Finnish Air Force
By Lt Gen (FAF ret) Heikki Nikunen
The Finnish Air Force was
founded on 6th March 1918. There was one exceptional feature
in the founding of the FAF, that it was organized right from
the start as an independent branch of the armed forces. This
foresight created a good basis for its development and made
it one of the oldest air forces in the world.
The first aircraft was donated by a Swedish count, Erik von
Rosen. On the wings of the airplane was painted his personal
lucky insignia, the blue swastikas. This was the origin of
the first official Finnish Air Force markings. The
swastikas, still seen in many FAF traditional markings, as
insignias have nothing to do with the Nazi swastikas of the
1930s.
The Winter War was the first real baptism of fire for the
Finnish Air Force. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany formed
a pact in 1939 which resulted in the German attack on Poland
in September of that year. Subsequent to that assault was
the Soviet Union's attack on Finland on November of the same
year.
The Defence Forces of Finland was ill-prepared for the war
from a material standpoint. In the Air Force for example the
number of fighters was alarmingly small. However, their
training and therefore their combat readiness was fairly
high. Actually, The Finnish Air Force was the inventor of
the modern fighter tactics.
Before and in the beginning of the second World War the
ideas of general Douhet were noticed in many air forces and
accordingly the fighter forces were rather universally
underestimated. Fighter tactics also was hampered by peace
time formalities.
In Great Britain the two types of fighter formation were
either built up from a tight vic of three aircraft or four
in line-astern. The vic was a legacy of peace time flying in
which the two wingmen had all their work cut out to stay
near their leader and little time to search the sky. The
high casualty rate of the tail-end Charlies was a grim
measure of the vulnerability of the line-astern formations.
During the Battle of Britain the RAF renewed both its
formation tactics and training.
In Germany the Luftwaffe was founded again in 1933 and the
Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, general Wever,
emphasized strategic bombers as the main aircraft of the new
organization. After Wever had died in the flight accident in
1936 the new technical chief, Ernst Udet, brought from a
trip to USA the idea of dive bombers as the most suitable
method for the blitzkrieg philosophy. The German bi-plane
fighters, Arado Ar 65/68 and Heinkel He 51, used in the
Spanish Civil War, proved to be inferior compared to the
adversaries I-15 and I-16 from Soviet Union. However, in
1938 both the fighters and the fighter tactics in Luftwaffe
were renewed when Legion Condor got the new Bf 109 B-2
fighters in use.
In the Soviet Union the bombers had the priority in the
operational planning of the air forces during the 1930s.
Also the Soviet Union participated the Spanish Civil War but
its Air Force elements were used as the subordinated support
units to the Army and thus for example the fighter tactical
lessons were unlearned. The Soviets kept on using the tight
three fighters formation as the basic tactical element in
air combat and the wingmen were to fire anytime the leader
did so. The weapons were lined straight ahead.
Some of the first American fighter combat experiences came
via Flying Tigers in China. They started by using eight
fighters tight formation but cancelled it soon and changed
both tactics and training. Also Japanese first used rather
big formations, for example fifteen Mitsubishi 96 Claude
fighters in tight Vic-formation in their Chinese campaign.
In Finland the Air Force started during the years 1934 and
1935 to use the loose and broad section as the basic
formation in fighter aviation. The bigger formations were
built so that two sections flying side by side made a finger
four division. In a flight formation two divisions flew
almost side by side while the top division was much higher
than the lower strike division. In divisions, the sections
still operated independently. These formations, at that time
differing from all international principles, were developed
during fighter courses in both theoretical analyses and
practical exercises.
The Finnish fighter pilots concluded that they would never
have such big numbers of fighters that they could build up
those great squadron formations which were used abroad to
concentrate fighter power to certain areas. They also
concluded that big and tight fighter formations were
tactically inefficient.
The most important element in the fighter combat was
surprise, and that was the goal which always had to be tried
to reach for. A big and tight formation could very seldom
achieve the surprise because it was easily seen from far
away and the pilots couldn't keep good lookout while working
to maintain their positions in the formation. On the other
hand a section with the two fighters about 100 - 150 yards
away from each other, or the division with 300 - 400 yards
between the two sections, were found very effective in the
search exercises. Every pilot was free to keep a good
lookout to every direction and also all the time to check
the six of the other pilots. In addition to that this kind
of small and loose formation was seen much later because all
of its aircraft were not always at the same time in the view
of the opponent. The search phase was heavily emphasized in
the training and the ability in that was an important factor
in the evaluation of the fighter pilots.
