
A R-1B of the 1st Aircraft Repair Unit
supplies critical parts to a B-29 unit operating in the Marianas during
World War II.
Helicopters played an
inconsequential role in World War II. However, World War II demonstrated
that the helicopter could perform useful missions, and they did see
service to a limited extent as supply craft and for rescue operations in
the China-Burma-India theatre, and were operated by the 1st Air Commando
unit. But the helicopters of the day were still limited in their power,
size, and hence their capabilities.
By Korea, helicopters were
more numerous but were still confined largely to support roles, primarily
search and rescue and medical evacuation, not to combat. Both the U.S.
Army and the Marine Corps also used in certain logistical roles. Although
army leaders thought about using helicopters to ferry troops during Korea,
the service was prohibited from operating large aircraft by a law passed
when the U.S. Air Force was created in 1947. This situation changed on
November 4, 1952, when the army and the air force signed an agreement that
continued the limit on the size of army fixed-wing aircraft but redefined
helicopters by function performed in the combat zone. This new agreement
paved the way for the use of large army helicopters, although it came too
late to seriously impact the war. The army did, however, send the 6th
Transportation Company (Helicopter) with Sikorsky H-19s to Korea before
the war ended.

The CH-47 Chinook was used to
transport troops and equipment in and out of battle.
The United States first
used this new concept of warfare, soon named "air mobility," during the
early years of its involvement in the Vietnam conflict. The Vietnam War
was the first real helicopter war. The army quickly began refining its way
of fighting as the war escalated.
American H-21 helicopters
manufactured by Vertol were used to ferry Army of the Republic of Viet Nam
(ARVN) troops into battle against communist Viet Cong guerillas in 1962.
At first, communist troops fled when the troop-carrying helicopters
landed. But at the important battle of Ap Bac, the Viet Cong soon learned
that if they stood their ground, they could bring down the helicopters
with relative ease. Communist training manuals described the best ways to
shoot at the H-21 and UH-1 Huey helicopters—how to shoot ahead of the
target to increase the chance of hitting it and where to shoot to cause
the most damage.
Despite the proven
vulnerability of helicopters to ground fire, the U.S. Army soon fully
embraced the concept of air mobility. By the mid-1960s, as American
involvement in Vietnam dramatically increased, the army began moving
massive amounts of troops by air, not just the small groups of only a few
years earlier. Some combat operations involved more than 100 helicopters
at a time, plus fixed-wing air support to drop bombs and fire rockets at
enemy troops.
The helicopter ushered in a
radically different way of fighting a war: instead of armies engaging each
other across vast fronts, advancing slowly, and holding ground, the U.S.
Army would quickly carry troops into hostile territory and deploy them,
then remove them after the fighting ended. While the overall strategy was
questionable—no territory was ever really held—the tactic was often very
successful. Helicopters offered high mobility for troops and a tremendous
element of surprise. An enemy that had been sitting unchallenged for days
or weeks could suddenly, without warning, find itself under assault from
troops brought in by helicopter. Large troop transport helicopters like
the CH-47 Chinook were developed for this purpose, but the workhorse UH-1
Huey became the most popular helicopter for moving troops into and out of
battle.
The army also used armed
helicopters to support ground troops, eventually fielding dedicated
helicopter gun ships like the AH-1 Cobra. A helicopter could be equipped
with guns, grenade launchers, rockets, or even guided missiles, and
provide rapid and wide-ranging fire against an adversary on the ground. By
the middle of the war, the helicopter had become as important to the army
as the tank, the armoured personnel carrier, and the jeep, and the Huey
was the most symbolic weapon of the Vietnam War.
Air mobility came at a
heavy price, however. During the Vietnam War, between 1962 and 1973, the
United States lost 4,869 helicopters to all causes (with more than a
thousand lost in 1968 and another thousand in 1969). Fifty-three percent
of these losses were due to enemy fire (including enemy attacks on
airbases). The rest resulted from operational accidents. The high rate of
operational accidents occurred largely because helicopters are prone to
mechanical breakdown if not regularly maintained, and during a war,
maintenance often suffers. Vietnam's heavy jungle canopy also made
helicopter operations difficult, with few places to land a stricken
helicopter.
Once the United States had
pioneered the use of helicopters in combat, other countries soon followed.
None could create large "airborne cavalry" units like the U.S. Army, but
many countries copied the concept of using helicopters to ferry troops
into and out of combat areas quickly, particularly when fighting rebel
groups. They often used U.S. helicopters for this purpose. Countries like
Great Britain and the Soviet Union usually chose to move primarily elite
troops by helicopter. U.S. Army airborne cavalry units like the famed
101st Airborne and the 82nd Airborne tended to be better trained than most
cavalry units.
By the 1970s, as Vietnam
came to an end and the U.S. Army refocused its attention on the threat of
a Soviet ground offensive in Europe, army leaders began to rethink some
aspects of the air mobility concept. Before the war, the army had only a
limited aviation capability. But by the end of the war, the army had a
substantial air force of its own—centred on the helicopter—and could take
on missions that were previously the domain of the U.S. Air Force but
which were often ignored by that service.
Attack helicopters like the
HueyCobra were more heavily armed and were given targets deep behind enemy
lines, such as command posts and tanks, attacking them with missiles. The
new strategy was also to fight at night, using advanced navigation and
imaging systems, and hiding down among the trees and hills using "Nap Of
the Earth" (NOE) flying. By doing so, the army could take advantage of
superior American technology to compensate for larger numbers of Soviet
ground forces. U.S. helicopters were equipped with infrared and night
imaging systems, and pilots were given night vision goggles so they could
see in the dark. By the 1980s, the United States also fielded heavily
armed helicopters dedicated primarily to the mission of destroying tanks
and equipped with laser-guided Hellfire missiles.
These changes in tactics
proved themselves during the Persian Gulf War, when U.S. attack
helicopters could freely range the battlefield during the night, easily
destroying Iraqi tanks and other vehicles. Large numbers of U.S. troops
were also ferried deep inside Iraqi territory, establishing facilities for
supporting the attack helicopters as well as ground troops. Once again,
other countries adopted the U.S. tactics and brought their helicopters.
While helicopters have
revolutionized infantry warfare, they have had less of an impact on other
areas of combat. This is primarily because they are still relatively slow,
vulnerable, and cannot carry the large payloads that fixed-wing aircraft
can carry.

