Flying on Nuclear: The Superpowers Quest
for a Nuclear Powered Bomber
By Raul Colon
July 2007
In the late 1940s, as the Cold War began to
heat-up, the Soviet Union began research into the development of nuclear
reactors as power sources to drive warships. The work was performed at
first by an academic Russian engineer, I.V. Kurchatov, which added
aviation as a possible recipient of the new nuclear power plants. On
August 12th, 1955 the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued a Mandate
which ordered certain groups within the aviation industry to join forces
in this research. As a direct result of the Mandate, the design bureaus of
Andrei Tupolev and Vladimir Myasishchev became the appointed chief design
teams on a project to develop and produce several aircraft designs
intended to be powered by nuclear propulsion while a bureau headed by N.D.
Kuznetsov and A.M. Lyulka, were assigned to develop the engines for the
aircraft.
They promptly decided on an energy transfer
method: Direct Cycle. This method will enable the engines to use the
energy supplied by the reactor, replacing the combustion chamber power
supply that the jet engine utilizes. Several types of nuclear powered
engines were tested: ramjet, turboprop and turbojet, with different
transfer mechanisms for transmitting nuclear generated thermal energy
across each one of them. After extensive experimentation with various
engines and transfer systems, Soviet engineers concluded that the direct
cycle turbojet engine offered the best alternative.
In the direct cycle power transfer
configuration, the incoming air entered through the compressor mechanism
of the turbojet engine, then, passed through a plenum that directed the
air to the reactor core. Then the air, by this time acting as the reactor
coolant additive, was constantly heated as it moved through the core.
After exiting the core, the air went back to another plenum and from there
was directed to the turbine section of the engines for thrust production.
New coolant systems were also tested, as it was the protective shielding
for the crew cabin. This and the size of the initial nuclear power plants
were the main problem facing engineers working on the project. Shielding
the crew and reducing the size and weight of the reactors in order to fit
one on an airframe became the main technical hurdle in the project.
The Tupolev bureau, knowing the complexity
of the task assigned to them, estimated that it would be two decades
before the programme could produce a working prototype. They assumed that
the first operational nuclear-assisted airplane could take to the air in
the late 1970s or early 1980s. The programme was designed to operate in
development phases. The first phase was designing and testing a small
nuclear reactor, which properly began in late 1955. On March 1956, the
Tupolev bureau was assigned by the Council of Ministers of the USSR the
task of producing a flying test-bed plane as soon as possible. The Tupolev
engineers decided to take an existing Tu-95M bomber and use it as a
nuclear flying laboratory, the plane’s eventual designation was to be
Tu-95LAL. By 1958, the ground phase of the programme, the rig used to
install the nuclear reactor on the aircraft, was ready for testing. Some
time during the summer of 1958, the nuclear power plant was turned on and
testing commenced. Immediately, the required level of reactor power was
achieved, thus opening the path for the flight test phase. Between May and
August 1961, the Tu-95LAL completed 34 research flights.
Tu-95 LAL-Nuclear Reactor
Much of them made with the reactor shut
down. The main purpose of the flight phase was examining the effectiveness
of the radiation shielding which was one of the main concerns for the
engineers. The massive amount of liquid sodium, beryllium oxide, cadmium,
paraffin wax and steel plates; were the sole source of protection for the
crew against the deadly radiation emerging from the core. The results were
once again promising. Radiation levels were low in the crew cabin, paving
the way for the bureau to design a new airframe. The next phase in the
programme was to produce a test aircraft designed from the beginning to
use nuclear power as its main propulsion force. This was to be the
Aircraft 119. This aircraft was based on the Tu-95 design. The major
distinction was that two of its four engines, inboard, were to be the new
NK14a turboprops with heat exchangers. The NK14a operated in a very
similar way to the direct cycle engines, the main difference being that
the air, after passing through the compressor, did not go to the reactor,
but directly to the heat exchange system. At the same time, the heat
generated by the reactor, carried in the form of fluid; went to the heat
exchange system. The combination of these two forces would enable the
turbojet to produce the required amount of thrust. The other two outboard
engines would remain NK12Ms.