When the aerial engagement began every pilot was free to
manoeuvre in the most effective way, so, both the attacks
and the evasive manoeuvres could be done without any delays.
The flying in the small formations meant continuous fighting
against bigger numbers but this could be compensated by
always attacking regardless of numbers. The fighter combat
generally spread quite quickly into section fights and duels
where there was no immediate benefit of the bigger numbers.
In these separate combats the better pilots always won.
However, this philosophy demanded that every pilot was a
skilful air combatant. This skill was trained for both in
the fighter courses and in the squadrons.
One of the corner stones in the skill of the fighter pilot
was the complete control of his aircraft. This was trained
by aerobatics and combat manoeuvres, and also by intentional
mis-manoeuvring. In the classic one versus one and two
versus two exercises and in the practice attacks on bomber
targets the combat manoeuvres were trained as instinctive
actions. In practical exercises the simple manoeuvres were
found to be the best ones.
It was also found in training that one of the most important
skills of fighter pilot was the shooting accuracy; the
ability to judge the right deflection during manoeuvring, to
estimate the right shooting distance and to concentrate the
fire on the point target, for example on some vulnerable
part of the target airplane. The shooting training became an
essential, and in times dominating, part of the fighter
training.
When the Winter War started the Finnish fighter tactics
differed from almost all other countries` tactical
principles. Only the Germans had started to use similar
methods during the Spanish Civil War. There was no certainty
of how this tactics would do in the merciless test of war.
The numbers of the attacking Soviet Union seemed to be
crushingly overwhelming. However, there was no hesitation
about the defence task in the flying units. At least in that
sense the training had succeeded; it had created a fighter
pilot cadre with high motivation and self-confidence.
Finnish Air Force Fokker D XXI
The war experiences proved both
the tactics and the training to be right and as a result,
the main fighters Fokker D.XXIs were able to achieve an
exchange ratio (kills in air combat versus losses in air
combat) of 16:1 against Soviet combat aircraft. This was
spectacular considering that the Fokkers had fixed
undercarriages, making them slow for the bomber interceptor
missions and clumsy against fighters in aerial combat.
The Soviet order of battle in the Finnish campaign enjoyed a
tenfold superiority against the Finnish Defence Forces. As a
consequence Finland was forced to yield certain areas in
Karelia. However, they were able to stop the Soviet
offensive inflicting heavy losses on their enemy. The
ineffectiveness of the Soviet offensive became an
embarrassment to the Soviet superpower and they considered
suing for a temporary peace agreement. On the other hand,
Germany being hostile, official Sweden strictly neutral and
the support plans of France and Great Britain proving to be
inadequate, Finland had not resources enough to continue the
fight alone. The peace treaty was thus signed on the evening
of 12th March 1940 and came into effect the following day.
This included a revision of the national border west of Lake
Ladoga.
When the war started the lack of fighters was quickly
realized within the nation at large, and prompt measures
were initiated to increase the fighter force. Thus 92
fighters were purchased or received as donations during the
Winter War, including Fiat G.50, Gloster Gladiator II and
Morane Saulnier M.S. 406 types. The best fighter acquired
during the war, a Brewster B 239, came too late to
participate in combat missions, and the same applied to the
10 Hawker Hurricane I fighters. So, all in all, the Finnish
fighter force was in much better shape in the end of the war
than what it had been in the beginning of the war.
Finland's strategic position stayed difficult after the
Winter War. The Soviet Union continued its diplomatic
pressure and Foreign Minister Molotov, on a trip to Germany
in November 1940, demanded that the "Finland problem" must
be resolved for good. The supporters, France and Great
Britain, were themselves embroiled in the war and in an
ironic twist of fate, the Finns found that the only nearby
country with whom they could trade to improve their defence
status was the Soviet Union's former ally, Germany, which
was at that time prepared its eastern offensive.
From a political point of view Finland did not want to be
involved in an alliance with Nazi Germany, but from a
military standpoint cooperation seemed to be the only
possible solution. But despite numerous requests by Germany
to advance their forces beyond the demarcation line drawn
through Eastern Karelia, for an attack on Leningrad, the
Finns refused to do this.
When Germany began its eastern offensive against the Soviet
Union in June 1941, Finland had already given that country
permission to stage units through Lapland, and after Soviet
bombers had attacked various targets in Finland on 25th June
1941, the Finns officially entered into military cooperation
with Germany, marking the beginning of the Continuation War.
