Even before the Apollo moon
landing in 1969, in October 1968 NASA began early studies
of space shuttle designs. The early studies were denoted
"Phase A", and in June 1970, "Phase B", which were more
detailed and specific.
In 1969 President Richard M. Nixon formed the Space Task
Group, chaired by vice president Spiro T. Agnew. They
evaluated the shuttle studies to date, and recommended a
national space strategy including building a space
shuttle.
During early shuttle development there was great debate
about the optimal shuttle design that best balanced
capability, development cost and operating cost.
Ultimately the current design was chosen, using a reusable
winged orbiter, solid rocket boosters, and expendable
external tank.
The Shuttle program was formally launched on January 5,
1972, when President Nixon announced that NASA would
proceed with the development of a reusable Space Shuttle
system. The final design was less costly to build and less
technically ambitious than earlier fully reusable designs.
The first Space
Shuttle, STS-1, waits on the pad before launch, March
1981.
The prime contractor for
the program was North American Aviation (later Rockwell
International), the same company responsible for the
Apollo Command/Service Module. The contractor for the
Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Boosters was Morton Thiokol
(now part of Alliant Techsystems), for the external tank,
Martin Marietta (now Lockheed Martin), and for the Space
shuttle main engines, Rocketdyne.
The first complete Orbiter was originally named
Constitution, but a massive write-in campaign from fans of
the Star Trek television series convinced the White House
to change the name to Enterprise. Amid great fanfare, the
Enterprise was rolled out on September 17, 1976, and later
conducted a successful series of glide-approach and
landing tests that were the first real validation of the
design.
The first fully functional Shuttle Orbiter was the
Columbia, built in Palmdale, California. It was delivered
to Kennedy Space Centre on March 25, 1979, and was first
launched on April 12, 1981—the 20th anniversary of Yuri
Gagarin's space flight—with a crew of two. Challenger was
delivered to KSC in July 1982, Discovery in November 1983,
and Atlantis in April 1985. Challenger was destroyed when
it disintegrated during ascent on January 28, 1986, with
the loss of all seven astronauts on board. Endeavour was
built to replace her (using spare parts originally
intended for the other Orbiters) and delivered in May
1991; it was launched a year later. Seventeen years after
Challenger, Columbia was lost, with all seven crew
members, during re-entry on February 1, 2003, and has not
been replaced.
Description

click to enlarge
The Shuttle sits atop the
Mobile Launcher Platform (MLP). It consists of Orbiter (on
top), External Tank (at centre), and Solid Rocket Boosters
(to the right and left of External Tank). Two Tail Service
Masts (TSMs) to the either side of the Orbiter's tail
provide umbilical connections for propellant loading and
electrical power. The Shuttle is a partially reusuable
launch system composed of three main assemblies: the
reusable Orbiter Vehicle (OV), the expendable External
Tank (ET), and the two reusable Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
The tank and boosters are jettisoned during ascent, so
only the orbiter goes into orbit. The vehicle is launched
vertically like a conventional rocket, and the orbiter
glides to a horizontal landing, after which it is
refurbished for reuse.
The Orbiter resembles an airplane with double-delta wings,
swept 81° at the inner leading edge and 45° at the outer
leading edge. Its vertical stabilizer's leading edge is
swept back at a 45° angle. The four elevons, mounted at
the trailing edge of the wings, and the rudder/speed
brake, attached at the trailing edge of the stabilizer,
with the body flap, control the Orbiter during descent and
landing.
The Orbiter's crew cabin consists of three levels: the
flight deck, the mid-deck, and the utility area. The
highest flight deck seats the commander and pilot, two
mission specialists in the back. The mid-deck has three
more seats for the rest of the crew members. Galley,
toilet, sleep locations, storage lockers, and the side
hatch for entering/exiting the vehicle is also located
there, as is the airlock hatch. The airlock has another
hatch into the payload bay. It allows two astronauts,
wearing their Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) space
suits, to depressurize before a space walk.