The NK Kuznetsov Design Bureau commenced
work on the engines at the same time that the schematics of Aircraft 119
were drawn. As in the Tu-95LAL, the internal bomb bay would house the
reactor. The connections leading from the reactor to the engines would run
through the main fuselage, up to the wings and then directly to the heat
exchangers attached to the two inboard engines. Tupolev estimated that the
first 119s were to be available for runway trials by late 1965. After
trials, the 119’s engines were to be replaced by a four NK14a engine
configurations based on the Tu-114 commercial liner. However, the 119
never made it off the drawing board. Budgetary constraints and the
development of new conventional aircraft designs were cited as the main
reason for the cancellation of the programme in August 1966. The
cancellation of Aircraft 119 did not mean that the Soviet Union terminated
its research into a nuclear powered aircraft. Several attempts were made
in designing a nuclear-powered, supersonic bomber. Around the same time
that Tupolev began working on the 119, there was a parallel program code
named Aircraft 120.
A vast amount of research was invested on
this project. Mainly on the design of a new turbojet engine and the layout
of a new nuclear reactor system that would have been able to offer more
protection to the crew and the aircraft sensitive avionics systems.
Aircraft 120 was to be fitted with two turbojet engines based on the
development by Kuznetsov. The reactor was to be installed near the rear
part of the plane, as far from the cabin as possible. The crew consisted
of the pilot, co-pilot, and navigator; enclosed in a heavy lead radiation
shielding cabin. The 120 would have a conventional aerodynamics
configuration with a high mounted 45 degrees swept wing, a swept empennage
and a tricycle landing gear. Tupolev’s goal of reaching the testing phase
for the 120 in the late 1970s never materialized, as with the 119, the 120
existence was only on the drawing board. Termination of the programme was
mainly for the same reasons as for the 119’s.
Next for Tupolev was the Aircraft 132. Another attempt by the Soviets to
produce a serviceable nuclear powered bomber. The 132 was conceived as a
low-level strike aircraft. The design 132 would have housed the reactor in
the front two turbojet engines, the entire package would be accommodated
in the rear of the airframe. The engines were to be designed to operate
with nuclear power or with conventional kerosene. The kerosene would be
only used for take-off and landing operations and the fuel would be housed
in a tank installed in front of the reactor. As with the 120, the 132
would have had a conventional configuration, with the cabin, again,
heavily shielded. The main difference was the wing configuration.
The 132 would have been a delta wing plane.
The empennage was also to be swept and the horizontal stabilizer was to be
located on top of the fin. As with the other projects, the 132 was
cancelled in the mid 1960s for budgetary and, most importantly, technical
difficulties. One last attempt was made by the Tupolev bureau to achieve a
nuclear powered aircraft. This aircraft would have been supersonic, long
ranged bomber designed to compete with Convair’s B-58 Hustler supersonic
medium bomber. This time, the aircraft did not make it to the drawing
board. In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union decided to abandon further
research into the feasibility of a nuclear powered aircraft. The main
reason given to the bureaux involved in the project was that with the
introduction of more accurate and less expensive Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missiles aboard nuclear powered Soviet submarines; the Soviet
Union could achieve the same degree of nuclear capability at a fraction of
the cost. Also, in consideration, but rarely mentioned by the Soviets, was
the ecological impact of a crash during operations. Should one of these
aircrafts were to crash in a populated area, the radiation fallout could
have been disastrous.
Another nuclear powered aircraft program was started by the Myasishchev
Design Bureau in the summer of 1955. On May 19th, 1955; a resolution
passed by SovMin ordering Myasishchev to commence development of a
supersonic nuclear bomber. The bureau first design was code name M-60. The
first draft of the project was finished on July 1956. At the same time,
Lyulka’s new engine design that would comprise a nuclear/turbojet engine
with the heat the reactor generates transferred through air to the jet, a
power plant configuration known as Open System; would had give the M-60 a
thrust of 49,600lbs. The aircraft would take-off and land with a chemical
mixture fuel as its propulsion. On reaching the desired operational
altitude, the nuclear system would engage and provide the M-60 with its
cruise speed. This engine configuration and thrust would have given the
M-60 the ability to achieve Mach 2 speeds. Crew accommodations was to be
housed in the centre of the fuselage, again, in an all enclosed, lead
shielded cabin.
The cabin configuration would have
curtailed visual observation. Consistent with other Soviet nuclear
configurations, the reactor would be housed in the rear of the aircraft to
offer further protection. . The initial fuselage configuration called for
a long, slim airplane with trapezoid wings and a trapezoid T-shaped tail.
