hitler placed
Albert Speer in charge of protecting the industry against
further Allied attacks. After the war, interviews with Speer
revealed that the October 14th attack destroyed almost forty
percent of Schweinfurt’s total production capacity. If the
bombers had returned shortly thereafter, he concluded,
German armament production would have been at a standstill.
The bombers did eventually return to Schweinfurt, ten more
times as a matter of fact, although by the time they
returned Speer had begun dispersing the undamaged machines
vital to bearing production deeper inside of Germany.
At this point in the war, Eaker had no way of knowing the
extent of the damage to the ball bearing factories. What he
did know was that sixty of his bombers had been shot down,
another 142 were damaged, and six hundred of his men were
either dead or missing. While he might have believed that
the American losses would be outweighed by the damage
inflicted on Schweinfurt, he must have also wondered how
long he would have to keep sending his men deep into Germany
without adequate fighter support.
Eaker’s discouragement over not totally destroying
Schweinfurt was short-lived on account of finally receiving
some long-awaited good news from the states. Two weeks after
the battle, as a direct result of the massive losses over
Schweinfurt, Arnold directed that all P-51s Mustangs and the
majority of the longer-range P-38’s were to be allocated to
the European Theater. Eaker at last had the long-range
fighters that he had been requesting for over a year. Once
his bomber force was replenished, he could send more bombers
against Germany more often without incurring huge loss
rates. Everything that he had envisioned for the 8th Air
Force was finally falling into place. Unbeknownst to Eaker
though, the organization that he had created from scratch
almost two years previous was about to be taken from him.
At a meeting in Cairo in early December, Arnold expressed
his displeasure with the mission rates of the 8th Air Force.
He had trouble understanding why a larger percentage of
available assets were used in other theaters and he
questioned Eaker’s training programs and target priorities.
Arnold thought that there was a problem in the 8th that
needed to be fixed. “Only a new commander divorced from day
to day routine could achieve this,” in Arnold’s view.
Arnold’s British equivalent, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles
Portal, a friend and supporter of Eaker, argued that Eaker
was doing the best that he could with the resources that he
had. He explained once more about the poor weather hindering
operations and that when the missions were launched, Portal
explained, “Air operations in Europe and the Pacific could
not be compared. In no other part of the world were our
bomber forces up against some 1,600 German fighters over
their own country.”
Also discussed in Cairo was the creation of a unified
command in the Mediterranean Theatre similar to the
arrangement the Allies had in the European Theatre. Worried
that having two commands would lead to two different
opinions and directives on the best way to defeat Germany,
the Combined Chiefs of Staff also created the position of
Supreme Allied Commander to provide unified guidance to the
two theatres on the destruction of Germany.
When the command structure suggested at the Cairo conference
was finalized, Arnold had found a way to remove Eaker from
command of the 8th Air Force without disgracing his old
friend. The creation of the Mediterranean Theatre Command
meant that there would have to be an Allied Mediterranean
Air Force Commander. With Spaatz reassigned to England as
the commander of the newly created U.S. Strategic Air Force
in Europe, Dwight Eisenhower, Roosevelt’s choice for Supreme
Allied Commander, agreed with Arnold to move Eaker to the
Mediterranean position saying, in a cable to Eaker, “…it
would be a waste to have both you and Spaatz in England.” He
continued, “We do not (repeat not) have enough top men to
concentrate them in one place.”
After repeated attempts at trying to change the mind of his
superiors to let him stay in command of the 8th, this cable
from Eisenhower effectively closed the door on Eaker’s
protests. He was well aware of Arnold’s impatience with the
lack of missions and knew the main reason for his transfer;
Portal had informed Eaker of Arnold’s comments at the Cairo
meetings. Despite his negative comments towards Eaker,
Arnold sent Eaker a letter of congratulations on his new
assignment, stating, “Your new assignment…pays tribute to
your talents as an organizer and a leader.” After a few
final orders and more than a few good-bye speeches, Eaker
was on his way to the Mediterranean to assume his new
command. Jimmy Doolittle, famous for his leadership in the
raid on Tokyo earlier in the war, replaced Eaker as 8th Air
Force Commander.
On his way to Italy, Eaker was informed that Prime Minister
Churchill was in North Africa and would like to have a word
with him. Eaker met Churchill in Marrakesh where the Prime
Minister thanked Eaker for his service and congratulated him
on his new, larger assignment. Then the former opponent to
strategic daylight bombing made one of the most telling
comments on Eaker’s time with the 8th Air Force; “This gives
me an occasion to tell you that your representations to me
at that time have been more than verified. Around-the-clock
bombing is now achieving the results you predicted.”