The Orbiter has a large 60 by 15 ft (18 m by 4.6 m)
payload bay, filling most of the fuselage. The payload bay
doors have heat radiators mounted on their inner surfaces,
and so are kept open for thermal control while the Shuttle
is in orbit. Thermal control is also maintained by
adjusting the orientation of the Shuttle relative to Earth
and Sun. Inside the payload bay is the Remote Manipulator
System, also known as the Canadarm, a robot arm used to
retrieve and deploy payloads. Until the loss of Columbia,
the Canadarm had been used only on those missions where it
was needed. Since the arm is a crucial part of the Thermal
Protection Inspection procedures now required for Shuttle
flights, it will probably be included on all future
flights.
Orbital Vehicle Three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)
are mounted on the Orbiter's aft fuselage in a triangular
pattern. The three engines can swivel 10.5 degrees up and
down and 8.5 degrees from side to side during ascent to
change the direction of their thrust and steer the Shuttle
as well as push.

The Orbital Manoeuvring
System (OMS) provides orbital manoeuvres, including
insertion, circularization, transfer, rendezvous, abort to
orbit, and abort once around.
The Reaction Control System (RCS) provides attitude
control and translation along the pitch, roll, and yaw
axes during the flight phases of orbit insertion, orbit,
and re-entry.
The Thermal Protection System (TPS) covers the outside of
the Orbiter, protecting it from the cold soak of -121 °C
(-250 °F) in space to the 1649 °C (3000 °F) heat of
re-entry
The orbiter structure is made primarily from aluminium
alloy, although the engine thrust structure is made from
titanium.
The External Tank (ET) provides 2.025 million litres
(535,000 gallons) of liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen
propellant to the SSMEs. It is discarded 8.5 minutes after
launch at an altitude of 60 nautical miles (111 km) then
burns up on re-entry. The ET is constructed mostly of
aluminium-lithium alloy about 1/8 inch thick.
Two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) provide about 83% of the
vehicle's thrust at liftoff and during the first stage
ascent. They are jettisoned two minutes after launch at a
height of about 150,000 feet (45.7 km), then deploy
parachutes and land in the ocean to be recovered. The SRB
cases are made of steel about 1/2 inch (1.27 cm) thick.
Computerized fly-by-wire digital flight control
The shuttle was one of the earliest craft to use a
computerized fly-by-wire digital flight control system.
This means no mechanical or hydraulic linkages connect the
pilot's control stick to the control surfaces or reaction
control system thrusters.
A primary concern with digital fly-by-wire systems is
reliability. Much research went into the shuttle computer
system. The shuttle uses five identical redundant IBM
32-bit general purpose computers (GPCs), model AP-101,
constituting a type of embedded system. Four computers run
specialized software called the Primary Avionics Software
System (PASS). A fifth backup computer runs separate
software called the Backup Flight System (BFS).
Collectively they are called the shuttle Data Processing
System (DPS).
The Shuttle deploys landing gear before landing on a
selected runway just like a common aircraft. The design
goal of the shuttle DPS is fail operational/fail safe
reliability. After a single failure the shuttle can
continue the mission. After two failures it can land
safely.
The four general-purpose computers operate essentially in
lockstep, checking each other. If one computer fails the
three functioning computers "vote" it out of the system.
This isolates it from vehicle control. If a second
computer of the three remaining fails, the two functioning
computers vote it out. In the rare case of two out of four
computers simultaneously failing (a two-two split), one
group is picked at random.
The Backup Flight System (BFS) is separately developed
software running on the fifth computer, used only if the
entire four-computer primary system fails. The BFS was
created because although the four primary computers are
hardware redundant, they all run the same software, so a
generic software problem could crash all of them. This
should never happen, as embedded system avionic software
is developed under totally different conditions than
commercial software. For example the number of code lines
is tiny relative to a commercial operating system, changes
are only made infrequently and with extensive testing, and
many programming and test personnel work on the small
amount of computer code. However in theory it can fail, so
the BFS exists for that contingency.