The nuclear/jet engines were to be placed side-by-side in the fuselage.
The length of the M-60 was proposed at 169ft, 3.5in; with a wing span of
86ft, 11in. Sub sequential design modifications of the M-60 had the
aircraft fitted with four engines mounted up in pairs at the rear of the
airframe. As with the other nuclear programs, a tricycle undercarriage was
selected for the M-60. Later, a swept wing design was incorporated on the
aircraft. Another variant for the M-60 was introduced in December 1957; it
called for the M-60 to be a delta winged design with both engines placed
on under wing pylons and in tip nacelles which resemble the configuration
of the M-50 Bounder. After an extensive research phase, the Myasishchev
bureau determined that with the correct nuclear power plants, a strategic
bomber with a 1,989 mph speed, an operational range of 15,500 miles, and a
service ceiling of 65,600ft was achievable. The M-60 also did not make it
out of the planning stage.
After the cancellation of the M-60 program
in 1959, the Myasishchev bureau put much of its research assets on the
M-30 program, which started back in 1953; but by this time SovMin interest
on a nuclear powered aircraft was winding. Several other attempts were
made to design an operational nuclear aircraft, chiefly the M-30, but also
the M-62 program, ran similar along the lines of the M-60 The final blow
to the nuclear powered aircraft programme came in early 1961, when the
Soviet leadership called for the abandonment of all related programmes,
ending one of the their most expensive and technically challenging
programmes ever. The end of the M-60 and the M-30 was also the end of
Myasishchev’s affiliation with the design and production of heavy bombers.
At the time of the cancellation of the program, the overall state of
available technology, atomic science and aerodynamic designs, had
progressed to the point that if the program had run its service course, it
is very plausible that the Soviet Union would had reach its goal of
deploying a nuclear powered bomber platform by the late 1970s. Instead,
the flow of new aerodynamic information and designs, the vast amount of
economic resources needed in the program, not only to develop a nuclear
powered bomber, but to maintain it were cited as the reason for the
cancellation. Also the emergence of a new Soviet doctrine that would rely
heavily on the new submarine launched ICBM; with improve targeting
mechanism, coupled with the sheer number of Land Based ICBM that the
Soviet were rapidly deploying, doomed the Soviet nuclear power bomber
program. At around the same time the Soviets commenced its nuclear powered
aircraft program, the other Cold War warrior, the United States, was
already working at a fast pace to field its own nuclear bomber.
At the same time that the Soviet effort was taking hold. In the United
States fascination about a potential nuclear power that might offer
limitless energy led the US Air Forces commenced in 1944 an experimental
programme designed to produce an operational nuclear powered bomber. The
idea of nuclear propulsion energy to power an aircraft dates back to 1942,
when Enrico Fermi, one of the fathers of the atomic bomb discussed the
idea with members of the Manhattan Project. For the first two years,
engineers were immersed on the issue of how radiation would affect the
performance of a flying platform, its avionics, materials, and more
importantly, its crew. The programme seemed lost in endless detailed
fights and controversies, when in 1947, it received new life. The newly
formed U.S. Air Forces decided to invest the necessary resources to make
the program feasible. Allocation for ten million dollars was promptly made
available to the program.
From early 1948 to 1951, extensive research
was made in reactor technologies and engine transfer systems; the backbone
of the nuclear powered aircraft. Many configurations were proposed, Dual
reactor, combination (chemical and nuclear) and single systems were
tested. Eventually it was decided that a single reactor would provide the
aircraft with the necessary flight reliability. Next came the debate about
what type of transfer mechanism would be implemented. Transferring nuclear
power to a conventional engine had long been seen by engineers as the main
obstacle in the development of the program.
In 1949, the programme ran a series of tests, known as the Heat Transfer
Reactor Experiment (HTRE), involving three types of reactors, with the
purpose of determining the most efficient method of transferring energy
from the reactor. After an extensive trial series, the HTRE-3 emerged as
the selected transfer system. The HTRE-3 was a Direct-Cycle Configuration.
In a direct cycle system, the air entered the engine through the
compressor of the turbojet, it then moved to a plenum intake that directs
the air to the core of the reactor. At this point the air, serving as the
reactor coolant, is super-heated as it travels through the core. After
that stage, it goes to another plenum intake; from there the air is
directed to the turbine section of the engine and eventually to the
tailpipe.