A FAF Brewster B 239 Buffalo formation
At the beginning of the
Continuation War the Soviet forces enjoyed only a two-to-one
superiority over the Finns, and this permitted the Finns to
advance fairly quickly to establish a defensive line where
trench warfare network were ultimately located. The FAF had
about 120 fighters in its flying units at that time,
including Brewsters (BW), Fiats (FA), Morane Saulniers (MS),
Curtisses (CU) and some Hurricanes (HC), 21 bombers, mainly
Blenheims (BL) and some war booty planes, and 58
reconnaissance and liaison planes of various types, mainly
obsolete. During this initial phase of the campaign the FAF
achieved air superiority, and the Brewsters in particular
excelled themselves, achieving a remarkable exchange ratio
of 32:1. They added to the Winter War formation tactics and
shooting accuracy a vertical energy-speed manoeuvre which
was very effective against their main adversaries of that
time, the I-153 Chaikas and I-16 Ratas, which were more
agile but a little slower.
During the trench war period the most important air
operations were carried out in the Gulf of Finland. These
were partly the outcome of naval operations, and gradually
the process evolved into the Battle of the Gulf of Finland,
which culminated in Soviet air raids on Kotka and Helsinki.
Finnish fighter pilots carried the main defensive burden in
this battle, and were quite successful in this. The FAF
strategy of concentrating on aerial combat instead of
attacks on the well-defended enemy bases proved correct. The
numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground didn't
mean much because the Soviet superpower's own aircraft
production plus lend-lease support from Great Britain and
the United States meant that there was no shortage of
aircraft. The shortage of trained pilots, however, became a
problem for the Soviets, as became apparent in the final
phase of the Battle of the Gulf of Finland. After the major
aerial engagements of May 1944, the People's Commissar for
the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kutznetsov, had to withdraw a whole
regiment from front line duties because of the lack of
pilots.
When the tide of war changed and the German forces began to
retreat westwards, Soviet pressure on Finland increased. In
spring of 1944 the Soviets decided to take Finland before
beginning their advance towards Berlin. They amassed a
tenfold superiority in troops and aircraft on the Karelian
Isthmus and began their strategic offensive on 9th June
1944. Their advance achieved initial success, forcing the
withdrawal of Finnish forces along the Isthmus, but in July
1944 the Finns were able to stabilize the front at the
Vuoksi River and further attempts by the Soviet forces to
advance beyond this line were repelled. The process seen in
the Winter War was repeated.
Despite the Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, the
FAF was able to concentrate its air forces and continue to
achieve good results. The Brewsters, along with the Morane,
Fiat and Curtiss fighters, although continuing their
operations, became obsolete in terms of performance from
1943 on, and new fighters, Messerschmitt 109 G (MT)s, were
received, although once again only in small numbers. When
the Soviet offensive began, the units had about 40
Messerschmitts. Fortunately, the FAF was able to get 74 more
fighters from Germany during the campaign, so that despite
the fierce battles, the number of Messerschmitt fighters
actually increased during the summer of 1944. The number of
bombers in the flying units at the beginning of June 1944
was 66.
FAF Messerschmitt Bf 109
One good example of the ability
to achieve local and temporal air superiority was the fact
that the FAF bombers and a German support unit known as
Kuhlmey were able to continue their effective air raids,
which were vital contributions to the war effort, as the
bombings could be concentrated on Soviet massed troops just
before their preplanned attack times. Warnings of impending
troop movements were usually captured by radio intelligence.
It is also significant that no bombers in the formations
escorted by the Messerschmitts were lost to enemy fighters
during this period. The Messerschmitt fighters achieved an
exchange ratio of 25:1.
Again the Finnish fighter force was stronger in the end of
the war than it had been in the beginning of that. Also,
during the wars the number of Finnish fighter aces had
become a world record in relation to population. And almost
all the Finnish top aces were fighting at the end of the war
just as they had been at the beginning.
Also the bomber and reconnaissance units were able to carry
on their missions throughout.
When it became obvious that the Soviets had failed in their
plan to take Finland, they began to move their troops from
the Karelian front for the race to Berlin. This failure on
the Karelian Front was the only Soviet strategic defeat
during their advance westward. The Soviets signed a
temporary peace agreement with the Finns on 4th September
1944 with the stipulation that the Finns push the
cooperative German forces out of Lapland.
Furthermore, the Finns ceded certain areas in Karelia and
Petsamo and retired to the 1940 border. Nevertheless, the
results of both the Winter War and the Continuation War were
considered major victories for Finland. From the opening
shots of the Winter War to the end of the Continuation War
the Finnish objective was to save Finland and guarantee her
independence. This was done and also one interesting point
was made. Of all the countries in the European theatre
participating the Second World War there were only two which
never were occupied: Finland and Great Britain.
|