The Italian Front: the air battle
By Raul Colon
November 8th, 2008
When Italy entered the Great War on May 1915,
she found herself on the ropes almost immediately. The country’s much
vaunted army, although poorly trained and even worse equipped, (at the
time of war Italy could muster thirty five frontline divisions) were
supposed to overwhelm their main opponent, Austria-Hungary which only had
twenty five deployed divisions along their common border.
If a battle was to take place, the Italian
Alps would most likely be the battle ground, so went the Italian military
thinking at the time. The Italian Alpine frontier was manned by four army
groups deployed in the Cadore, Carnia, Isonzo and Trentino sectors. Of all
the sectors, it was on the Isonzo combat area where the Italians deployed
the bulk of its armed forces, fourteen divisions strong plus seven more in
tactical reserve. Although the Italians possessed a clear man-power
superiority over the Austrians, they lagged behind their opponents in the
number of field artilleries deployed. A critical aspect in those days.
Meanwhile, in the air, Italy’s Aeronautica del Regio Eserciti (Royal Army
Air Servive) RAAS; was better prepared than its army counterpart to take
on their new task. Equipped with fourteen fully manned and equipped
squadriglie fitted with Nieuports, Bleriots and Murice Farmans; they could
more than hold their own against a perceived undermanned and under
equipped Austrian-Hungary air force.
When the Italians finally went to war, it was
their reconnaissance squadrons that paved the way for their initial
success in the field. As the fight began to stabilize, most of it on the
eastern flank of the Isonzo River, the RAAS not only provided the army
with much needed information on enemy troop and equipment movements, but
it also commenced to assert itself in the air. At period of the battle,
the Italians met little, if any at all, organized resistance from the
Austrians. They controlled the air from day one. After achieving air
dominance, Italian planes began to bomb and harass their enemy on the
ground at regular bases. It was not a coincidence that it was in this
sector of the front that the Italians made their biggest gains during the
first months of fighting. Unfortunately for the them, the series of major
defeats suffered by the embattled Russian army at Galicia, left the door
open for the Austrians to redistribute their forces towards the Isonzo
thus commencing what is viewed as the second battle for that important
river bank.
This time around, the Austrian air force was
augmented by newly aquired German Rumplers and Aviatik C-1s planes, which
provided their field artillery batteries with excellent spotting and
targeting information. Meanwhile, the Italian air force had been
reorganized to, not only provide valuable reconnaissance data, but to
interdict more directly on the ground with concentrated bombing and
strafing missions. For this type of mission, the Italians depended heavily
on their inventory of Macchis, Caudrons and Farmans. By the spring of
1916, the Italians had reduced the strength of their scout or fighting
squadrons and concentrated their efforts on developing dedicated bombing
units. In the accordance with the important of the Isonzo front, only two
squadriglie of Nieuports 11s were deployed to defend the Santa Caterina
and Aquileia sectors, while the rest were assigned to the Isonzo theatre
of operations. It was here, the beginning of the second Isonzo Battle,
that the Italians first encountered real Austrian opposition in the air.
The Austrians, emboldened by the arrival of a
small number of Fokker E-I monoplanes and a growing number of Lohner and
Lloyds reconnaissance platforms, began to challenge Italian air dominance.
Those planes were supplemented by an infusion of Fokker B-II, D-I and
D-II. The D-I, known simply as the “Star-Strutter” by its pilots, would
become the symbol of the whole Austrian air effort over the Isonzo. Their
main squadron, Fliegerkompanie Number 12, lead by the charismatic Austrian
ace Godwin Brumowski; was assigned the task of preparing the Austrians to
engage the Italians on equal terms for the first time. A task he took with
pride. In just a few months, Brumowski had developed the tactics that
would well serve the Austrians and some Germans pilots, for the rest of
the war in the Italian theatre. His Italian strategic counterpart,
Francesco Baracca, also had developed a
series of formations and tactics that enabled him to lead all Italian
pilots with thirty four confirmed air victories. His efforts paved the way
for Italy’s bombing campaign along the river bank. He died while flying a
mission on June 18th 1918. For his brilliant exploits the RAAS
employed his combat emblem after his death. In fact, the Cavallino
Rampante, Baracca’s pride symbol, is still in use by the Italian air
force today. A testament to Baracca’s contribution, not only to the war
effort, but to Italy’s overall air force structure.
During the winter of 1916-17, the morale of
the Italian ground troops plunged to an all time low. That particular
winter brought with it one of the most unforgiving and coldest seasons
ever experienced in Italy. Hundreds of troops died of frost bite,
pneumonia and other weather-related illnesses. Adding to this misery was
the sad state of the Italian army. Troops were exhausted, supplies were
running short and much needed equipment was constantly breaking up. In
short, the Italians were on the brink of collapsing. The Austrians were
not faring that well either. Their major operation at Bainsizza took a
heavy toll on their now overextended army. The end result of the battle
for the strategic Plateau not only decimated the ranks of the Austrian
army but prompted the introduction of German combat troops into the
Italian sector.
As a direct result, a massive German buildup
all along the Isonzo front resulted in the defeat of the Italian army at
Caporetto on October 1917. The defeat at Caporetto brought the entire
Italian held front to the brink of collapsing. The situation was so
critical that the situation forced the Allies to send precious resources,
both human and materials, to bolster the front. Eleven British and French
first line divisions were rushed to Italy. Their air assets combined was
four British Royal Air Force squadrons with three French escadrilles. They
arrived just in time. Their combined might, plus the extraordinary bravery
of the Italian troops, helped the Allies to fend off the Germans and
Austrians at Piave.
Meanwhile in the air the fighting turned from
tough to brutal. By this time the Italians had again reorganized its
forces around the scout squadriglie. Eight Hanriot HD-1, four SPAD S.VII
and three Nieuports, not fully manned squadrons, were forced into the
battle. The Italians also deployed fourteen squadriglie fitted with
Caproni bombers. In January 1918, what was probably Italy’s best light
bomber platform of the war, the much anticipated Ansaldo bomber; began to
arrive to the front in large numbers. Italian pilots began to destroy
their Austrians counterparts above the Isonzo during the later stages of
1917. On the other side of the front, Brumowski had changed his
Fliegerkompanie’s aircraft from the D-I to the more robust and better
armed Albatross D-III. He and fellow Austrian ace, Julius Arigi, who would
rack up thirty two kills before the war ended; were also engaging the
numerical superior Italians with a somewhat poorer success ratio. All of
them scored the majority of their victories during the Caporetto
offensive.
After Caporetto, the Italians, now emboldened
by an ever increasing number of Allied troops and aircraft; began a series
of major offensive attacks that finally broke the back of the Austrian
army at Isonzo. It took eleven major battles to decide the outcome of
Isonzo, but in the end, the Italians and their Allies proved their worth.
After August 1917, no Austrian major thrust was ever orchestrated against
Italy’s Isonzo flank, freeing up Italian troops to be re-deployed to other
war fronts. The end of Caporetto also marked the end of most of the air
battles over Isonzo. Several minor actions did take place, but they paled
in comparison to other previous encounters. The battle toll for the
Italians was enormous. Nearly 40,000 were killed, 108,000 wounded and
18,000 more taken prisoner. The Austrians lost 10,000 killed, 45,000
wounded and 30,000 were taken prisoner. A high toll for both sides, but a
more disastrous figure for the already stretched thin Austrians.
Battles of World War I, Martin Marix Evans,
The Crowood Press 2004
The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare,
Editor Chris Bishop, Amber Books 2001
World War I, Ian Westwell, Hermes House 2005 |