This configuration allowed the aircraft
engine to start on chemical power and then switch to nuclear heat as soon
as the core reached optimized operational temperatures, thus providing the
proposed aircraft the ability to take-off and land on conventional power.
Another system considered was the Indirect-Cycle Configuration. In this
configuration, the air did not go through the reactor core, air instead
passed through a heat exchanger. The heat generated by the reactor is
carried by liquid metal or highly pressurized water, to the heat exchanger
where the air is, thus heating the air in its way to the turbine.
Engineers preferred the direct-cycle approach due to the fact that was
simpler to produce; programme managers preferred the idea because its
development time was relatively short compared to the indirect system.
After establishing the parameters for the power plant and the transfer
mechanism, engineers commenced work on the shielding for the crew and
aircraft avionic systems. Initial plans called for the shielding of the
reactor by massive layers of cadmium, paraffin wax, beryllium oxide, and
steel. The idea behind this setting was that the more protection the
reactor have, the less shielding the crew cabin would require.
Technically, this was a sound approach, but in a rapidly functioning
environment such as an aircraft setting, this shielding proved to be
ineffective. For this reason it was decided to implement what is known as
Shadow Shielding Concept. In shadow shielding, the layers of protection
would be equally divided between the reactor and the crew cabin. Shadow
Shielding would also provide a more robust protection for the aircraft’s
avionics systems. An added plus from the implementation of this system was
the reduction in the weight of the aircraft due to the distribution of the
shield.
Having tackled the reactor, transfer mechanism, and shielding problems,
the programme moved it to the aircraft design stage. By late 1951, the
program was heavily involved in the acquisition of a test-bed type
aircraft for the initial trials of the configuration. The only proven
airframe large enough to carry the massive reactor and Heat Transfer
system was the Convair’s B-36 Peacekeeper Bomber. The Peacemaker started
to enter front line service with the U.S. Air Force in late 1948 and at
the time of the nuclear powered programme, was the Strategic Air Command
(SAC) main nuclear deterrent platform.
The B-36 was indeed massive. The dimensions
are impressive even today. A wingspan of 230ft, a length of 162ft 1in,
high of 46ft 8in, and a wind area of 4,772sq ft. This bomber maximum
take-off weight was an amazing 410,000lbs; which is why the program
managers selected the B-36. A service ceiling of 39,900ft and a climb rate
of 2,220ft per minute were also pluses in the selection process. Once the
testing aircraft had been identified, the next phase would commence at
once; the conversion of the B-36 into an experimental aircraft. The main
modification made to the original B-36 airframe was on the nose cone
section. The original crew and avionics cabin was replaced by a massive
11tons structure lined with lead, and rubber. Water tanks were also placed
in the aft section of the frame to absorb any escaping radiation.
The other section of the plane that underwent significant modifications
was the rear-internal bomb bay. Internal cross sections were removed as
well as many of the bomb carrying rafts in order to make space for the
nuclear reactor power plant. These alterations made it possible for the
aircraft to receive a new designation. It is from this moment on that this
sole B-36 Peacemaker, numbered 51-5712, would be called Nuclear Test
Aircraft-36. A further designation change was made when the nuclear
powered plant was installed on the aircraft. Thus the NB-36 “Crusader” was
born. Identifying the aircraft was the radioactivity symbol painted on the
tailfin. The R-1, one standing for the energy it would generate, a
megawatt; reactor installed on the aircraft was a liquid-sodium cooled
power plant winched up into the plane’s bomb bay at a dedicated pit on
Convair’s Fort Worth plant every time the NB-36 was scheduled to take to
the air. When the NB-36 landed, the R-1 was removed for research purposes.
The original B-36 was powered by six Pratt & Whitney 3600hp, R4360-53
radial piston engines, supplemented by four General Electric 54000lb
thrust J47-19 turbojets.
After conversion, the engines were removed
and a new configuration was incorporated. The NB-36 now had four GE J47
nuclear converted piston engines generating 3,800hp augmented by four
23.13Kn turbojets generating 5,200lb of thrust. Each of the engines
utilized the Direct-Cycle Configuration for power conversion. The NB-36
was designed from the beginning, to be propelled into the air with a
conventional chemical mixture, and then the crew would switch on the
reactor after achieving the necessary heat requirements on its core. On
landing approaches, the aircraft would switch back to chemical mixture.
This procedure was implemented in order to minimize the possibility of a
major radiation leak in case of a crash landing.