The software for the shuttle computers are written in a
high-level language called HAL/S, somewhat similar to
PL/I. It is specifically designed for a real time embedded
system environment.
The IBM AP-101 computers originally had about 424
kilobytes of magnetic core memory each. The CPU could
process about 400,000 instructions per second. They have
no hard disk drive, but load software from tape
cartridges.
In 1990 the original computers were replaced with an
upgraded model AP-101S, which has about 2.5 times the
memory capacity (about 1 megabyte) and three times the
processor speed (about 1.2 million instructions per
second). The memory was changed from magnetic core to
semiconductor with battery backup.

STS-26 Discovery
lifts off from its platform at Kennedy Space Centre on
September 29, 1988.
Exhaust plumes billow from the two solid rocket boosters and
covers launch pad as the Discovery,
atop of the orange external tank clears the launch tower and
heads for Earth orbit. STS-26 marks NASA's first human spaceflight mission since the 51L
Challenger accident, January 28, 1986.
Other improvements
During STS-101 Atlantis was the first Shuttle to fly with
glass cockpit. Internally the Shuttle remains largely
similar to the original design, with the exception of the
improved avionics computers. In addition to the computer
upgrades, the original vector graphics monochrome cockpit
displays were replaced with modern full-colour, flat-panel
display screens, similar to contemporary airliners like
the Airbus A320. This is called a "glass cockpit". In the
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project tradition, programmable
calculators are carried as well (originally the HP-41C).
With the coming of the ISS, the Orbiter's internal
airlocks are being replaced with external docking systems
to allow for a greater amount of cargo to be stored on the
Shuttle's mid-deck during Station re-supply missions.
Shuttle Orbiter, showing Shuttle main engines. The Space
Shuttle Main Engines have had several improvements to
enhance reliability and power. This explains phrases such
as "Main engines throttling up to 104%." This does not
mean the engines are being run over a safe limit. The 100%
figure is the original specified power level. During the
lengthy development program, Rocketdyne determined the
engine was capable of safe reliable operation at 104% of
the originally specified thrust. They could have rescaled
the output number, saying in essence 104% is now 100%.
However this would have required revising much previous
documentation and software, so the 104% number was
retained. SSME upgrades are denoted as "block numbers",
such as block I, block II, and block IIA. The upgrades
have improved engine reliability, maintainability and
performance. The 109% thrust level was finally reached in
flight hardware with the Block II engines in 2001. The
normal maximum throttle is
104%, with 106% and 109% available for abort emergencies.
For STS-1 and STS-2 the external tank was painted white to
protect the insulation that covers much of the tank, but
improvements and testing showed that it was not required.
The 600 lb saved by not painting the tank results in an
almost 600 lb increase in payload capability to orbit.
Additional weight was saved by removing some of the
internal "stringers" in the hydrogen tank that proved
unnecessary. The resulting "light-weight external tank"
has been used on the vast majority of Shuttle missions.
STS-91 saw the first flight of the "super light-weight
external tank". This version of the tank is made of the
2195 aluminium-lithium alloy. It weighs 7,500 lb (3.4 t)
less than the last run of lightweight tanks. As the
Shuttle cannot fly unmanned, each of these improvements
has been "tested" on operational flights.
The SRBs (Solid Rocket Boosters) have undergone
improvements as well. Notable is the adding of a third
O-ring seal to the joints between the segments, which
occurred after the Challenger accident.
Several other SRB improvements were planned in order to
improve performance and safety, but never came to be.
These culminated in the considerably simpler, lower cost,
probably safer and better performing Advanced Solid Rocket
Booster which was to have entered production in the early
to mid-1990s to support the Space Station, but was later
cancelled to save money after the expenditure of $2.2
billion. The loss of the ASRB program forced the
development of the Super Light-Weight external Tank (SLWT),
which provides some of the increased payload capability,
while not providing any of the safety improvements. In
addition the Air Force developed their own much lighter
single-piece SRB design using a filament-wound system, but
this too was cancelled.
