Combined Bomber (CBO)
At the Casablanca conference in
January 1943 it was decided to support Maj.-General Eaker's
plan to launch a combined bombing offensive against Germany,
with the British bombing at night and the Americans by day.
Portal was given the task of co-ordinating it and on 21
January the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) issued the
Casablanca Directive. This stated that the objective of the
CBO was 'the progressive destruction and dislocation of the
German military, industrial and economic system, and the
undermining of the morale of the German people to a point
where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally
weakened.'
Despite being planned in four phases between April 1943 and
April 1944 the CBO only really started when the POINTBLANK
Directive, which amended the Casablanca Directive, was
issued by the CCS in June 1943. While listing various
categories of targets, it gave absolute priority to the
destruction of German fighters, and the factories where they
were built, as the Normandy landings (Overlord) could not be
launched until air supremacy was achieved. The Quebec
conference of August 1943 upheld this high priority while
abandoning attacks on German morale as a means of achieving
that purpose.
POINTBLANK resulted in air offensives against Berlin,
Hamburg, and the Ruhr, and raids on Schweinfurt and
elsewhere, but the heavy losses sustained, and doubts about
their efficacy, helped create a crisis of confidence in the
CBO. Raids deep into Germany were stopped by the Americans
until long-range fighters became available and good weather
ensured that any losses sustained would be justified by the
results, conditions which were not fulfilled until February
1944. Following the six-day operations mounted then-called
Big Week - the Luftwaffe ceased to defend its air space
automatically and was incapable of mounting an effective
counter-attack during OVERLORD that June.
German fighter production increased throughout the CBO, and
continued to do so until September 1944. What gained the
Allies air supremacy over Normandy was the inability of the
Germans to train sufficient fighter pilots because of a
shortage of fuel, and the inferior performance of those who
were trained which enabled US long-range fighters to cause
heavy losses amongst them. It remains a matter of conjecture
whether the CBO would have achieved more if, as was done
later, it had attacked the German synthetic oil industry.
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