The NB-36 made 47 recorded flights between the summer of 1955 and the fall
of 1957. All these tests were made operating the NB-36 with conventional
chemical power. The R-1 reactor was turned-on on many of these flights,
not to actually power the aircraft, but to test and collect data on the
feasibility of a sustained nuclear reaction on a moving platform. All the
data collected by these tests showed the program managers that the
possibility of using a nuclear power plant to provide an aircraft with
unlimited operational range was indeed at their disposal at this time.
Impressive as the taxi and flight testing were for the NB-36, the complete
concept of a nuclear powered aircraft was made irrelevant by advances in
conventional aircraft and engine design and the public concern about the
dangers of flying a nuclear reactor over their homeland. In the end, after
expending no less than $469,350,000 on the nuclear powered programme and
having a concept aircraft flying, the U.S. Air Force shelved the programme
in the late 1960s, thus ending any major attempt by the United States to
utilize nuclear propulsion to power an aircraft in combat.
Why the United States and the Soviet Union, clearly on a path to develop
and produce a serviceable nuclear powered air platform; decided to
terminate their respective programs? If the technology was there, what was
missing? As with any programme involving a military project, there
political and social forces driving it in reverse directions. These same
forces that drove the U.S. and U.S.S.R. into investing so many resources
were the same ones that drove their programmes to a halt. The nuclear
power aircraft program of both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. started an a time
when atomic energy was view as a “do it all” energy source. But here is
where the similarities ended. From the late 1940s to the early 1960s,
atomic power was viewed very favourably by the general population in the
United States. Atomic energy was being used to supply electricity to
cities and small towns across the country. The U.S. military rapidly
responded to this new found energy source with its own research and
development programmes. Beside the ordinance harness of the atom, such as
in bombs or missiles; nuclear propulsion was an intriguing subject among
military leaders.
The U.S. Navy began to experiment with
nuclear reactors aboard vessels, specially, aircraft carriers; with the
purpose of generating an unlimited source of steam to drive them.
Submarine use of nuclear propulsion was also researched and vigorously
tested during this period. Seen their main competitor for funds
implementing nuclear propulsion programs, the newly formed United States
Air Force decided to join the fray. Immediately, the Air Force recognized
the strategic bomber as the platform that would argument its operational
profile if it were nuclear powered. Aircraft do not have the capacity to
carry enough fuel to achieve maximum operational capability. For long
distance flights or combat patrols, bombers usually needed to make more
than one re-fuelling stop. Subtracting time from the mission profile.
A nuclear powered aircraft could solve this
problem. As previously stated, studies had demonstrated that the U.S.
possessed the technical ability to produce a workable nuclear powered
bomber. Here is where the political aspect of the equation enters. Through
its history, the nuclear powered aircraft programme was plagued by a lack
of short term vision and political interfering. The Air Force, who was
tasked to oversee the programme by the Department of Defence, almost
immediately failed to set short-term, achievable goals for the programme.
Major shifts in the programme’s objectives were made with relative
frequency. Causing the programme managers to shift resources from one
aspect of the programme to another. This lead directly to wasting of
valuable time and financial resources. One example was the construction of
massive test facilities for the programme at great expenses, only to be
closed after they were never used.
In March of 1953, the programme was placed
on termination phase by then Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson due to a
lack of progress. However, the Soviet’s successful lunch of Sputnik
changed all of this. Sputnik did more than start the space race; it
brought back to centre stage the nuclear technological race between the
superpowers. Congressmen were flowing letters to the Eisenhower
Administration to re-invest in the nuclear powered bomber program at once.
Vigorous lobbying on behalf of the Air Force created an increase in
available funds for the programme. Adding to the public sentiment of fear;
reports began to surface about an experimental Soviet nuclear powered
bombers flying test runs near the Polish border. The net effect on the
programme was an influx of funds and human resources. A new life, albeit,
a short one.
As the political situation worsened. Desk officials were overriding field
managers on key aspect of the programme. Datelines were frequently missed.