A cargo-only, unmanned variant of the Shuttle has been
variously proposed and rejected since the 1980s. It is
called the Shuttle-C and would trade re-usability for
cargo capability with large potential savings from reusing
technology developed for the Space Shuttle.
On the first four Shuttle missions, astronauts wore
full-pressure Launch Entry Suit (LES) during ascent and
descent. The pressured helmet was used from STS-5 until
the loss of Challenger. The LES was reinstated when
Shuttle flights resumed in 1988. The LES ended its service
life in late 1995, replacing by the Advanced Crew Escape
Suit (ACES).
Technical data
Orbiter Specifications (for Endeavour, OV-105)
Length: 122.17 ft (37.24 m)
Wingspan: 78.06 ft (23.79 m)
Height: 58.58 ft (17.25 m)
Empty Weight: 151,205 lb (68,586.6 kg)
Gross Lift-off Weight: 240,000 lb (109,000 kg)
Maximum Landing Weight: 230,000 lb (104,000 kg)
Main Engines: Three Rocketdyne Block 2 A SSMEs, each with
a sea level thrust of 393,800 lbf (178,624 kgf)
Maximum Payload: 55,250 lb (25,061.4 kg)
Payload Bay dimensions: 15 ft by 60 ft (4.6 m by 18.3 m)
Operational Altitude: 100 to 520 nmi (185 to 1,000 km)
Speed: 25,404 ft/s (7,743 m/s, 27,875 km/h, 17,321 mi/h)
Cross range: 1,085 nautical miles (2,009.4 km)
Crew: Seven (Commander, Pilot, two Mission Specialists,
and three Payload Specialists), two for minimum.
Space Shuttle Atlantis transported by a Boeing 747 Shuttle
Carrier Aircraft (SCA), 1998 (NASA) External Tank
Specifications (for SLWT)
Length: 153.8 ft (46.9 m)
Diameter: 27.6 ft (8.4 m)
Propellant Volume: 535,000 gallon
Empty Weight: 58,500 lb (26,559 kg)
Gross Lift-off Weight: 1.667 million lb (757,000 kg)
Solid Rocket Booster Specifications
Length: 149.6 ft (45.6 m)
Diameter: 12.17 ft (3.71 m)
Empty Weight: 139,490 lb (63,272.7 kg)
Gross Liftoff Weight: 1.3 million lb (590,000 kg)
Thrust (sea level, liftoff): 2.8 million lbf (1,270,058
kgf)
System Stack Specifications
Height: 184.2 ft (56.14 m)
Gross Lift-off Weight: 4.5 million lb (2.04 million kg)
Total Lift-off Thrust: 6.781 million lbf (3.076 million
kgf)
Ascent
At T minus 16 seconds, the sound suppression system begins
to release a torrent of water on the Mobile Launcher
Platform (MLP) and SRB trenches as the three SSMEs are
started at T minus 6.6 seconds, protecting the Orbiter
from damage by acoustical energy and rocket exhaust
reflected from the flame trench and MLP during lift-off.
All SSMEs must reach the required 100% thrust within three
seconds. If the onboard computers verify normal thrust
buildup, at T minus 0 the SRBs are ignited. At that point
the vehicle is committed to takeoff, as the SRBs cannot be
turned off once ignited. There are extensive emergency
procedures (abort modes) to handle various failure
scenarios during ascent. Many of these concern SSME
failures, since that is the most complex and highly
stressed component. After the Challenger disaster, there
were extensive upgrades to the abort modes.
Shuttle launch of Atlantis at sunset in 2001. The sun is
behind the camera, and the plume's shadow intersects the
moon across the sky. Shortly after clearing the tower the
Shuttle begins a roll and pitch program so that the
vehicle is below the external tank and SRBs. The vehicle
climbs in a progressively flattening arc, accelerating as
the weight of the SRBs and main tank decrease. To achieve
low orbit requires much more horizontal than vertical
acceleration. This is not visually obvious since the
vehicle rises vertically and is out of sight for most of
the horizontal acceleration. Orbital velocity at the 380
km (236 miles) altitude of the International Space Station
is 7.68 km per second (27,648 km/h, 17,180 mph), roughly
equivalent to Mach 23. For missions towards the
International Space Station, the shuttle must reach an
azimuth of 51.6 degrees inclination to rendezvous with the
station.