Churchill was correct with his statement. With the addition
of the Mustang to escort the bombers, the Allies were able
to penetrate deeper and more often into Germany than ever
before. By mid-1944, the Luftwaffe was offering little to no
opposition to the foreign aircraft that penetrated their
airspace. On D-Day, Allied warships were untouched in their
venture across the English Channel and Allied bombers were
unmolested by enemy aircraft as they dropped their payloads
on the beachheads. In his autobiography, Global Mission,
Arnold states, “What had happened to the German Air
Force?…Had our daylight bombing been effective? Had our
plans for ‘round the clock’ bombing of Germany borne fruit?
We needed no further proof.”
Some, due to the excessive loss rates and poor bombing
results, consider missions such as Schweinfurt a failure.
The critics of these missions, Schweinfurt in particular,
fail to take into account what came about as a result of the
mission. Besides heavily damaging the five main ball bearing
factories in Schweinfurt, the bombing also created a massive
reorganization of the German bearing industry that caused a
slowing in the production of bearings. There might not have
been an immediate drop in the production of
bearing-dependant aircraft, but without the attack on
Schweinfurt, production of these aircraft and other
war-related machines would have continued on longer than it
did.
Shortly after Eaker’s departure, the 8th was able to send
over one thousand bombers on a single mission. It was
sustaining a lower loss rate on these missions than during
Eaker’s tenure as commander and the bombing results were
better than during Eaker’s tenure. All of these improved
numbers are a direct result of the addition of the P-51
Mustang to the inventory of the 8th Air Force. The same P-51
that Eaker had requested over a year before he was relieved
of command.
The second battle of Schweinfurt is a microcosm of all of
the reasons that Eaker was replaced as commander of the 8th
Air Force. The poor weather that was constantly hampering
the 8th’s ability to conduct missions was responsible for
the loss of sixty bombers before the divisions even crossed
into occupied Europe and was a contributing factor in the
destruction of five bombers whose crews bailed when they
were unable to find a landing strip. It was also responsible
for the grounding of the 3rd Air Division’s egress escorts.
The majority of the aircraft lost on the mission to
Schweinfurt were lost because of the lack of fighter escort
any further than the German border. Repeatedly over the past
year and a half, Eaker had requested the allocation of P-51
Mustangs to escort his aircrew into Germany. Before the
P-51s were available, he had asked for external fuel tanks
for the existing fighters. Despite the multiple requests and
the large amount of losses on every deep penetration
mission, Arnold could never get the 8th the resources they
needed to conduct a successful operation against the Germans
until Eaker had already been reassigned.
After the week that culminated with the Schweinfurt raid,
the 8th had to stand down for a few days until they had
replaced the lost aircraft and repaired the damaged ones.
Throughout his time in Europe, Eaker had been promised
replacements and reinforcements that would bolster his
numbers and enable the 8th to mount the large-scale attacks
that were necessary both for protection of the bombers and
for destruction of the selected target. When it was time for
these reinforcements to arrive, something else would come up
and the bombers that were supposed to be given to the 8th
were instead given to other commands, other services, or
other countries. At the same time Eaker was denied assets
while he was still expected to continue with the bombing
campaign. When he could not keep up the pace of operations
that was expected of him, because of all of the factors
stated above, Arnold criticized him for proceeding too
slowly.
And finally, because of British resistance to the concept of
strategic bombing, the American raid on Schweinfurt was
never followed by what would have been a crippling British
attack. Ever since Eaker had arrived in England, Harris had
been trying to convert Eaker to the concept of area bombing.
His dislike of the strategic bombing concept never caused
him to deny Eaker any help that he was able to offer, but he
refused to attack the targets that the Americans felt were
the most important.
The second mission to Schweinfurt was an important battle in
American military history. On the outside, it damaged the
major producer of a crucial component of the Nazi
war-machine. More importantly, on the inside, it was the
catalyst for the sweeping changes that were necessary to
ensure the maximum destruction of Germany as fast as
possible with the minimum loss of human life. And once
again, in an effort of such magnitude that had never been
put forth before or duplicated since, it showed that no
matter what the opposition, the American soldier will never
be turned away without completing his objective.
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