The HueyCobra was a dedicated helicopter gunship
that supported ground troops.
Other than infantry and
anti-tank operations, helicopters have most notably been used for Combat
Search and Rescue (CSAR), where they retrieve downed pilots deep inside
enemy lines. This technique was really perfected during Vietnam, but
several well-publicized rescues took place during the Bosnia crisis and
later during the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia. These helicopters are often
equipped with highly sophisticated navigation systems and are supported by
other armed helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft during their rescue
mission.
Helicopters have also been
used in the maritime surveillance and anti-shipping role. During the
Falklands War in 1981, a British Lynx helicopter fired a missile and sank
an Argentine submarine moored at dock. U.S. helicopters have also been
equipped with missiles for attacking small ships and boats.

The Lynx helicopter, produced
jointly by Westland and A‚rospatiale, saw action in the Falklands War. It
was used in an anti-shipping role, where one sank a moored Argentine
submarine in 1981.
Other than search and
rescue of downed aviators, the primary purpose of naval helicopters has
been submarine hunting and over-the-horizon targeting. Helicopters hunting
submarines can hover and lower a large sonar into the water using a winch
and cable. They are far more mobile than a ship and are invulnerable to
the submarine they are hunting. Helicopters equipped with radar are also
used to detect targets that a ship's sensors cannot see because they are
over the horizon. They relay this data to the ship and can also guide
ship-launched missiles to their targets. This has helped change the role
of surface warships from defensive platforms used to protect aircraft
carriers, to offensive platforms capable of attacking other ships at long
range. In addition, helicopters have proven their utility at clearing
mines. By towing large sleds along the water, the helicopter can stay away
from any potentially harmful mines.
Although the helicopter is
a highly useful military aircraft, it still suffers from slow speed, short
range and limited lifting capabilities, leading aircraft manufacturers to
search for ways to combine the attributes of both helicopters and
conventional airplanes.