Around a point called "max-q", where the aerodynamic
forces are at their maximum, the main engines are
temporarily throttled back to avoid over speeding and
hence overstressing the Shuttle (particularly vulnerable
parts such as the wings). At this point, a phenomenon
known as the "Prandtl Glauert Singularity" occurs, where
condensation clouds form during the vehicle's transition
to supersonic speed.
126 seconds after launch, explosive bolts release the SRBs
and small separation rockets push them laterally away from
the vehicle. The SRBs parachute back to the ocean to be
reused. The Shuttle then begins accelerating to orbit on
the Space Shuttle Main Engines. The vehicle at that point
in the flight has a thrust to weight ratio of less than
one — the main engines actually have insufficient thrust
to exceed the force of gravity, and the vertical speed
given to it by the SRBs temporarily decreases. However, as
the burn continues, the weight of the propellant reduces,
the ever-lighter vehicle produces more and more
acceleration until the thrust to weight ratio exceeds 1
again and the vehicle can hold itself up.
The vehicle continues to climb and takes on a somewhat
nose-up angle to the horizon — it uses the main engines to
gain and then maintain altitude whilst it accelerates
horizontally towards orbit.
Finally, in the last tens of seconds of the main engine
burn, the mass of the vehicle is low enough that the
engines must be throttled back to limit vehicle
acceleration to 3 g, largely for astronaut health and
comfort.
Before complete depletion of propellant (running dry would
destroy the engines) the main engines are shut down and
the external tank is released by firing explosive bolts.
The tank then falls to largely burn up in the atmosphere,
with some fragments falling into the Indian Ocean.
To keep the shuttle from following the external tank back
into the atmosphere, the OMS engines are fired to raise
the perigee out of the atmosphere. On some missions (e.g.,
STS-107 and missions to the ISS), the OMS engines are also
used while the Main engines are still firing.
Descent and landing
The outside of the Shuttle heats to over 1,500 °C during
re-entry. The vehicle begins re-entry by firing the OMS
engines opposite to the orbital motion for about three
minutes. The deceleration of the Shuttle lowers its orbit
perigee down into the atmosphere. This OMS firing is done
roughly halfway around the globe from the landing site.
The entire re-entry, except for the lowering the landing
gear and deploying the air data probes, is then under
complete computer control. However the re-entry can be and
has (once) been flown manually. The final landing can be
done on autopilot, but is typically hand flown.
The vehicle then starts significantly entering the
atmosphere at about 400,000 ft doing around Mach 25. The
vehicle is controlled, achieved by a combination of RCS
thrusters and control surfaces, to fly at a 40 degrees
nose-up attitude producing high drag, not only to slow it
down to landing speed, but also to reduce re-entry
heating. In addition, the vehicle needs to bleed off extra
speed before reaching the landing site. This is achieved
by performing s-curves at up to 70 degree bank angle.
Endeavour deploys drag chute after touch-down. In the
lower atmosphere the Orbiter flies much like a
conventional glider, except for a much higher descent
rate, over 10,000 feet per minute (roughly 20 times that
of an airliner). It glides to landing with a glide angle
of 4:1. At approximately Mach 3, two air data probes,
located on the left and right sides of the Orbiter's
forward lower fuselage, are deployed to sense air
pressures related to vehicle's movement in the atmosphere.
When the approach and landing phase begins, the Orbiter is
at 10,000 ft (3048 m) altitude, 7.5 miles (12.1 km) to the
runway. The pilots apply aerodynamic braking to help slow
down the vehicle. The Orbiter's speed is reduced from 424
mph (682.3 km/h) to approximately 215 mph (346 km/h),
(compared to 160 mph for a jet airliner), at touch-down.
