bomber tactics
The 1930s brought a rapid
advance not only in the design of bombers but in the
theories and tactics of how they were to be used: and for
the Germans, in particular, participation in the Spanish
Civil War gave the Luftwaffe an early chance to test many of
its new ideas in combat.
Broadly speaking, the bomber of the Second World War was
employed strategically (attacks on an adversary's
communications, factories, sources of supply, civilian
population), or tactically (attacks on an adversary's armed
forces in support of one's own, and on an adversary's lines
of communication and such specific targets as shipping).
The best demonstration of the tactical use of a bomber early
in the war was the use of the German Junkers Ju87 dive
bomber. It was the spearhead of the blitzkrieg which proved
so successful during the Polish campaign of September 1939
and in the fighting which led to the fall of France in June
1940. Its task was to destroy targets in the path of the
advancing ground forces and it did so with pinpoint
accuracy-within 30 m. (100 ft.) of its target-by diving
vertically at it. It then released its bomb(s) at low
altitude at the bottom of its dive, a method that proved
four times more accurate than normal horizontal bombing from
altitude.
The RAF had no effective army support bomber during the
fighting in France. This lack was rectified in 1941 during
the Western Desert campaigns when Hurricane fighters were
equipped to carry bombs. Their success led later to the wide
scale employment of the RAF Typhoon and the P47 Thunderbolt
and P51 Mustang of the US Army Air Forces (USAAF) in the
role of fighter and bombers, and these were often employed
in cab ranks. Each could carry a bomb or rocket to a load of
up to 907 kg. (2,000 Ib.; twice that of many 1939 twin
engined bombers-and after the load had been released the
aircraft had the performance and manoeuvrability to defend
itself.
Another tactic for supporting ground troops was developed by
Air Chief Marshal Tedder in the Middle East, and came to be
known as 'Tedder's Carpet'. It was not unlike a rolling
barrage, in that bombers saturated the ground ahead of the
advancing forces with high explosive and napalm bombs, and
was used to help the Allied break out (COBRA) from the
Normandy beachhead during the Normandy campaign. After a
preliminary bombardment by fighter and bombers, 1,500 US
heavy bombers dropped 3,000 tons of bombs on German
positions around St Lo. On both occasions some dropped short
killing 100 servicemen, including Lt. General Lesley McNair,
and wounding 600 others, but it was very effective in
clearing the way for the advancing infantry and tanks, and
certainly contributed to the success of the operation.
Strategic bombing demanded defensive, not offensive, tactics
and the Luftwaffe bombers which raided British cities in
daylight in the battle of Britain flew in formations
designed to give the maximum mutual protection; this proved
of little avail, however, and the bombers were later
provided with fighter escorts where possible. Single bombers
were, also used to mount 'hit and run' raids on any nearby
coastal target and they then escaped across the Channel
before British fighters could be vectored on to them. But it
was the bombers employed to mount the Allied strategic air
offensives that were continually forced to evolve different
tactics to counter German air and ground defences. Because
RAF Bomber Command mostly mounted unescorted Area bombing
night raids the tactics employed were different from those
of the Eighth USAAF whose bombers attacked during the day
using Precision bombing. Initially the British bombers were
widely dispersed when they flew to their targets and this
enabled the night fighters of the German Kammhuber Line to
cause casualties among each succeeding flight as they passed
through the various 'boxes'. To counter this the bomber
stream, first used for the Thousand bomber raid on Cologne
in May 1942, was introduced. Instead of bombers converging
on their target from their airfields separately they were
gathered in one stream by giving each bomber a time and
height to fly over a predetermined point. This created, by
the time the Kammhuber Line was being approached, a mass of
aircraft 112 km. (70 ml.) long and some 1,200 m. (4,000 ft.)
deep, which, with any luck, completely overwhelmed the
Kammhuber defensive box through which it flew. Air gunners
had strict orders never to open fire unless attacked as a
bomber was more likely to survive by evasion in the dark
than by taking the offensive. If attacked, the corkscrew
manoeuvre was the best tactic to employ; Martin Middlebrook
relates how one German nigh fighter ace followed a
corkscrewing Lancaster bomber for three quarters of an hour
without once being able to get into a firing position.
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