Goals were half-met, if met at all. The programme was also plagued by a
lack of a central, unified voice. A voice that could command respect and
inspire the personnel working on the project. In the end, this was the
undoing of the whole programme. Critics had pointed to the development of
more accurate Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles or a serviceable
mid-air refuelling system, or even the ecological effects of a crash
landing by one of these “special” bombers; as the main reasons behind the
cancellation of the programme. These facts played an important role in the
programme’s demise, but the factor that ultimate undid the programme was
mismanagement. The atmosphere surrounding the programme’s operational
management team never fully complemented the team on the ground. Waste
after waste of scarce financial resources as well major time delays, gave
the access the politician coveted to take a measure of control over the
programme; and in the end, destroying any hope a achieving a successful
conclusion.
The Soviet approach to their programme was, from the very start, quite
different than that of the U.S. Their main goal in achieving a nuclear
powered bomber was to enhance their ability to strike deep into
Continental America. At the time, the leaders at the Kremlin were alarmed
at the U.S. installation of offensive medium-range ballistic missiles in
Europe and Turkey. These developments were added to the fact that the
Soviet Union had failed in its attempts at develop a truly
intercontinental and technological advanced heavy bomber platform. After
the first reports of an interest in the part of the U.S. to commence
research into the possibility of an atomic plane, the U.S.S.R., partially
motivated by pride and the reality that one superpower was getting
technological superior to them, started a crash programme to look into the
possibility of producing an atomic plane. The nature of the Soviet
political system did not allow for much political squandering.
After the Kremlin made its decision to
start or back a development programme, especially one of this scale, full
resources were allocated for the project without political interference.
That is how the Soviet effort began. As with the American programme,
extensive research was performed and valuable data collected. Also, as it
was the case of the American programme, technology pointed to the
possibility of producing a workable nuclear powered bomber in relative
short time. Then why the Soviets, so close to realizing the programme’s
main objective, decided also to abandon it? Managerial practices were not
to play a role on the programme’s demise. The Kremlin gave orders to start
or terminate any programme, but in those days, they did not micromanage.
So, what was the reason? Politics. Geo, and military politics. In the mid
1950s, the U.S.S.R. made a political decision in regards to their
strategic offensive nuclear force.
They calculated that with advances made in
tracking radar systems and the development of accurate surface-to-air
missiles batteries, a nuclear powered bomber would be hard pressed to
penetrate the U.S. airspace; missiles on the other hand, possessed a
greater survival capability over the enemy’s airspace. The other aspect of
the political decision was maintenance. The Soviets calculated that with
the financial resources needed to maintain an airworthy atomic bomber
force, it could field a vast array of Inter Continental Ballistic Missile
systems. Soviet leaders, watching the development of their space
programme, a programme that was centred on the launching of massive
rockets, felt in love with the ICBM. Missiles are relatively inexpensive
to produce and maintain compared to atomic planes. And enough deployable
missiles would allow the Soviet Union to implement their long standing
military doctrine of brute force. They calculated that the possession of
an overwhelming number of missiles and the ability of these missiles to
shower the United States, they would be able to deter the U.S. from taking
any offensive action against the Soviet Union or its interests around the
world.
Another key development was the introduction of nuclear propulsion into
the Soviet Union’s submarine force. This, coupled with the introduction of
the Sea Launched Ballistic Missile, gave the Soviet another potent brute
force type of platform from which to deter the U.S. The Soviets decided to
invest vast amounts of resources in the development of a nuclear submarine
force. A feat they were able to achieve with impressive results. When the
Cold War ended, the Soviet Union possessed the largest nuclear missile
carrying force in the world. Those factors combined to make the nuclear
powered bomber programme obsolete accordingly to the new Soviet doctrine
that relied on the ability of the missile to get through a dense air
defence network.
In both cases, politics, not technology, was the primary factor in
abandoning their respective nuclear powered aircraft programme. One can
only imagine what would have happened if these atomic planes were built to
an operational status. Although today there is still interest in the
concept, major advances in unmanned air platforms had rendered the concept
almost obsolete. But almost did not mean, completely. One example being
Custer’s Channel Wing Concept of the early 1950s. As of today, the concept
is being revised for possible application to today’s airframes. Can this
sort of renew interest happen with the atomic air platform?
REFERENCES
Concept Aircraft:
Prototypes, X-Planes, and Experimental Aircraft; Edit Jim Winchester,
Thunder Bay Press – 2005
2 Peacetime Use of Atomic Energy; Martin Mann, The Viking Press – 1961
3 The X Plane; Jay Miller, Aerofax – 1988
4 Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program; Metal Progress – 1959
5 The World Encyclopedia of Bombers; Francis Crosby, Anness Publishing -
2004
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