The landing gear is deployed while the Orbiter is flying
at 267 mph (429.7 km/h). In additional to applying the
speed brakes, a 40 ft (12.2 m) drag chute is deployed once
the nose gear touches down at about 185 knots. It is
jettisoned as the Orbiter slows through 60 knots.
After landing the vehicle stands on the runway to permit
the fumes from poisonous hydrazine that was used as
propellant for attitude control to dissipate.

Main engine
exhaust, solid rocket booster plume and an expanding ball of
gas from the external tank is visible seconds after the
Space Shuttle Challenger accident on Jan. 28, 1986.
Operations,
applications and accidents
From left to right: Columbia, Challenger, Discovery,
Atlantis and Endeavour. Not illustrated: Enterprise,
Explorer and Pathfinder.
Shuttles
Individual Orbiters are both named, in a manner similar to
ships, and numbered, using the NASA Orbiter Vehicle
Designation system. Whilst all Orbiters are externally
very similar, they have minor internal differences; new
equipment is fitted on a rotating basis as they are
maintained, and the newer Orbiters tend to be structurally
lighter.
- Handling test
article designed with no spaceflight capability:
-
Pathfinder
(Orbiter Simulator, no series number)
- Mockup for display
at Kennedy Space Centre
visitor complex.
- Main propulsion test
article, with no spaceflight capability:
-
MPTA-ET
(External Tank) which is now attached to
Pathfinder
-
MPTA-098
suffered major damage due to engine failure.
- Structural test
article, with no spaceflight capability:
-
STA-099
which became Challenger
- Test vehicle
suitable only for glide/landing tests, with no
spaceflight capability without major refit:
- Lost in accidents
(see below):
-
Challenger
(OV-099, ex-STA-099) - destroyed after lift-off -
January 28,
1986
-
Columbia
(OV-102) - destroyed during re-entry
February 1,
2003
Applications
Crew rotation of the ISS
Manned servicing missions, such as to the Hubble Space
Telescope (HST)
Manned experiments in LEO
Carry to LEO:
Large satellites — these have included the HST
Components for the construction of the ISS
Supplies
Carry satellites with a booster, the Payload Assist Module
(PAM-D) or the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS), to the point
where the booster sends the satellite to:
A higher Earth orbit; these have included:
Chandra X-ray Observatory
Many TDRS satellites
Two DSCS-III (Defense Satellite Communications System)
communications satellites in one mission
A Defence Support Program satellite
An interplanetary orbit; these have included:
Magellan probe
Galileo spacecraft
Ulysses probe
Flight statistics (as of August 25, 2005)
Shuttle Flight days Orbits Distance
-mi- Distance
-km- Flights Longest flight
-days- Crews EVAs Mir/ISS
docking Sat.
dep. †
Columbia 300.74 4,808 125,204,911 201,497,772 28 17.66 160
7 0 / 0 8
Challenger 62.41 995 25,803,940 41,527,416 10 8.23 60 6 0
/ 0 10
Discovery 255.84 4,027 104,510,673 168,157,672 31 13.89
192 28 1 / 5 26
Atlantis 220.40 3,468 89,908,732 144,694,078 26 12.89 161
21 7 / 6 14
Endeavour 206.60 3,259 85,072,077 136,910,237 19 13.86 130
29 1 / 6 3
Total 1,045.99 16,557 430,500,333 692,787,174 114 *17.66
703 91 9 / 17 61
† Satellites deployed
* This was flight STS-80, during November 1996.
Accidents
Two Shuttles have been destroyed in 114 missions, both
with the loss of the entire crew:
Challenger — lost 73 seconds after lift-off, January 28,
1986
Further information: STS-51-L
Columbia — lost during re-entry, February 1, 2003
Further information: Space Shuttle Columbia disaster
This gives a 2% death rate per astronaut per flight.
While the technical details of the accidents are quite
different, the organizational problems show remarkable
similarities. In both cases events happened which were not
planned for or anticipated. In both cases, engineers were
greatly concerned about possible problems but these
concerns were not properly communicated to or understood
by senior NASA managers. In both cases the vehicle gave
ample warning beforehand of abnormal problems. A heavily
layered, procedure-oriented bureaucratic structure
inhibited necessary communication and action. In both
cases a mind set among senior managers developed that
concerns had to be objectively proven rather than simply
suspected.
With Challenger an O-ring which should not have eroded at
all did erode on earlier shuttle launches. Yet managers
felt because it had not previously eroded by more than
30%, that this was not a hazard as there was "a factor of
three safety margin". Morton Thiokol designed and
manufactured the SRBs, and during a pre-launch conference
call with NASA, the Thiokol engineer most experienced with
the O-rings pleaded with management repeatedly to cancel
or reschedule the launch. He raised concerns that the
unusually cold temperatures would stiffen the O-rings,
preventing a complete seal, which was exactly what
happened on the fatal flight. However, Thiokol senior
managers overruled him, dismissing his safety concerns and
allowed the launch to proceed. Challenger's O-rings eroded
completely through as predicted, resulting in the complete
destruction of the spacecraft and the loss of all seven
astronauts on board.
Columbia was destroyed because of damaged thermal
protection from foam debris that broke off the external
tank during ascent. The foam had not been designed or
expected to break off, but had been observed in the past
to do so without incident. The original shuttle
operational specification said the orbiter thermal
protection tiles were designed to withstand virtually no
debris hits at all. Over time NASA managers gradually
accepted more tile damage, similar to how O-ring damage
was accepted. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board
called this tendency the "normalization of deviance" — a
gradual acceptance of events outside the design tolerances
of the craft simply because they had not been catastrophic
to date.
Retrospect
Costs
While the Shuttle has been a reasonably successful launch
vehicle, it has not met the goal of greatly reducing
launch costs. There are various ways to measure per-launch
costs. One way is dividing the total cost over the life of
the program (including buildings, facilities, training,
salaries, etc) by the number of launches. This method
gives about $1.3 billion per launch[1]. Another method is
calculating the incremental (or marginal) cost
differential to add or subtract one flight — just the
immediate resources expended/saved involved in that one
flight. This is about $55 million. Neither figure is right
or wrong; they are simply different ways to examine the
picture.
The total cost of the program has been $145 billion as of
early 2005, and is estimated to be $174 billion when the
Shuttle retires in 2010. NASA's budget for 2005 allocates
30%, or $5 billion, to Space Shuttle operations.
Original goals of the Shuttle included operating at a
fairly high flight rate (roughly 12 flights per year, at
low cost, and with high reliability. Improving in these
areas over the previous generation of single-use and
unmanned launchers was a motivation. Although it did
operate as the world's first reusable crew-carrying
spacecraft, it did not greatly improve on those
parameters, and is considered by some to have failed in
its original purpose.
Although the final design differs from the original
concept, the project was still supposed to meet USAF goals
and be much cheaper to fly in general. One reason behind
this apparent failure is inflation. During the 1970s the
U.S. suffered from severe inflation. Between when the
program began in 1972, and first flight in April 1981,
inflation increased prices over 200%. When evaluating
shuttle development costs in later-year dollars, this
superficially appeared to be a large cost overrun in the
program. In fact when discounting inflation, the shuttle
development program was within the initial cost estimate
given to President Richard M. Nixon in 1971.
The high shuttle operational costs have been much more
than anticipated, if counting all associated support
resources (total expenditures, including development
costs, divided by number of flights). Some of this can be
attributed to a lower flight rate, operating beyond the
10-year anticipated lifespan of each Shuttle, and higher
than anticipated maintenance costs. The marginal or
incremental per launch costs have been about 50% more than
early projections.
Some reasons for higher than expected operational costs
can be ascribed to:
Maintenance of thermal protection tiles turned out to be
very labour intensive, averaging about 1 person·week to
replace a tile, with hundreds damaged with each launch.
The main engines were highly complex and maintenance
intensive, necessitating removal and extensive inspection
after each flight. Before the current "Block II" engines,
the turbopumps (a primary engine component) had to be
removed, dissembled, and totally overhauled after each
flight.
Launch rate is significantly lower than initially
expected. This does not reduce actual operating costs, but
if dividing total program costs by number of launches,
more launches per year produces a lower per-launch cost
figure. Some early hypothetical studies examined 55
launches per year, but the maximum possible launch rate
was limited to 24 per year, based on manufacturing
capacity of the external tank. Early in the shuttle
development, the expected launch rate was about 12 per
year. Launch rates reached 9 per year in 1985 but averaged
less thereafter.
Early cost estimates of $118 per pound of payload were
based on marginal or incremental launch costs, and based
on 1972 dollars and assuming a 65,000 pound payload
capacity. Correcting for inflation and other factors, this
equates to roughly $36 million incremental costs per
launch. Compared to this, today's actual incremental per
launch costs are about 50% more, or $55 million per
launch.
Shuttle operations
The Shuttle was originally conceived to operate somewhat
like an airliner. After landing, the orbiter would be
checked out and start "mating" to the rest of the system
(the ET and SRBs), and be ready for launch in as little as
two weeks. Instead, this turnaround process takes months;
Columbia was once launched twice within 56 days. Because
loss of crew is unacceptable, the primary focus of the
Shuttle program is to return the crew to Earth safely,
which can conflict with other goals, namely to launch
payloads cheaply. Furthermore, because in some cases there
are no survivable abort modes, many pieces of hardware
simply must function perfectly and so must be carefully
inspected before each flight. The result is high labour
cost, with around 25,000 workers in Shuttle operations and
labour costs of about $1 billon per year.
During development, shuttle features were primarily chosen
based on capability required to service the future space
station. Even though the initially planned Space Station
Freedom was significantly scaled back, the shuttle was
still vital to service it. No other launch vehicle had the
shuttle's payload capability or could return large items
from the space station to earth.
NASA's plan for using the shuttle to launch all unmanned
payloads declined, then was discontinued. Following the
Challenger disaster, carrying in the shuttle payload bay
the powerful liquid fuelled Centaur upper stages planed
for interplanetary probes was ruled out. The Shuttle's
history of unexpected delays also makes it liable to miss
narrow launch windows. Advances in technology over the
last decade have made probes smaller and lighter, and as a
result unmanned probes and communications satellites can
use cheaper and more reliable expendable rockets,
including Delta launcher, and Atlas V.
Looking back and ahead
Opinions differ on the lessons of the Shuttle. While it
was developed within the original development cost and
time estimates given to President Richard M. Nixon in
1971, the operational costs, flight rate, payload
capacity, and reliability have been worse than
anticipated.
In general future designers look to less complex, more
reliable launch systems with lower maintenance costs. One
approach is Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO), which would be
100% reusable and use a single stage. NASA evaluated
several concepts in the 1990s, and selected the X-33,
which would eventually have been the Venturestar. During
design that program increased in complexity and
development cost, encountered problems and was finally
cancelled.
Another variant of SSTO is a hypersonic, scramjet-powered,
air breathing vehicle. This would be launched and landed
horizontally like an airliner. It would achieve much of
orbital velocity while still within the upper atmosphere.
It was originally investigated by the U.S. Department of
Defence, but passenger-carrying civilian versions were
planned, sometimes called the "New Orient Express". The
official name was the Rockwell X-30. Like the X-33, the
X-30 encountered major technical difficulties, primarily
due to the system complexity and materials required for
hypersonic flight, and was also cancelled.
Another approach is lower cost expendable launch vehicles.
NASA currently uses these for unmanned launches, and plans
to use them for future manned launches. NASA plans on
using modified shuttle components to build an expendable
Shuttle Derived Launch Vehicle. This technology would be
used to develop two separate launchers, one for manned
missions and the other for unmanned heavy cargo. This
contrasts with the current shuttle where astronauts and
heavy cargo are launched in a single vehicle. Unlike the
shuttle, this future launcher and associated crew
exploration vehicle will have a launch escape system to
save the crew in the event of a disaster.